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ABSTRACT 
ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS AND THE DEALERS' BID-ASK SPREAD 
AROUND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS: DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION AND 
SIGNAL QUALITY 
MAY 1993 
NIRANJAN H. CHIPALKATTI, B.COM., UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY 
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Carolyn Callahan 
This study examines the behavior of the bid-ask spread and 
the adverse selection cost component surrounding second 
quarter earnings and subsequent dividend announcements of 
Over-The-Counter firms. It examines the efficiency of such 
announcements in reducing the relative information asymmetry 
in a firm's environment, given that the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread is positively associated with a 
dealer's perception of the relative level of information 
asymmetry. Specifically, the study analyzes the 
relationship between the adverse selection cost component of 
the spread and (i) the quality of earnings, and (ii) the 
pre-disclosure information environment of the firm. 
Initial results indicate a decrease in the dealers' 
perception of the relative information asymmetry in the pre¬ 
announcement period possibly due to the "abstain or 
disclose" rule of the Security Exchange Commission. 
Further, there is evidence of a decrease in the adverse 
vi 
selection costs in the post-announcement period as new 
information gets impounded by the market. 
The study demonstrates that the market maker perceives 
an increase in the level of informed trading in the event 
period of the low quality of earnings firms versus high 
quality of earnings firms. Further, contrary to 
expectations based on Miller and Rock (1985), there is 
evidence to indicate that subsequent dividend signals are 
not efficient in reducing the perceived levels of 
information asymmetry for earnings signals that are noisy. 
The cross-sectional results for the differential 
information portfolios are sensitive to the choice of the 
quality of earnings measure. Adverse selection costs 
demonstrate increases surrounding the dividend signal of 
high differential firms with no significant change 
surrounding the earnings announcement. There is also 
evidence of reduced adverse selection costs associated with 
the earnings signal of low and medium differential firms 
with weak evidence of increases for the dividend signal. 
A positive relationship between adverse selection 
costs and the timing of earnings reports and unexpected 
earnings was al*so indicated. 
These findings suggest that earnings announcements are 
useful in reducing the information asymmetry between 
investors, conditional on the quality of the signal and the 
pre-disclosure information environment of the firm. 
vi 1 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines the impact of earnings 
announcements made by Over The Counter (OTC) firms on the 
information environment of those firms. The study assesses 
the reaction of the capital market to the information 
contained in second quarter earnings reports and subsequent 
dividend announcements by examining the behavior of the bid 
ask spread surrounding such announcements. Very broadly, it 
assesses whether the marginal information content of an 
earnings signal results in a change in the relative 
information asymmetry between investors operating in the 
capital market, i.e., whether public disclosure of earnings 
information provides useful information in a manner 
consistent with the Financial Accounting Standard Board's 
(FASB) objectives of financial reporting. 
In the late 1960s, the emphasis in financial reporting 
was revised from its traditional measurement of economic 
income viewpoint to its current thrust on the provision of 
economic information. This shift was formalized in the 
FASB's Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, 
"Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises", 
(1978, p. 2), which indicated that "financial reporting 
should provide information that is useful to present and 
1 
potential investors ...". This theme is consistent with a 
comment by Hirschleifer (1970,p. 311): 
In a world of uncertainty, information becomes a 
useful commodity - acquisition of information 
to eliminate uncertainty should then be 
considered as an alternative to productive 
investment subject to uncertainty. 
Financial reports are a primary source of information 
to investors for their assessment of the relative risk and 
return on investment opportunities and assist, therefore, 
in the efficient functioning of the capital market. The 
FASB's "Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises",(1978), clearly recognizes the role of 
financial information in shaping investor expectations 
about an enterprise's future cash flows and the resultant 
market prices of its securities. Hence, according to the 
FASB, financial reports should be useful to investors "in 
assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of 
prospective cash receipts from dividends or interest" (FASB 
SFAC No. 1,1978,p. 19), and in assessing the enterprise's 
ability to generate enough cash to meets its operating 
needs and financial obligations. Further, because of 
investors' concerns about a firm's ability to generate 
favorable cash flows in the future, "the primary focus of 
financial reporting is information about an enterprise's 
performance provided by measures of earnings and its 
components" (FASB SFAC No. l,1978,p. 19). This focus on 
earnings is reflected in the FASB's SFAC No. 1, (1978,p. 21) : 
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Investors, creditors, and others often use reported 
earnings and information about the components of 
earnings in various ways and for various purposes in 
assessing their prospects for cash flows from 
investments in or loans to an enterprise. For example, 
they may use earning information to help them (a) 
evaluate management's performance, (b) estimate 
"earnings power" or other amounts they perceive as 
"representative" of the long-term earning ability of an 
enterprise, (c) predict future earnings, or (d) assess 
the risk of investing in or lending to an enterprise. 
They may use the information to confirm, reassure 
themselves about, or reject or change their own or 
others' earlier predictions or assessments. Measures of 
earnings and information about earnings disclosed by 
financial reporting should, to the extent possible, be 
useful for those and similar uses and purposes. 
As indicated before, financial reports are used by 
investors to assess the "earnings power" of a firm, i.e., 
to predict its long term earnings ability and potential to 
generate cash on a recurring basis in the future. Earnings 
measured by the principles of accrual accounting have been 
determined to be a "reliable and relevant indicator of 
future probabilities of cash inflows and outflows" 
(Bernstein,1978,p. 640) as compared to, say, information 
about current cash receipts and payments. However, accrual 
accounting has its shortcomings arising out of the 
flexibility the management has in its choice of accounting 
methods from the pool of generally acceptable accounting 
principles. In fact, the management can resort to income 
smoothing accounting adjustments and the reported earnings 
figure can be managed. Such accounting manipulations to 
the earnings stream will reduce the ability of investors to 
assess the earnings power of the firm. To be useful to 
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investors therefore, accounting earnings information should 
possess certain qualitative characteristics. 
It follows therefore that to be useful to investors 
accounting earnings information should have certain 
qualitative characteristics. The FASB established a 
hierarchy of qualities which accounting information should 
ideally possess (FASB SFAC No. 2, 1980). Within the 
context of the capital markets, financial accounting 
information should be "relevant" to investors. Such 
information can make a difference to investors by 
"improving their capacity to predict future cash flows or 
by providing them feedback on earlier expectations" (FASB 
SFAC No. 2, "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information", 1980,p. 27). 
Further, accounting information should be timely, i.e., 
available to all investors soon after the reported event. 
The larger the time span between any significant event and 
the public release of information, the lower the value of 
such information for any future action assuming that there 
may be a group of informed investors with selective and 
timely access to such valuable information. 
In addition, accounting numbers should reliably measure 
all economic events having an effect on the financial 
position of a firm, i.e., accounting information should be 
representative, and have no bias (neutrality). Also, there 
should be a consensus that the economic events and resources 
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measured by accounting techniques are true and fair 
representations of events (verifiability). Further, 
accounting reports should be consistent across time and 
comparable across firms. 
In summary, the thrust of the FASB Statement on the 
qualitative aspects of accounting information is that 
financial reports, to be useful, should be timely, relevant 
and comparable rather than late, unclear and non-comparable 
(Hakansson,1990). To the extent financial reports possess 
the former qualities, they will preempt costly private 
information search and reduce the selective access to and 
the use of valuable information by a restricted group of 
informed investors. 
This distinction between investors operating in the 
capital market based on their relative access to valuable 
information highlights the existence of information 
asymmetries in the capital markets. Such asymmetries in 
information are the major reason for systematic, ex-ante 
risk adjusted return differentials across investors (Lev, 
1988). Specifically, investors having access to more 
information can earn higher risk adjusted returns at the 
expense of those investors who are less informed. Such 
informed investors typically consist of insiders and well- 
to-do investors with access to superior information 
analysis capabilities "who prefer to buy and sell on the 
basis of an informational advantage vis-a-vis the "ocean" 
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of other investors" (Hakansson,1990,p. 40). Furthermore, 
the existence of information asymmetries among investors in 
the capital market questions its efficiency. Beaver's 
(1981) definition of an efficient market clearly implies a 
symmetric distribution of information among all investors 
in the system. It has been suggested that one of the 
broader roles of public information is the reduction of 
such asymmetries among investors (Beaver,1981; Strong and 
Walker/1987; Lev,1989). 
Hakansson (1990) indicates if the financial reporting 
of a firm is inefficient, i.e. late, unclear, and non¬ 
comparable, it will provide trading opportunities for 
informed investors especially around earnings and other 
financial disclosures made by the firm. On a similar note, 
Lev (1989) operationalizes the quality of firm's earnings 
reports and the efficiency of its financial reporting in 
terms of the predictive ability of its reported earnings 
stream. If earnings reports of a firm historically tend to 
be of lower quality, i.e. have lower predictive ability, 
the information in the hands of informed traders, with 
their superior information analysis capabilities, will be 
more precise than that available to the unsophisticated 
investor. "For example, if reported earnings of a given 
firm were increased by an accounting change which is 
perceived to have no future cash flow or contractual 
implications, then informed investors can be expected to 
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adjust earnings by eliminating the impact of accounting 
changes" (Lev,1989,p. 177). 
In general, the more "noisy" the financial reports, 
i.e., the larger the perceived deficiencies in earnings 
reports, the larger will be the degree of adjustments to be 
made on the current earnings figures for the prediction of 
future earnings. Lev (1989) demonstrates that the 
predictive quality of earnings as measured by the variance 
of the perceived deficiencies in reported earnings is 
inversely related to the correlation between returns and 
unexpected reported earnings. Lev concludes that the 
quality of earnings is positively related to the predictive 
ability of earnings with respect to future earnings, i.e., 
the greater the predictive ability, the better the earnings 
quality. Hence, the predictive ability of earnings provides 
an operational framework to examine various quality of 
earnings related issues at the cross-sectional level. 
Within the Miller and Rock (1985) framework, the more 
noisy an earnings announcement and the less effective it is 
in reducing the perceived information asymmetry in the 
environment, the greater will be the information content of 
the dividend signal. The information content of a 
subsequent dividend signal to the investors is also 
conditioned by the quality of the initial earnings signal. 
Hence earnings and dividends may be viewed as a sequence of 
joint signals within the framework of Miller and Rock 
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(1985), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987), and. Brown, Choi 
and Kim (1989) . The management of a firm may be assumed to 
use an efficient mix of these two signals to minimize the 
associated costs of signaling. It follows that the quality 
of a firm's earnings announcements and the efficiency of its 
financial reporting can be examined by measuring the 
reaction of the capital market around the public 
announcement of earnings and subsequent dividend signal 
sequences. 
Asymmetric information and the differential information 
content of disclosures like earnings or dividend 
announcements can also be viewed in terms of the quality of 
the firm's information environment. The quality of a firm's 
information environment relates to the amount of 
predisclosure information available for a firm through 
differential sources of information. The general 
conclusion of the research on the differential information 
content of earnings signals (Atiase,1985; Freeman,1987) and 
of dividend signals (Brown, Choi, and Kim,1989) is that 
such announcements are more important as information 
signals for small firms than for large firms. Earnings and 
dividend announcements of large firms tend to be preempted 
by other, alternative sources of pre-disclosure information 
resulting in a less pronounced market response around such 
announcements. Hence, the importance of earnings and 
dividends announcements for the reduction of information 
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asymmetries is dependent on the quality of the firm's 
information environment, i.e., the amount of pre-disclosure 
information available for a firm. In fact, Seyhun (1986), 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1988), Lin and Howe (1990), and, 
Hasbrouck (1991) have found evidence that is consistent with 
the hypothesis that information asymmetries are larger for 
small market capitalization firms. Hence, this study will 
examine the relationship between the quality of a firm's 
information environment and the degree of information 
asymmetry, as well as the link between the quality of a 
firm's earnings signals and the pre-disclosure information 
environment of a firm. 
Very broadly, this study will evaluate the efficiency 
of the earnings and dividend.signal issued by firms in the 
OTC market. The study will examine whether quarterly 
earnings and dividend announcements provide useful 
information to investors, i.e., information which is 
timely, relevant and comparable. To the extent such 
quarterly earnings and dividend announcements are late, 
unclear, and non-comparable, they will provide a window for 
informed investors to trade at the expense of the relatively 
uninformed investors. This study will use the market 
microstructure to capture the effect of such informed 
trading around quarterly earnings and dividend 
announcements, and to measure the usefulness and efficiency 
of these announcements. 
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The market microstructure and, specifically, the bid- 
ask spread as a factor affecting the transaction price and 
volume behavior of securities has become a subject of 
increasing academic research. "There is an accelerating 
awareness of the potential implications of market 
microstructure for making valid inferences about market 
behavior, including the adjustment of prices to information 
as it enters the public domain" (Brown,1989,p. 214). The 
dealers' perception of the relative information asymmetry 
in the firm's information environment determines the size 
of the adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask 
spread. The increased arrival of informed traders, 
according to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), will result in the 
widening of the spread by the market makers due to an 
increase in the adverse selection costs faced by them. 
This study, therefore, will examine the behavior of the 
bid-ask spread and the adverse selection cost component 
surrounding second quarter earnings and dividend 
announcements. The behavior of the spread especially the 
adverse selection cost component around the announcements 
will reflect on their efficiency, i.e., their timeliness, 
relevance, and comparability. To the extent such earnings 
and dividend signals efficiently reduce the information 
asymmetry in the environment, there may be a decrease in the 
adverse selection cost component of the spread. On the 
other hand, to the extent such earnings and dividend 
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signals are not efficient, i.e. are late, unclear, and non¬ 
comparable, there may be an increased arrival of informed 
traders accompanied by a widening of the bid-ask spread, and 
an increase in the adverse selection cost component 
proportional to the level of information asymmetry 
perceived by the market maker. 
Hence, the more noisy the earnings signal, the less 
useful it is to the uninformed investors. This will 
further aggravate the information asymmetries in the 
environment and increase the trading opportunities to 
informed traders especially surrounding earnings and 
dividend announcements. According to Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), the arrival of informed traders with more precise 
information will result in the widening of the spread by the 
market makers as they perceive an increase in the adverse 
selection costs. Therefore, the study will look at the 
contemporaneous association between the quality of earnings 
reports and the behavior of the bid-ask spreads and the 
adverse selection cost component around second quarter 
earnings and dividend announcements. This will help to 
focus on the relevance of earnings quality in reducing 
information asymmetries and enhancing market efficiencies. 
The dealer's perception of the relative information 
asymmetry surrounding earnings and dividend announcements 
may also be affected by the quality of the firm's 
information environment. As indicated before , there is 
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evidence that suggests that information asymmetries increase 
as the market capitalization of the firm decreases. The 
lack of alternate sources of pre-disclosure information may 
exacerbate the existing information asymmetries in a firm's 
information environment. This issue, relating information 
asymmetry and the differential information content of 
earnings and subsequent dividend signals, is also examined 
within the context of the market microstructure. 
Specifically, this study examines the behavior of bid-ask 
spreads and the adverse selection cost component surrounding 
second quarter earnings and subsequent dividend 
announcements across differential information environments. 
In general, the study intends to demonstrate the link 
between the quality of the earnings signal and the pre- 
disclosure information environment of a firm, and, the 
market microstructure. The objectives of this study are to 
examine the behavior of the bid-ask spread and the adverse 
selection cost component surrounding second quarter earnings 
and subsequent dividend announcements. The relationship 
between earnings and dividend announcements and a firm's 
information environment have been highlighted by Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) who demonstrate that revealing public 
information ( and reducing information asymmetries) can 
reduce a firm's cost of capital and increase the liquidity 
of its securities. Specifically, this study will examine 
the role of earnings quality and its relevance for reducing 
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information asymmetries in the environment. Other 
refinements will include adjustments for the quality of the 
firm's information environment, i.e., the amount of 
predisclosure information available for a firm. The study 
looks at the relevance of the differential information 
environment of a firm in reducing the perceived information 
asymmetries among investors. 
13 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
There is considerable evidence that suggests that 
earnings announcements contain information that is useful to 
investors. Ball and Brown (1969) found a positive 
relationship between the sign of the unexpected annual 
earnings component and excess returns. Beaver, Clarke and 
Wright (1979) extended the results of Ball and Brown and 
demonstrated a significant relationship between the 
magnitude of annual earnings changes and the size of the 
abnormal returns. Beaver (1968) found significant increases 
in trading volume and security return variability in the 
earnings announcement week. These results suggest that 
earnings reports have information content and that investors 
shift their portfolios- around such announcements. In their 
study on quarterly earnings announcements, Hagerman, 
Zmijewski and Shah (1984) demonstrated a significant 
association between earnings forecast errors and abnormal 
returns. Similarly, Patell and Wolfson (1984) find 
significant changes in the intra-day security price 
variability surrounding the trading hour of the earnings 
announcement consistent with the information content 
hypothesis. Consistent with the discounted cash flow 
hypothesis, Cornell and Landsman (1989) find a significant 
association between revisions in quarter ahead and year 
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ahead forecasts and, excess returns at the time of quarterly 
earnings announcements. Their results suggest that earnings 
announcements contain information not only about current 
performance but are,also, used by financial analysts to 
revise future estimates of a firm's earnings. Easton (1985) 
results suggest that accounting earnings are good predictors 
of future dividend realizations and that current earnings 
have significant explanatory power over current dividends on 
this issue. Further, Easton (1985,p. 75) suggests that the 
information in accounting earnings is "apparently useful in 
interpreting the information in current dividends". 
However, in recent paper Bernard and Thomas (1989) find 
evidence which suggests that the changes in market price 
surrounding quarterly earnings announcements may not fully 
reflect the information contained in current earnings 
regards the future earnings potential. 
Current research has also focussed on the empirical 
determinants of the earnings response coefficient, i.e., the 
beta coefficient in the linear regression between unexpected 
returns and unexpected earnings. Collins and Kothari (1989) 
demonstrate that the earnings response coefficient increases 
as market capitalization of a firm decreases. They also 
find an association between earnings growth and the response 
coefficient. Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Easton and 
Zmijewski (1989) find that the earnings response coefficient 
is positively associated with earnings persistence. Imhoff 
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and Lobo (1992) demonstrate that the earnings response 
coefficient is negatively associated with ex ante 
uncertainty in a firm's information environment. Lipe 
(1990) shows that the response coefficient is an increasing 
function of the ability of past earnings (versus alternate 
sources of information) to predict future earnings. The 
ability of the market to assess the permanent element of the 
earnings stream and, also, the predictive ability of 
earnings depends on the quality of a firms earnings reports. 
Similarly, the market's perception of the ex ante 
uncertainty prior to firm's earnings announcement may also 
be a function of the precision and the "informedness" 
(Holthausen and Verrecchia,1990) of its earnings signals, 
i.e., their quality. 
This study examines the impact of the second quarter 
earnings and subsequent dividend signals in the OTC market 
on the bid-ask spread and the adverse selection cost 
component of the spread. It postulates a relationship 
between the reaction of the capital market at the micro¬ 
structure level and (i) the quality of the earnings signal, 
(ii) the magnitude of the pre-disclosure information 
available for a firm, and, (iii) the signal sequencing. 
Studies that relate to the quality of a firm's differential 
information environment reflect on the extent to which 
earnings and dividend signals are preempted by other sources 
of pre-disclosure information. Similarly, signal sequencing 
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studies examine the extent to which dividend and earnings 
signals preempt each other. On the other hand, the 
association between the precision of the earnings report, 
specifically its ability to predict the future earnings of 
the firm, and the bid-ask spread focuses on the relevance of 
earnings quality in reducing information asymmetries between 
informed and uninformed investors. In general, the lower 
the quality of earnings reports, the larger should be the 
ex-ante information asymmetries in the environment. Studies 
that relate to the quality of earnings are looked at next. 
2.1 Quality of Earnings Disclosures 
Lev (1989,p. 177) points out "that adjustments to 
reported data are an essential element of financial 
statement analysis". According to Lev the more noisy the 
reported earnings figures and the larger the variance of 
such adjustments made by the investors to the reported 
earnings figures, the lower will be the predictive ability 
of reported earnings. This is because the larger such 
deficiencies in the earnings figures, the lower will be the 
coefficient of determination of the abnormal returns- 
unexpected earnings regression. 
To the extent that reported earnings figures contain 
some "noise" (e.g. accounting policy changes, extra¬ 
ordinary items, discontinued operations, etc.), 
sophisticated investors will make adjustments to the 
reported earnings figures and use such adjusted figures to 
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make predictions about future earnings. Hence, for all 
investors, the quality of such reported earnings figures 
improves if they contain less "noise", i.e., they have 
better predictive content. The predictive ability of 
earnings is a way to operationalize the quality of earnings 
issue. The better the quality of earnings, the smaller will 
be the extent of the losses unsophisticated investors will 
suffer in the hands of more informed investors with 
superior information analysis ability. To the extent that 
better quality earnings disclosures reduce ex-ante 
information asymmetries, it reduces the adverse selection 
problem of the market maker. 
Hakansson (1989) points out that there is a conflict 
between these two groups of investors: 
(1) the uninformed investors: the less well-to-do investors 
who subscribe to investment services and the non-subscribing 
investors who have a small set of resources; and, 
(2) the informed investors: the management (insiders), the 
talented information-searchers, and the well-to-do among the 
subscribers to investment services. This latter group, 
according to Hakansson (1989,p. 40), prefers "to buy and 
sell on the basis of an informational advantage vis-a-vis 
the "ocean of other investors". 
The former group has the incentive to require timely, 
relevant, and comparable financial disclosures whereas the 
latter group has the incentive to retain a late, unclear, 
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non-comparable type of financial disclosure. Hakansson 
observes that the power to influence business practices and 
laws is typically vested in the hands of the second group 
even though it represents a minority, and hypothesizes that 
financial reporting is inefficient in the U.S.A primarily 
because of this lobby. Based on this primary hypothesis, 
Hakansson conjectures that accounting policy proposals that 
restrict insider trading and require the immediate 
disclosure of significant events on a "best estimate" basis 
will be resisted by this lobby, as well as, attempts to 
restrict managements' range of choice with respect to 
accounting methods and its discretion in applying that 
method. The author provides anecdotal evidence to support 
his conjectures. Hakansson suggests that investor-manager 
contracts should be re-worded so as to provide a 
disincentive to inefficiencies in financial reporting and 
concludes that it is necessary to narrow the window between 
the occurrence of a significant event affecting a company 
and its publication. 
Bernstein (1978) highlights the fact that accrual 
accounting is the most relevant and reliable framework for 
judging the future cash flows of a firm. Accrued earnings 
help in the assessment of a firm's "earning power", a 
concept which focusses on the stable and persistent element 
of the earnings stream of a firm over a future time span. 
The evaluation of the persistent element of the earnings 
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stream and its effect on future cash flows is what relates 
the quality of earnings issue to the earnings power concept 
(Bernard and Stober,1989). In fact, Bernard and Stober 
(1989,p. 627-28) operationalize the quality of earnings 
variable in terms of the market's reaction to unexpected 
cash flows. They hypothesize that unexpected accruals will 
have smaller impact on prices than unexpected cash flows of 
the same magnitude "since accruals are either subject to 
manipulation, or represent only indirect links to future 
cash flows". 
Bernstein (1978,p. 617) lists the following factors 
which affect the quality of earnings disclosures: 
(i) the accounting and computational discretion that 
management has over choosing alternative accounting 
principles; 
(ii) the degree to which the management has made "adequate 
provision for the maintenance of assets, and, the 
maintenance and enhancement of present and future 
earnings". Bernstein recommends financial analysts look at 
discretionary expenses like repairs and maintenance, 
advertising, research and development outlays as a 
percentage of sales. Also, he suggests an analysis of the 
provisions for bad debts, slow moving inventories, etc.. All 
these numbers can be utilized by managers to "manage" 
reported earnings. 
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(iii) the stability and the predictability of earnings, 
which is directly related to the quality of the reported 
earnings figures. 
Thorton O'Glove (1987), in his book on "The Quality of 
Earnings", lists items that make earnings figures in 
accounting reports noisy and contribute to reducing their 
quality and hence require thorough investigation: 
(1) Non-operating and/or non-recurring income items: 
Strictly, these items relate to income which is not earned 
from the normal and usual operations of the firm. While the 
definition is clear, O'Glove points out that there are 
times when the classification can be ambiguous and can 
result in a divergence of opinion among analysts regards the 
normal operating earnings of the firm. To compound the 
problem, most of the times the details of the non-operating 
and/or the non-recurring item are available in footnotes, 
supplementary information, letters to shareholders, etc.. 
(2) Declining and increasing expenses: O'Glove mentions that 
one has to look at current earnings figure conditioned by 
the type of expenses that are increasing or decreasing. For 
example, increasing advertising expenses may imply higher 
future cash flows. While advertising expenses might hurt 
the current earnings figures, they might help bring in 
future revenues. Similarly, declining raw material costs 
benefit the bottom line after a lag, while declining 
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allowances for uncollectibles may have an adverse effect on 
future cash flows. 
(3) Changes in accounting policy: O'Glove highlights the 
need to compare a firm's shareholder reports with its tax 
reports to get a true picture of a firm's growth based 
earnings in a year. According to O'Glove (1987,104), "under 
the umbrella of generally accepted accounting principles, a 
company can utilize accounting methods that accelerate 
revenues for book reporting purposes. When a corporation 
does this, it may start out with less aggressive accounting 
policies and then change to more aggressive ones to maintain 
the facade of growth". 
(4) Cashflow related issues: O'Glove points out that a good 
way to estimate future cash flows is to examine a firm's 
accounts receivables and inventory trends, and also to 
investigate its interest payments and its debt structure of 
the firm. If there is a slowdown in a firm's sales and its 
cash flows, this might affect a firm's interest paying 
ability. O'Glove points out that stagnating firms with free 
cash flow tend to give higher dividends than growth firms. 
Such firms often resort to share repurchases to hike their 
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earnings per share. 
(5) Big baths: O'Glove points out (based on an article by R. 
J. Swieringa) that restructuring costs are charged against 
income in the year in which the decision to restructure is 
taken. As a result the actual restructuring costs are 
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matched with the decision and not charged in the period when 
restructuring occurs and the benefit is realized by the 
firm. This can result in an apparently healthy post- 
restructuring earnings trend which may not be realized in 
terms of future cash flows. 
Similarly, Hector (1989) suggests that managers obscure 
the true earnings picture, (a) by taking a big bath, which 
enables them to take major write-offs in one period and 
benefit from the associated restructuring in the years to 
come. The management, then, takes credit for a turnaround 
in these future years; (b) by smoothing quarterly profits, 
(c) deferring costs like software development costs to 
future periods, (d) by recognizing revenues much before the 
firm is likely to receive the money for them, like in long 
term contracts, which can result in a cash crunch not 
reflected in the earnings figures, (e) by hiding inventory, 
for e.g. by pushing sales to its dealers, which would be 
reflected by a disproportionate rise in accounts 
receivables, (f) by dabbling with depreciation, and (g) by 
touting one time gains as permanent structural changes. 
Tinic (1990) in his perspective paper on the stock 
markets fixation on accounting numbers comments on Hand's 
(1990) extended functional fixation hypothesis. According 
to Tinic (1990,p. 787), the extended functional fixation 
hypothesis is a modified form of the functional fixation 
hypothesis and implies that "prices of some stocks at some 
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points in time may be determined by unsophisticated marginal 
investors who are fixated on bottom line accounting 
earnings". In particular, Tinic (1991,p. 787) points that 
"stocks of small capitalization firms, which tend to be more 
heavily owned by individual investors, as particularly 
likely to be priced by fixated investors who do not 
understand the effects of accounting procedures on reported 
earnings". 
Hand (1990), in his test of the extended functional 
fixation hypothesis, proposes that when responding to 
accounting data, the stock price reaction may be either set 
by the sophisticated investors or the unsophisticated 
investors. The probability that the stock price is set by 
unsophisticated investors is a function of the proportion of 
such investors of the total investors. In fact, Hand 
provides some empirical evidence that is inconsistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis that there should not be any 
stock price reaction to accounting reports with no real 
gains. He finds support for the extended functional 
fixation hypothesis that unsophisticated investors set the 
price. Hand's study concludes that firms used the reported 
accounting earnings gain from the debt-equity swap to smooth 
unexpected and transitory decreases in their (economic) 
earnings stream. The future cash flow implications of such 
gains should have been impounded in the stock prices at the 
time of the debt-equity swap announcement considering that 
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they are not real gains but merely book profits. However, 
on the contrary, Hand finds evidence that unsophisticated 
investors, who are fixated to the earnings number, 
misinterpret this gain at the time of the earnings 
announcement as a real increase in the future cash potential 
of the firm. This is because the unsophisticated investors, 
who may set the price of a stock, often do not understand 
the real implications of an accounting procedure on 
earnings. 
Elliot and Philbrick (1990) find that financial 
analysts forecast errors and the dispersion of forecasts is 
greater in years of accounting changes than in non-change 
years. Also, their results suggest that financial analysts 
view a change in accounting methods as being consistent 
with income smoothing. Their evidence points to lower 
predictive ability of earnings, given income smoothing i.e. 
lower quality of earnings disclosures. 
Briloff's (1982,p. 12) much publicized Anacomp article 
in Barrons, based on information already in the public 
domain, indirectly comments on the quality of earnings 
issue: 
What intrigues me about Anacomp is less its impressive 
growth than the use the company has made of generally 
accepted accounting principles... in my study of 
Anacomp's financials, I found manifestations of front- 
end loading of revenues, the inclusion of questionable 
items of revenues, the avoidance of proper recognition 
of costs, and the deferral of recognized costs for 
inordinately long periods....Accounting practices 
implemented by Anacomp over the past several years have 
had a salutary impact on reported earnings. 
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On the day Briloff's article was published, Anacomp's 
security price declined by approximately 14% and trading 
volume increased seven-folds. Foster (1987) notes that on 
an average there was a drop of 8.11% in the security price 
of firms subject to Briloff's criticisms, the day the 
articles were published in Barrons. Using a post¬ 
announcement period benchmark of 30 trading days, Foster 
concludes that this drop reflected a permanent revaluation 
of the firm by the market. This study highlights the fact 
that poor quality of earnings signals increases the 
possibility that uninformed (and unsophisticated) investors 
may not be able to perceive the deficiencies in the earnings 
reports thus aggravating any pre-existing information 
asymmetries. 
In summary, the quality of the earnings signal of a 
firm is positively associated with the predictive ability of 
the earnings stream. The larger the noise in earnings 
reports, the lower is the predictive ability of the earnings 
stream and the ability of investors to analyze the permanent 
component in earnings. As indicated before, the results of 
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Lipe (1990) demonstrate that 
the earnings response coefficient (and therefore the 
information content of earnings announcements) is positively 
associated with earnings persistence and its predictive 
ability. Hence, the lower the quality of earnings, the less 
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will be the utility of such announcements to uninformed and 
unsophisticated investors. 
This dissertation also examines the role of alternate 
sources of pre-disclosure information and the preemptive 
role of signal sequences. A review of related studies 
follows. 
2.2 Differential Information 
The uninformed can attempt to learn some of the 
information of the informed by observing price changes. 
Price therefore serves as an additional (though noisy) 
information signal; it transmits information from the 
informed to the uninformed, apart from its traditional 
Walrasian role of clearing markets (Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1976,1980 ; Verrecchia,1982 ). Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) 
point out that trading activity by the informed traders 
results in the partial revelation of their information to 
the uninformed and, hence, there is a potential limit to 
their gains from trade. As it is easier to detect informed 
trading in small, thinly traded firms than in large, heavily 
traded firms, the potential profit for informed traders is 
larger for large firms than for small firms. Further, the 
informativeness of the security prices increases as (i) 
the number of traders who actively participate in the 
market of a security increases, and (ii) the proportion of 
the informed traders increases (Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1976,1980). Atiase (1985) hypothesized and demonstrated 
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that large firms have a larger number of differential 
sources of pre-disclosure information as compared to small 
firms, and, hence, the stock price revisions surrounding 
earnings announcements of small firms are larger than those 
of the large firms. Earnings announcements seem to be more 
important information signals for small firms than for large 
firms. Private information search and production activity 
(through the services of financial intermediaries like 
financial analysts etc.) increased with firm size because 
according to Atiase (1985), marginal trading profits net of 
search costs increased in direct proportion to firm size. " 
For e.g., the knowledge that a large firm's common stock is 
'mispriced' by 1% could be used to earn a greater profit 
than information that would generate a 1% adjustment in the 
market value of a small firm's equity" (Freeman,1987,p. 
196). All this has become encapsulated as the "differential 
information hypothesis" and typically variables like firm 
size and number of analysts following have been used as 
control variables for the pre-disclosure information 
environment of a firm. The hypothesis itself is based on 
the economic intuition that one can get increasing returns 
to scale from information. "The cost of information per 
unit of scale declines as the scale increases, whereas the 
value of information per unit of scale does not change" 
(Lev 1988,6). Similarly, according to Bhushan (1989), 
ceteris paribus, the demand for analyst services for the 
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same reason is likely to be an increasing function of firm 
size because the benefits from information acquisition 
increase with size. 
Atiase (1985,1987) formally tested the differential 
information hypothesis that the pre-disclosure information 
available for a firm varies inversely with the firm's size 
and that the amount of pre-disclosure information available 
for a firm is also a function of the exchange in which the 
firm is listed. Specifically, OTC firms have lower amounts 
of pre-disclosure information available than the NYSE firms 
of the same size. This result confirmed the results of 
Grant (1980), who had arrived at the same conclusion. 
Brown and Barry (1984) empirically demonstrate the 
existence of a size based premium as well as a premium 
associated with the period of listing of a firm which is 
not accounted for by the standard capital asset pricing 
model. Subsequently, Barry and Brown (1985) theoretically 
demonstrated that there was a higher degree of estimation 
risk associated with the security returns of firms with low 
amounts of pre-disclosure information and that this risk 
premium was not captured by the standard Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. They suggested three empirical proxies for 
estimation risk, namely, period of listing, the actual 
number of observations of data available, and the 
divergence of analysts' opinion. 
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In the same line, Arbel, Carvell, and, Strebel (1983) 
had shown that there is a premium attached to the returns 
of firms which are neglected by financial analysts. This 
premium was subsequently shown to be an estimation risk 
factor by Barry and Brown (1985). In a similar tone, Kross 
and Schroeder (1988) demonstrate that the amount of media 
coverage, measured as the column-inches dedicated to that 
firm the Wall Street Journal Index, is inversely 
proportional to size, and that the stock price reactions to 
earnings announcements are greater for firms with lower 
media coverage. 
The study by McNichols and Manegold (1983) looks 
directly at the effect on security price variability of a 
change in the disclosure environment of a firm. The 
implicit assumption in their study is that financial 
disclosure through annual reports and interim reports 
enriches the information environment of a firm and, hence, 
reduces the estimation risk associated with the firm's 
returns. Their study shows that the variability of security 
returns after annual earnings announcements decreases once 
the firm initiates more timely interim reporting. 
Bamber (1986) demonstrated that the trading reaction, 
measured by the unexpected trading volume, to unexpected 
earnings shocks in earnings announcements is larger for 
small firms than for large firms, after controlling for the 
magnitude of unexpected earnings. This seems to suggest 
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that the lower the degree of predisclosure information in 
the environment for a firm, the greater will be the extent 
of the belief revisions regards the future earnings 
potential of the firm around annual earnings announcements. 
Freeman (1987) directly tests the association 
between accounting earnings and security returns for large 
and small firms. Unlike Atiase's (1985) cross-sectional 
study. Freeman's study uses a time-series approach. His 
results demonstrate that the prices of large firms impound 
the information associated with permanent changes in the 
earnings stream three months earlier than the prices of 
small firms. Also, the magnitude of such revisions is 
greater for small firms, which have significant price 
revisions even after the fiscal year-end. 
Patell and Wolfson (1982) document that the variance of 
returns increases substantially on the day before the 
earnings announcement as per the Wall Street Journal and on 
the day of the announcement. Earlier, Beaver (1968) 
demonstrated that returns variability was 67% higher in the 
week of the earnings announcement. Chari, et al (1988) 
document that small firms have a larger returns variability 
around annual earnings announcements than large firms. 
This inverse relationship is consistent with the results of 
Atiase (1985, 1987) . 
In his model, Bhushan (1989) lists firm characteristics 
which determine the number of financial analysts following 
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a firm. According to Bhushan, the number of financial 
analysts following a firm will be an increasing function of 
firm size as the aggregate demand for information analysis 
will also increase with size. This is because the benefits 
from information acquisition are likely to be an increasing 
function of firm size. Dempsey (1989) points out that while 
firm size is an endogenous proxy for predisclosure 
information environment, the number of financial analysts 
following a firm are an exogenous proxy for the same. Like 
Bhushan (1989), Dempsey (1989) argues that only one of the 
many determinants of analysts following is firm size.This 
implies that financial analyst following, as an exogenous 
proxy variable for differential information environment, 
may have some incremental explanatory power over and above 
that associated with firm size. Dempsey's results confirm 
this intuition and also demonstrate that thinly monitored 
large firms have significantly larger price revisions 
surrounding earnings announcements than widely monitored 
small firms. This implies that analysts following and firm 
size are not equivalent proxies for the quality of the 
firm's information environment. 
Collins, Kothari, and, Rayburn (1987) show that price- 
based expectation models perform better for large firms 
than for small firms. Their results suggest that the 
security prices of large firms impound information about 
permanent changes in earnings earlier than the security 
32 
prices of small firms. This is because of the larger number 
of differential sources of such information available for 
large firms. For small firms, however, earnings 
announcements remain the most important source of 
information of such changes in the permanent earnings 
stream. 
Studies which examine the preemptive role of dividends 
and earnings signals are looked at next. 
2.3 Signal Sequencing 
This study will also examine the behavior of the bid- 
ask spread around the announcement dates of signal 
sequences, i.e., a sequence of a first earnings announcement 
followed by a second dividend announcement. 
In view of the relative noisiness of both earnings and 
dividend signals, investors may view these announcements as 
joint signals and may look for some consistency in them. 
Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984) found evidence of an interaction 
effect between earnings and dividend announcements when 
examining the abnormal returns in the announcement month. 
However, their sample was restricted to only earnings and 
dividends announcements made within ten days of each other, 
and they did not investigate the signal sequencing issue. 
Easton (1991) found evidence consistent with this 
interaction effect in the Australian market where earnings 
and dividends are always announced simultaneously. 
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Miller and Rock (1985) point out that in a world of 
asymmetric information the Miller-Modigliani dividend 
invariance theorem does not hold. A firm's dividend 
announcement signals to the market the firm's current 
earnings and, in turn, plays a role in the estimation of its 
future earnings potential. In the Miller and Rock 
framework, the greater the asymmetry of information 
surrounding the earnings announcements, the greater the 
importance of the dividend announcement as an information 
signal. The more noisy the earnings announcement, the 
greater will be the significance of the information content 
of a dividend signal. Further, the greater the persistence 
in the earnings stream, the larger the price reaction around 
dividend announcements. In a recent paper, Howe and Lin 
(1992) find a significant negative relation between the bid- 
ask spread and the dividend yeild. This relationship 
demonstrates that the announcment of dividends conveys 
information to the market and reduces the information 
asymmetry in the environment and, consequently, the spread. 
The theoretical work of Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) 
provides a framework to analyze two signals like an earnings 
announcement and a dividend announcement as a dual signal or 
a signal sequence in this fashion. Within their framework, 
signals like dividends and earnings announcements (Ambarish, 
John and Williams look at dividends and investment 
announcements) can be jointly used by insiders to signal the 
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firm's future cash flows. An efficient mix of these signals 
can be used to minimize the costs of signalling, namely, 
increased dividend payout and reduced investments in 
positive net present value projects. 
The extent of "signal mitigation" by the first signal, 
in a sequence of two signals, is an issue in such signal 
sequencing studies. Brown, Choi and Kim (1989) investigate 
the impact of signal sequencing on the information content 
of earnings and dividends. They find evidence of the 
differential information hypothesis even for dividend 
signals. Specifically, they find that dividend changes are 
more informative for small firms and that signal sequencing 
impacts the information content of small firm announcements. 
The authors demonstrate that the information content of a 
subsequent earnings announcement by a small firm is 
preempted by a preceding dividend announcement. Preceding 
earnings signals of small firms, however, only partially 
mitigate subsequent dividend signals, which suggests that 
dividend signals contain information not available in the 
earnings announcement. 
In summary, the literature demonstrates a systematic, 
positive association between firm size, analysts following 
and the pre-disclosure information environment of a firm. 
Earnings announcements of firms in the high differential 
information environment, i.e. large capitalization firms or 
firms with a large number of analysts following them, are 
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preempted by other alternate sources of information. On 
the other hand, for firms in the low differential 
information environment earnings announcements are the 
primary source of information for investors and this may 
aggravate existing information asymmetries in a firm's 
information environment. Similarly, signal sequencing 
studies suggest that a subsequent dividend signal does have 
incremental information content and that the capital market 
reaction to such an announcement is a function of the 
relative noisiness of the preceding earnings signal. There 
is evidence, however, that the impact of the subsequent 
signal is dependent on the predisclosure information 
environment of a firm. 
This study will also examine the systematic differences 
in informed trading across certain cross-sectional variables 
like the quality of the firm's information environment and 
to earnings disclosures. Previous studies have documented 
systematic differences in the level of informed trading, 
specifically in the form of insider trades, across firm 
size. This literature is looked at next. 
2.4 Insider Trading and Firm Size 
Seyhun (1986) finds a significant negative relationship 
between abnormal returns to insiders and firm size. 
According to Seyhun, conditional on trading, insiders in 
small firms earn substantially greater abnormal returns than 
insiders in large firms i.e. the former set impose larger 
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adverse information costs on the uninformed traders. 
Further, the probability of trading against insiders 
(measured as the ratio of the dollar value of insider trade 
to the dollar value of all trading) is significantly and 
inversely related to firm size. This also suggests that the 
bid-ask spread of smaller firms will have a higher adverse 
selection cost component than the bid-ask spread of large 
firms. Further, Seyhun's results suggest that insiders 
purchase stock prior to the release of unfavorable 
information. In his study, Seyhun finds significant 
increases in abnormal returns after insider purchases and 
significant decreases in abnormal returns after insider 
sales. Also, there was a significant stock price decline 
prior to insider purchases and significant abnormal stock 
price increase prior to insider sales. This, according to 
Seyhun, suggests that insiders refrain from purchasing 
(selling) stock until after unfavorable (favorable) 
information is released. 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) find weak evidence to 
support their contention that insiders of small firms 
benefit from the greater information asymmetry for small 
firms. They speculate that this is because small firms have 
a smaller set of insiders who retain more information and 
hence cause greater adverse selection problems. 
Ajinkya and Jain (1989) demonstrate that the mean 
percent of outstanding shares traded (the ratio of trading 
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volume in dollars to shares outstanding) decreases with firm 
size. This variable has been previously used in various 
micro-structure studies (Stoll,1976; Glosten and 
Harris,1988) to proxy for the level of information driven 
trading for a firm, and is consistent with the result of 
Seyhun (1986) that the probability of informed trading 
increases as firm size decreases. Similarly, Hasbrouck 
(1991) finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
information asymmetries are larger for small firms. 
However, in contrast, Lin and Howe (1990) find no conclusive 
evidence of this relationship between insider abnormal 
returns and firm size for OTC firms. 
In summary, therefore, there is some evidence which 
suggests that the probability of insider trading increases 
with firm size. 
The basic objective of this study is to examine the 
relationship between the efficiency of second quarter 
earnings announcements (and subsequent dividend 
announcements) and information asymmetries in a firm's 
information environment by examining the reaction of the 
capital market at the micro-structure level. Essentially, 
it focuses on the behavior of the bid-ask spread and, 
especially, on the adverse selection component of the same, 
which, in general, relates to the information asymmetries 
in a firm's environment. The literature relating to the 
market micro-structure of the study and, especially, the 
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adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread is 
reviewed next. 
2.5 The Bid-Ask Spread 
The market makers in the OTC market are dealers who 
specialize in maintaining a continuous two-sided competitive 
market for a security. The market makers buy and sell 
shares (from traders) at their bid and the ask price, 
respectively. Apart from this, market makers also function 
as price stabilizers and as processors of information 
(Schwartz,1987;Amihud,et al.,1985) and serve as the vital 
link between the market microstructure and the pricing of a 
security. The quoted bid-ask spread of the market maker is 
determined by the market maker after taking into account all 
the fixed and variable costs involved in market making. 
Stoll (1978) notes that the dealer incurs three types of 
costs: 
(a) order processing costs - the costs of carrying out a 
transaction, which include variable costs of labor, 
communication, clearing and record-keeping, and other fixed 
costs. 
(b) inventory holding costs - these refer to the price risk 
and the opportunity costs of holding inventories of a 
stock. 
(c) information costs - the dealer has an adverse selection 
problem due to the possibility that some other trader may 
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have more information about the security than the dealer 
does. 
2.6 Adverse Selection Cost Component of the Spread 
The adverse information cost theory was first advocated 
by Walter Baghehot (1971). According to this theory, the 
market maker makes money from the liquidity traders and 
loses money to informed transactors. While "dealers and 
specialists may have an advantage over many public traders, 
they do not, however, have a advantage over all traders. 
Some public traders receive news and transmit orders to the 
market before the dealer has learned of the informational 
change. When this happens the public trader profits at the 
dealer's expense " (Schwartz,1987,p. 399). Schwartz calls 
this the cost of ignorance on the part of the market maker. 
In general, the theoretical work by Copeland and Galai 
(1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and, Easley and O'Hara 
(1987) seems to suggest that the market maker will widen 
the bid-ask spread when there is an increase in the 
probability that the next trader he deals with is an 
informed trader or when the quality of the information 
available to the informed trader improves. Under such 
circumstances, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) demonstrate that 
the market maker will increase the ask price and decrease 
the bid price to cover the increase in the adverse selection 
costs due to the increase in the information asymmetry in 
the environment. Stoll (1989) estimates that the adverse 
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selection cost component is about 43% of the spread for his 
sample of OTC firms. The approach taken by the information 
cost theorists suggests that the bid-ask spread would exist 
even if the market makers' order processing costs and 
inventory holding costs were zero and/or competition drives 
these costs to zero. 
2.6.1 Adverse Selection and the Behavior of the Spread 
Copeland and Galai (1983) demonstrate that the 
equilibrium bid-ask spread of a market maker is one which 
maximizes gains from liquidity traders and minimizes losses 
from informed traders. They point out that there is a 
trade-off the market maker has to make between the dealings 
with informed traders and transactions with liquidity 
traders. "If he sets the bid-ask spread too wide, he loses 
expected revenues from liquidity traders but reduces 
potential losses to informed traders. On the other hand, if 
sets a spread which is too narrow the probability of losses 
incurring to informed traders increases but is offset by the 
potential revenues from liquidity trading" (Copeland and 
Galai,1983,p. 1460). This proposition assumes that the 
probability of liquidity trading will fall as the spread 
increases, a notion that has important empirical 
implications while modelling trading volume. 
In their paper, Copeland and Galai take an ex-post 
view (Glosten,1987) of the market maker's adverse selection 
problem. According to them, market makers lose to the 
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informed traders and recover these losses from the 
uniformed liquidity traders by charging them the adverse 
information cost component of the spread. They assume that 
the informed traders possess non-public information which " 
allows them to have a better estimate of the future 
security price than either the dealer or the liquidity 
traders" (Copeland and Galai,1987,p. 1458) and provides them 
an option to trade on their unique information conditioned 
on the current market valuation of the security price. 
Copeland and Galai use an open-quote interval model to 
provide some insights on the effect of non-synchronous 
trades on the spreads. In an open quote interval model, it 
is assumed that the market maker waits for some interval of 
time until the next trader arrives to trade with him, or 
some new information enters the market. At this time the 
market maker revises his quotations. The authors show that 
for low trading volume firms the adverse information costs 
of the market maker are higher, given that the chances of an 
information event occurring without the market maker 
becoming aware of it are greater. Hence, as the expected 
duration between trades decrease and trading volume 
increases, the spreads will decrease to reflect the lower 
adverse information costs faced by the market maker. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) also look at the dynamic 
properties of the spread and, especially, the role of the 
specialist in processing private information. Unlike 
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Copeland and Galai (1983) they take an ex-ante view of the 
adverse selection component of the spread (Glosten,1987). 
The adverse selection component of the spread is modelled 
as the revision in the expectations of the specialist in 
response to a buy or sell transaction, considering that the 
specialist is uncertain about whether the next investor he 
deals with would be an informed trader or otherwise. Also, 
unlike Copeland and Galai who assume that prices will 
instantaneously reflect the information driving the 
transaction, Glosten and Milgrom allow further trading 
before prices reflect the underlying information. The 
authors demonstrate that with a risk-neutral specialist in 
a competitive environment with adverse selection and with 
no transaction costs, there will be a positive spread to 
cover the adverse selection costs as well as the fee for 
immediacy. The adverse selection costs arise because of 
the adverse selection problem faced by the specialist in the 
presence of informed traders who know the "true" value of 
the firm the specialist deals in. This "true" value, in 
the Glosten and Milgrom scenario will be revealed to the 
uninformed traders and the specialist at some later time 
when the firm makes a public announcement. At this point 
of time the market will arrive at a new consensus on the 
market value of the firm, and the information asymmetries 
in the environment will be resolved. Glosten and Milgrom 
have a broader definition of an informed trader, namely. 
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traders who have differential access to private 
information, or who do superior analysis of public 
information. The ask price of the specialist, under these 
circumstances, is the expected value of the firm after a 
specialist sale and similarly, the bid price of the firm is 
the specialist's expectation of the true value of the firm 
given a specialist buy. 
In their proposition 2, Glosten and Milgrom 
demonstrate that the transaction prices of a security form a 
martingale with respect to all public information and, 
information known to the specialist. This implies that an 
investor cannot earn abnormal returns by using the 
information in the hands of the specialists and that the 
first differences of the transaction price process (i.e. 
returns) will be serially uncorrelated. What this 
proposition suggests is that the adverse selection 
component of the spread does not cause the observed 
negative serial correlation in returns but is the result of 
the inventory holding and order processing cost components 
of the spread. Further, in their proposition 4, Glosten 
and Milgrom demonstrate that, over time, the expectations 
of the specialists and the informed traders regards the 
underlying value of the firm will converge as the number of 
trades increase, and by this process the market will 
impound the information of the informed traders. Also, as 
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the number of trades increase, the prices will impound more 
information and the spreads will become smaller. 
Proposition 5 of Glosten and Milgrom relates to the 
determinants of the size of the spread, given the adverse 
selection scenario, and confirms the results of Copeland 
and Galai(1983): 
For any given time t, the ask price A increases and 
the bid price B decreases when, other things being 
equal, (i) the insider's information at time t 
becomes better (i.e., finer), (ii) the ratio of the 
informed to the uninformed arrival rates at t is 
increased, or (iii) the elasticity of uninformed 
supply and demand at time t increases. 
This means that if the probability of dealing with an 
informed trader is small, then, the specialist needs to 
make only small revisions in his expectations about the 
value of the firm conditional on a sale or a buy 
transaction. However, if the probability that the next 
arrival is informed is high, the specialist would need to 
revise his expectations by a larger amount conditional on 
whether the transaction is a buy or a sale, i.e., the spread 
would be widened by the specialist. However, if liquidity 
traders have relatively inelastic demand for the security, 
then, the specialist need not widen the spread by as much. 
In sum, Glosten and Milgrom theoretically derive the 
existence of a non-zero adverse selection cost component of 
the spread in the presence of informed traders. They also 
demonstrate that the adverse selection cost component will 
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increase with an increase in the arrival rate of informed 
traders with more precise information. 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) extend the theory of 
Copeland and Galai (1983), and, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
by including trade size as a variable involved in informed 
trading. In their work, Easley and O'Hara decompose the 
adverse selection problem faced by the specialist into (i) 
the uncertainty that the specialist faces regards whether 
the next trader is an informed trader, and (ii) the 
uncertainty that the specialist faces regards whether any 
information has been selectively released or extracted. 
They show that informed traders would prefer to trade in 
larger blocks at a given price. The larger the trade size, 
the more likely it is that the specialist is dealing with 
an informed trader. Hence, the specialist is likely to widen 
the spread in face of such a large, block trade. This, 
according to Easley and O'Hara, is an explanation for the 
fact that, typically, block buys are made at higher prices 
and block sales are made at lower prices than other normal 
transactions. 
Loux (1989) also finds that the spread declines at a 
decreasing rate as the tendency of liquidity traders to 
trade in small transaction sizes, proxied by the stocks 
average trade size, increases. Further, as the proportion 
of large trade increases, spreads increase. Such an 
increase in the proportion of large trades reflects an 
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increased probability of facing an informed trader who 
prefer large, block trades. Consistent with the results of 
Seyhun (1986) , Loux finds that the probability of trading 
with an insider decreases as firm size increases. 
In a recent paper, Umlauf (1991) detects the 
existence of information asymmetries between secondary and 
primary dealers in the secondary market for U.S. government 
securities, and finds evidence that the bid-ask spreads of 
the secondary dealers are larger than those of the primary 
dealers. 
The theoretical work of Copeland and Galai (1983), 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) 
relates to the quoted spread. Other theoretical papers have 
dealt with the realized spread and its relationship to the 
quoted spread by analyzing the serial covariance of 
transaction prices. This distinction between the quoted 
spread and the realized spread, and its implication to the 
adverse selection component was examined by Stoll (1989) and 
is looked at next. 
2.6.2 Adverse Selection and the Serial Covariance of 
Transaction Prices 
Roll (1984) estimated the realized spread to be 
related to the negative serial covariance of returns. Roll 
ignores the existence of adverse selection costs and 
assumes a constant spread in an informationally efficient 
market with no new information arrivals. Glosten (1987), 
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pointed out that the negative serial covariance in returns 
is due to the inventory holding and order processing costs 
which cause transaction prices to reverse. The adverse 
selection cost component is related to transaction price 
changes which are permanent. Glosten shows that Roll's 
estimate of the realized spread is upwardly biased as Roll 
ignores the existence of the adverse selection component. 
Stoll (1989) decomposes the spread into all of its 
components, while assuming a constant spread and an 
efficient market. He looks at two parameters, 7r, the 
probability of a price reversal, and (1 - <5) , the amount of 
price reversal as a fraction of the total spread and 
analyzes the behavior of the components of the spread in 
terms of these parameters. He calculates the covariance of 
transaction prices and the covariance of quoted prices and 
analyzes them in terms of the contribution of each of the 
components of the spread. Stoll demonstrates that the 
adverse selection cost component does not cause covariance 
in transaction and quoted prices. He further demonstrates 
that the realized spread is 2(7r - 6) S, where S is the total 
spread, and that the adverse selection cost component of 
the spread is equal to the quoted spread less the realized 
spread. 
2.6.3 Cross-sectional Determinants of the Spread 
Empirical work on the order processing costs and the 
inventory holding costs has been quite extensive, and the 
48 
variables used to model these two components of the 
transaction cost fall into four categories (based on Morse 
and Ushman, 1983) : (a) price; 
(b) trading characteristics (for e.g., number of 
shareholders, trading volume, number of institutional 
investors); 
(c) competition ( for e.g., number of competing dealers, 
number of other markets the security is traded in); and, 
(d) risk ( for e.g., return variance, systematic and 
unsystematic risk). 
Stoll (1978) developed a log-linear model of the total 
proportional spread which explained 82% of the 
cross-sectional variation in the bid-ask spreads of his 
sample of NYSE firms. His independent variables were: 
(1) The variance of the stock's returns which reflected the 
marketability risk borne by the dealer and, also, proxied 
for the non-diversifiable risk of holding a stock of that 
security. For a risk-averse dealer, the greater the risk, 
the larger will be the spread. Also, the greater the risk, 
the larger are the chances of informed trading (Barnea and 
Logue,1975). This variable had a significant positive 
coefficient. 
(2) The trading volume of the stock which proxied for the 
holding period of the dealer. In general, the greater the 
volume of trade, the easier it is for the market maker to 
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reverse his position and the shorter is his holding period. 
This variable had a significant negative coefficient. 
(3) A turnover variable to reflect the adverse information 
costs. Stoll defined the ratio of the trading volume of 
shares to the dollar value of shares outstanding as the 
'turnover' of a stock. The higher the information-based 
trading in the stock, the larger will be the turnover of the 
stock. This variable had a significant positive coefficient. 
(4) Price, to reflect the minimum holding cost of a stock. 
For high priced stocks this minimum cost is spread over a 
larger number of dollars. Further, the minimum spread of 
one-eight causes the proportionate spread to be higher for 
low priced shares than for high priced shares. Stoll found 
that price is negatively related to proportional spread. 
(5) A competition variable proxied by the number of dealers 
in the stock. This variable had a significant negative 
coefficient suggesting that the greater the competition, the 
lower would be the spreads. Stoll pointed out that this 
variable could also proxy for the capital-backing provided 
by the market makers of that security. 
Branch and Freed (1977) also modeled the spread of NYSE 
and AMEX stocks. In their log-linear model they used the 
following variables: (i) trade volume, which had a 
significant negative coefficient, (ii) number of exchanges 
in which the stock is traded, which had a negative 
coefficient, (iii) risk, which had a positive coefficient. 
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and,(iv) monopoly power of a dealer, which had a positive 
coefficient. All variables had significant coefficients 
except the competition variable (the number of exchanges 
traded in) and the monopoly power variables for AMEX 
stocks. Their R2s were 49% for NYSE and 68% for AMEX 
stocks. 
Glosten and Harris (1988) cross-sectionally modeled the 
components of the spreads. They initially decomposed the 
spreads into their components, by using time series 
analysis. They then used a system of four equations with 
four dependent variables, which were modeled as a function 
of the following variables: 
(a) the holding and order processing cost components as a 
function of trade frequency and a security's risk; 
(b) the adverse selection proportion as a function of 
insider ownership and the number of non-insider owners; 
(c) the average trade volume as a function of the total 
spread and the number of non-insiders; 
(d) the average volume of trade as a function of the adverse 
selection component and the average holdings of non¬ 
insiders. 
They show that the adverse selection costs are positively 
related to information based activity. 
2.6.4 Event Studies on the Spread 
Morse and Ushman (1983) examined the behavior of the 
bid-ask spread surrounding earnings announcement dates and 
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large price change dates. They found little evidence of an 
increase in the spreads around such periods. Their results 
were weak for the earnings announcement dates and marginal 
for large price change dates. 
Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) look at the behavior of 
the total proportional spread and the adjusted spread 
(after adjusting for the holding costs) around quarterly 
earnings announcement dates and dividend announcement 
dates. They divide their announcement sample into three 
categories: 
(i) joint announcements : these are announcements of 
earnings and dividends made on the same day (30 NYSE 
firms) ; 
(ii) first announcements: these are announcements of either 
dividends (earnings) in the quarter which are (1) not 
preceded by either dividends or earnings announcements in 
the 30 days prior to the selected announcements, and (2) 
succeeded by another earnings (dividends) announcement by at 
least 10 days after this announcement (49 NYSE firms); 
(iii) second announcements: these are the announcements of 
earnings or dividends made at least 10 days after a first 
announcement (40 NYSE firms). 
Venkatesh and Chiang carry out tests on the 
proportional spread and the adjusted proportional spread 
prior to each announcement. Their estimate of the adjusted 
proportional spread is made by controlling for the holding 
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cost components of the spread using average trading volume 
and standardized price variability as covariates. They 
hypothesize an increase in the information asymmetry prior 
to the announcements and an associated shift in the mean 
adjusted spread during the seven days prior to the 
information event conditional on the whether the event is a 
joint, first or a second announcement. Venkatesh and Chiang 
find that the total proportional spread and the adjusted 
proportional spread (adjusted for holding costs) increase 
before the second announcements only. This, according to 
them, reflects the increased arrival of informed traders 
prior to the second announcements. 
Skinner (1991) finds evidence similar to Morse and 
Ushman (1983). In his study, he finds weak evidence of any 
increase in the bid-ask spread prior to an earnings 
announcement as well as a decrease after the announcement. 
However, he finds that the bid-ask spread increases 
immediately after earnings announcements that convey large 
earnings surprises to the market. Note that Skinner 
examines the percentage bid-ask spread and does not try to 
isolate the behavior of the adverse selection cost component 
of the spread. 
Barclay and Smith (1988) find evidence to suggest that 
open market repurchase of shares by firms results in an 
increase in the bid-ask spread. The presence of informed 
managers in the open market increases the adverse selection 
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costs of the market makers who consequently, widen the 
spread. The authors conclude that firms prefer to reward 
investors with cash dividends rather than resorting to share 
repurchase strategies in order to minimize the trading costs 
for the uniformed investors. 
Rao, Tripathy, and Dukes (1991) study the impact of 
option listing on the size of the bid-ask spread. They find 
that the adverse selection cost component of the spread 
declines when a firm's share is listed on the option market. 
This is because, according to the authors, the market makers 
can effectively hedge themselves against informed trading by 
dealing in the option market especially around earnings 
announcement. Further, informed traders may prefer to 
operate in the options market and, hence, reduce adverse 
selection costs on the stock exchange transactions. 
Recently, Fedenia and Grammatikos ((1992) find that the 
spread of NYSE stocks decrease and those of OTC stocks 
increase with option listing. 
Conrad and Niden (1990) examine the behavior of the 
bid-ask spread and other variables surrounding corporate 
acquisition announcements of NYSE target firms. They report 
significant increases in the spread prior to such 
announcements and a significant decrease after such 
announcements possible due to increased liquidity trading. 
In their cross-sectional analysis, however, they find no 
evidence that the adverse selection cost component of the 
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spread increases prior to the acquisition announcements. In 
contrast, Foster and Vishwanathan (1990) find that adverse 
selection costs and inventory holding costs increase seven 
days prior to the announcement of takeovers for NYSE and 
AMEX firms. They find that this increase in costs is the 
greatest when the bidder firm is not listed on a United 
States stock exchange. Further, these cost components 
decline after the takeover announcement. In a related 
study, Conrad, Mandelker, Niden, Rosenfield and Shastri 
(1992) find a significant increase in trading volume and 
bid-ask spread of target OTC firms immediately preceding the 
acquisition announcements. This suggests an increase in the 
adverse selection costs in this period. The authors, also, 
propose an alternate explanation which is based on profit- 
maximizing behavior of existing market makers prior to the 
entry of additional market makers into the system. Jennings 
(1991) documents changes in the bid-ask spread for target 
NYSE and AMEX firms at an intra-day level on the day of the 
takeover announcement. In his study, he finds some evidence 
of an increase especially for NYSE firms prior to 
announcement as well as just after the anouncement. An 
intraday analysis of spread components demonstrates that 
adverse selection cost is heightened prior to the 
announcement. 
Tripathy and Rao (1992) find a decline in spread prior 
to the announcement of seasoned equity offerings. The 
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results, however, demonstrated dramatic differences when the 
sample was split based on size of the issues. The authors 
find that for large (small) issues average excess spreads 
are significantly negative (positive) in the pre¬ 
announcement period. However, the excess spread declines 
further after the announcement only for the large issues. 
Note that while Conrad and Niden (1990), and Conrad, 
et. al. (1992) look at total bid-ask spreads Morse and 
Ushman (1983), Skinner (1991), and Rao (1992) look at 
percentage bid-ask spreads. However, none of these studies 
attempt to directly isolate the behavior of the adverse 
selection cost component. The studies by Barclay and Smith 
(1988) , Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), Rao, Tripathy and Dukes 
(1991) and Foster and Vishwanathan (1990) have attempted to 
isolate the adverse selection cost component in their 
studies. In addition, the first three studies also use the 
percentage bid-ask spread. 
Theoretical work on the adverse selection cost 
component of the bid-ask spread implies that it is 
proportional to the relative information asymmetry perceived 
by the market maker, and that it increases with the 
increased arrival of informed traders with more precise 
information. The existence of this component has been 
demonstrated at the cross-sectional level by Stoll (1978), 
Branch and Freed (1977) and Glosten and Harris (1988) . The 
results of various event studies are mixed. Venkatesh and 
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Chiang (1986) find some evidence of increased adverse 
selection costs prior to second announcements in signal 
sequences. On the other hand, the results of Skinner (1991) 
suggest no such increase in the adverse selection costs 
prior to corporate earnings announcements. Similarly, the 
results for the target firms of takeover announcements 
provide mixed evidence. Given that one of the functions of 
the public disclosure of earnings is the reduction of ex- 
ante information asymmetries (Diamond and Verrecchia,1991), 
the examination of the time-series behavior of the adverse 
selection cost component surrounding such disclosures will 
provide direct evidence on this issue. 
2.7 Conclusion 
There has been extensive theoretical work and empirical 
work on the determinants of the bid-ask spread and, 
specifically, on the adverse selection cost component of 
the spread. This component is known to be associated with 
the market maker's perception of the relative asymmetry of 
information in the firm's environment. Further, there is 
reason to believe, based on the review of the differential 
information literature, that the adverse selection problem 
faced by the market maker may decrease for firms with 
better quality of information environments, and also for 
firms whose earnings reports are less noisy. This study 
empirically tests these issues by examining the behavior of 
the bid-ask spread and the adverse selection component 
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surrounding second quarter earnings and subsequent dividend 
announcements across differential information environments. 
The study also examines the relationship between spread, 
adverse selection costs and the quality of a firm's 
earnings reports. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as 
follows: In Chapter 3, the hypotheses are developed and 
stated. Further, Chapter 3 outlines the methodology to be 
used in the study. Chapter 4 lists and then discusses the 
results of this study. Chapter 5 highlights the 
implications and contributions of this study to the capital 
market literature in accounting. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 The Research Hypotheses 
The quoted bid-ask spread of the market maker is 
determined by the market maker after taking into account 
all the fixed and variable costs involved in market making. 
These costs include (a) order processing costs,(b) inventory 
holding costs, and (c) adverse selection costs, arising out 
of the possibility that some traders who deal with the 
market maker have more information about the "true" price 
of the security than the market maker. 
As indicated previously, the presence of asymmetric 
information in the market results in an adverse selection 
problem for the market maker. The adverse selection cost 
component of the spread reflects the losses the market 
maker suffers from more informed traders and recovers from 
liquidity traders. In addition to the holding and order 
processing costs, the market maker's spread is set to 
maximize the difference between the expected gains from the 
uninformed, liquidity traders and the expected losses from 
the information motivated traders (Copeland and Galai,1983; 
Glosten and Milgrom,1985; Easley and O'Hara,1987; 
Stoll,1989). Note that the implicit assumptions in the 
adverse selection theory are that the market participants 
are anonymous and fall into two categories, namely, the 
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informed traders and the uninformed, liquidity traders, and 
that the market maker is relatively less informed than the 
set of informed traders. The adverse selection costs of the 
market maker will increase as the proportion of informed 
traders who decide to trade on their information 
increases. The theoretical work on the behavior of bid-ask 
spreads suggests that the market maker will widen the bid- 
ask spread given an increase in the asymmetric information 
in the environment specifically when there is an increase 
in the arrival rates of the informed traders or when there 
is an improvement in the quality of their information 
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). 
It has been suggested by Glosten and Harris (1988) and 
Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) that such perceived increases 
in information asymmetry might take place prior to 
anticipated firm specific information events like earnings 
and dividend announcements, takeover attempts, etc.. A 
public disclosure will render the unique information 
possessed by the informed traders valueless which, then, 
provides an incentive to these traders to trade on the 
information prior to such public announcements preferably 
through large block trades (Easley and O'Hara,1987). 
Hence, the first hypothesis relates to the contemporaneous 
association between spread and quarterly earnings and 
dividend announcements. 
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HI: There will be no significant change in the bid-ask 
spread around second quarter earnings and dividend 
announcement dates. 
As indicated before, it is expected that the bid-ask 
spread will increase prior to earnings and dividend 
announcements due to an increase in the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. Further, even the inventory 
holding cost component of the spread will increase with the 
increase in the variability of returns (Chari,et al 1988) 
around such announcement dates, especially on the day 
before the announcement date as per the Wall Street Journal 
Index, and, the day of the announcement (Patel1 and 
Wolfson,1982). The bid-ask spread will subsequently 
decrease with the reduction in the variability of returns 
and the increase in trading volume. Also, as the new 
information gets impounded in the security prices, the 
adverse selection cost component of the spread will 
decrease subsequent to the earnings announcement (Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985). However, this decrease in the adverse 
selection cost component will depend on the quality of the 
firm's information environment and the noisiness of the 
firm specific information releases. This relationship 
between the bid-ask spread and the quality of the firm's 
information environment, and the relative precision of the 
earnings reports is looked at next. 
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There is substantial evidence in the differential 
information literature in accounting on the relationship 
among firm size, the firm's pre-disclosure information 
environment, and the magnitude of the market's reaction to 
an earnings announcement. The results of Atiase (1985), 
Freeman (1987), Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1987), 
Beaver, Lambert and Ryan (1987), Collins and Kothari 
(1989), and Bhushan (1989) all seem to suggest that 
historical accounting earnings figures tend to reflect 
permanent earnings changes with a lag, especially for large 
firms . That is, for large firms information about 
permanent earnings changes are impounded in prices earlier 
than in the earnings figures, due to the informativeness 
of the security price of large firms. For small firms, 
however, the primary source of information on permanent 
earnings changes are historical earnings announcements. 
Specifically, less pre-disclosure information is available 
for small firms. 
The adverse selection problem of the dealer could, 
therefore, be affected by the quality of the firm's 
information environment. Some indirect evidence of this 
can be found in Ajinkya and Jain(1989) who demonstrate that 
the mean percent of outstanding shares traded (i.e. the 
value of shares traded divided by the value of the shares 
outstanding on that day) decreases as the size of the firm 
increases. This variable has been used in various cross- 
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sectional studies to reflect the degree of informed trading 
in a firm's stock (Stoll,1976; Glosten and Harris,1988) 
Similarly, Seyhun (1986) demonstrated that the probability 
of trading with an insider decreases as firm size increases. 
In addition, Chiang and Venkatesh (1988), Hasbrouck (1991) 
also observe an inverse relationship between firm size and 
the degree of information asymmetry in firms. Therefore, it 
is hypothesized that the relative information asymmetry 
will be felt more sharply by the market makers of firms in 
the low differential information environment ( and, hence, 
by the uninformed investors in these firms) than by market 
makers of firms in the high differential information 
environment. Further, it can be conjectured that a precise 
earnings signal plays a pivotal role in alleviating the 
information asymmetries existing in the environment of firms 
in the low differential information environment. This issue 
regarding differential information and the significance of 
second quarter earnings and dividend signals in reducing the 
perceptions of information asymmetries in the environment is 
looked at next. 
H2: There will be no significant difference between the 
change in the bid-ask spread of firms in the high 
differential information environment and the change in 
the spread of firms in the low differential information 
environment, around second quarter earnings and 
dividend announcement dates. 
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As previously discussed, reported earnings figures may 
be noisy to the extent that some adjustments are required 
to be made to the figure before they can be used to predict 
the future earnings potential of the firm. Earnings 
figures may become noisy due to income smoothing accounting 
policy changes, for e.g. (Elliot and Philbrick,1990; 
Hand,1990), or the effect of extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations on future income streams 
(O'Glove,1987; Hector,1989) . In general, the lower this 
noise element associated with earnings, the greater the 
predictive ability of reported earnings and the higher will 
be the quality of earnings. Low quality of earnings 
disclosures aggravate the information asymmetries in the 
environment and result in ex-ante return differentials 
among investors. Elliot and Philbrick (1990) demonstrate 
that there is a reduction in earnings predictability after 
the issuance of earnings figures with accounting changes. 
Hence, the association between the increase in the bid-ask 
spreads and the quality of the firm's earnings disclosures 
will throw some light on the effect of the latter on the 
information asymmetry in the firms's information 
environment. 
H3: There will be no significant difference between the 
change in the bid-ask spread of firms characterized by 
low quality of earnings disclosures and the change in 
the bid-ask spread of firms characterized by high 
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quality of earnings disclosures, around second 
quarter earnings and dividend announcements. 
The adverse selection cost component of the spread is 
associated with the dealer's perception of the relative 
information asymmetry in the environment, specifically the 
arrival rates of the informed traders and the quality of 
information in their hands. A direct way to test the effect 
of information asymmetries on the behavior of the spread is 
to look at only the adverse selection cost component of the 
spread and not at the total spread. Hence, by controlling 
for the dealer's holding and order processing cost and after 
accounting for the market maker's inventory policy1, one 
can look at the behavior of the adverse selection cost 
component around earnings and dividend announcements and 
reexamine the previous hypotheses. 
H4: There will be no significant change in the adverse 
selection cost component of the spread around second 
quarter earnings and dividend announcements. 
The role of differential information and its 
impact on the information asymmetries among investors at 
the time of such announcements is looked at next. 
H5: There will be no significant difference between the 
change in the adverse selection cost component of the 
spread for firms in the high differential information 
environment and the change in the adverse selection 
cost component of firms in the low differential 
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information environment, around second quarter earnings 
and dividend announcements. 
Similarly, the quality of earnings signal and its 
relevance to the information asymmetries in the environment 
will be examined next by directly looking at the adverse 
selection cost component. 
H6: There is no significant difference between the 
change in the adverse selection cost component of firms 
characterized by low quality of earnings disclosures 
and the change in the adverse selection cost component 
of firms characterized by high quality of earnings 
disclosures, around second quarter earnings and 
dividend announcements. 
It is expected that the adverse selection cost 
component, in the case of earnings announcements, will 
increase prior to the event date and that the increase in 
the adverse selection cost component will stabilize 
subsequent to the event dates. This stabilization in the 
post-event period will be function of the quality of the 
firm's earnings signal and its noisiness. However, once 
the new information gets impounded into the prices, the 
adverse selection cost component will decrease to its 
normal level. In the case of subsequent dividend 
announcements, while the adverse selection cost component 
will increase prior to such announcements, its behavior 
subsequent to the event may be slightly different. The 
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adverse selection cost component may subsequently decrease 
at a faster rate for the dividend announcements than for 
the earnings announcements but this decrease will be 
conditional on the quality of the earnings disclosures made 
by the firm. 
This study will also examine the behavior of the bid- 
ask spread across a sequence of a preceding earnings signal 
and a succeeding dividend signal. Brown, Choi and Kim 
(1989) have provided evidence that for small firms an 
antecedent dividend signal mitigates the impact of a 
subsequent earnings signal. Hence, the effect of signal 
sequencing on the behavior of the adverse selection cost 
component, given the differential information environment 
of a firm, will be examined. In addition, consistent with 
the Miller and Rock (1985) framework, the quality of the 
earnings signal may systematically affect the behavior of 
the adverse selection cost component around dividend 
announcements. While this relationship may depend on 
whether the dividend signal is antecedent or subsequent to 
the earnings signal, this study examines the behavior of the 
bid-ask spread and the adverse selection cost component 
around earnings followed by dividends signal sequences only. 
H7: There is no systematic relationship between the 
behavior of the adverse selection cost component 
around subsequent dividend announcements and the 
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quality of the firm's information environment as well 
as the quality of its earnings disclosures. 
In the next section, the variables and the methodology 
of the study shall be defined. 
3.2 Sample Selection 
The sample has been extracted from the CRSP-NASDAQ 1989 
data tapes from the University of Chicago. The initial 
sample has been restricted to those OTC firms which are on 
the COMPUSTAT tape (to be used for financial data) and, 
also, on the IBES tapes (to be used for consensus earnings 
forecast information). While the sample time period is 
1985-1989, the sample has been restricted to only those 
firms with full data for the years 1980 to 1989 in an 
effort to obtain companies which have been active for at 
least 10 years. The firms should have total assets of at 
least $ 1 million2 and should have greater than 500 
shareholders as of the beginning of 1980. This is to 
ensure that the sample firms have been required to file 10- 
k reports with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) on a 
regular basis. The dates of the filings of such 10-k 
reports and the information contained in such reports are 
used in this study for the evaluation of the quality of the 
earnings disclosures made by the firm. All sample firms 
should have had a December 31 fiscal year-end and a second 
quarter earnings announcement published in the Wall Street 
Journal (WSJ) during the analysis period. Further, the 
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selected firms should have declared dividends continuously 
to eliminate the impact of dividend initiations, omissions 
and resumptions. Also, firms selected must have second 
quarter and annual earnings forecast data available on the 
IBES data tape. 
The data on second quarter earnings announcements and 
dividend announcements for the sample period of 1985 to 
1989 have been obtained from the Wall Street Journal Index 
(WSJI) as well as the COMPUSTAT and the CRSP data tapes, 
respectively. The announcement dates have been classified 
(Venkatesh and Chiang,1986) into (i) joint announcements, 
(ii) first and initial announcements, and (iii) second and 
subsequent announcements. By reference to the WSJI, firm- 
events have been classified as follows: 
(i) joint announcements sample: these are announcements of 
dividends and earnings made on the same day. In addition, 
these firms have no other preceding announcements made 35 
days prior to the announcement3. 
(ii) first announcements sample: these are first 
announcements of earnings in the quarter, not preceded by 
any other earnings or dividends announcements in the 35 
days prior to the selected announcements, and, secondly, 
are followed by another dividends announcement at least 25 
days after this first announcement. 
(iii) second announcements sample: these are announcements 
of dividends made at least 25 days after a first earnings 
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announcement but not more than 35 days after the first 
announcement (see Figure 1). 
In addition, earnings announcements not preceded by any 
other such announcement in the 35 days prior to or 35 days 
after such announcements, have also been examined. Such 
events have been categorized as sole earnings announcements. 
For all the announcements, the estimation period 
starts 147 days and ends 21 days before the first (or, 
joint) announcement. Additional sample selection criteria 
that have been imposed at this stage are (i) there should 
be no other confounding events taking place both in the 
estimation window and the analysis window, and (ii) the 
security should have been traded for at least 60 days in 
the estimation window. For all announcements, the analysis 
period begins 15 days before and ends 10 days after the 
event - the announcement date in the WSJI (see Figure 1). 
Each firm-event is centered around either a first earnings 
announcement, or, a joint earnings and dividend 
announcement, or, a sole earnings announcement. 
3.3 The Variables 
3.3.1 The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the daily spread 
in the analysis period (Sid) for each firm-event i (i = 
1.N) and for each day d ( d = -15...0...+10) in the 
analysis period. This study focusses on the total (or 
absolute) spread and not the proportional (or relative) 
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spread, consistent with recent theoretical work (Copeland 
and Galai,1983; Glosten and Milgrom ,1985; Easley and 
O'Hara,1987; Stoll,1989), and the empirical work of Conrad 
and Niden (1990) . 
3.3.2 Proxies for Differential Information Environment 
Annual firm size in the sample period (FS ) , an 
endogenous proxy for the amount of predisclosure 
information in the environment, has been used to classify 
the sample firms into three portfolios, namely high 
differential information environment firms, low 
differential information environment firms and medium 
differential information environment firms. Firm size has 
been measured at the beginning of the calendar years in the 
sample period. The sample firms have then been assigned 
to the three portfolios, sorted on the basis of their firm 
size. The largest firms, meeting all other sample 
selection criteria, have been assigned to the high 
differential information portfolio. Similarly, the set of 
small firms have been classified in the low differential 
information environment and the middle firms have been 
classified as medium differential information environment 
firms. 
The entire analysis has been repeated using an 
exogenous proxy for the differential information 
environment of the firm, namely the number of analysts 
following (AF ) a firm at the beginning of each estimation 
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period. Dempsey (1989) has demonstrated that financial 
analysts' following, as a proxy for the quality of 
firms' information environment, has some incremental 
explanatory power over and above firm size. Dempsey 
concludes that firm size and analysts' following are not 
equivalent proxies for firms' predisclosure environment. 
Hence, in a manner similar to firm size, three differential 
information portfolios have been formed in order to carry 
out the rest of the analysis. 
3.3.3 Proxies for Earnings Quality 
Bernard and Stober (1989,p. 627-28) operationalize the 
quality of earnings variable in terms of the market's 
reaction to unexpected cash flows. They hypothesize that 
unexpected accruals will have smaller impact on prices than 
unexpected cash flows of the same magnitude "since accruals 
are either subject to manipulation, or represent only 
indirect links to future cash flows". On a similar note. 
Lev (1989,p. 177) points out "that adjustments to reported 
data are an essential element of financial statement 
analysis". To the extent that reported earnings figures 
contain some noise (e.g., accounting policy changes, extra¬ 
ordinary items, discontinued operations, etc.), 
sophisticated investors will always make adjustments to the 
reported earnings figures and use such adjusted figures to 
make predictions about future earnings. Hence, for 
investors, the quality of such reported earnings figures 
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improves if they contain less noise, i.e., they have better 
predictive content with respect to the future cash flow 
potential of the firm and its dividend paying ability. The 
predictive ability of earnings then is one way to 
operationalize the quality of earnings issue. Another way 
to measure the earnings quality is by directly examining 
the noisiness of the earnings data by looking at the 
volatility of the reported earnings stream and other 
financial variables. The earnings predictability measure 
is described next. 
3.3.3.1 Earnings Predictability Measure 
According to Lev (1989) the better the predictive 
ability of earnings, the higher is the quality of a firm's 
earnings reports. Hence, the lower the quality of the 
earnings reports, the greater will be the absolute forecast 
errors made by analysts. In fact, Eliott and Philbrick 
(1990,p. 173) find that the analysts' forecast errors for 
firms with accounting policy changes is larger than those of 
firms with no accounting changes. In general, the mean 
absolute forecast errors of analysts following low quality 
of earnings firms will be larger than the mean absolute 
forecast error of high quality of earnings firms. Evidence 
of this relationship was demonstrated in a recent paper by 
Imhoff (1992). In his study, Imhoff finds a strong positive 
relationship between earnings quality and the predictability 
of the earnings stream. In addition, he documents that 
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financial analysts of high quality of earnings firms make 
(i) a smaller number of forecast revisions after the 
announcement of first quarter results, and (ii) have smaller 
absolute annual forecast errors as compared to low quality 
of earnings firms. 
Similarly, the lower the quality of a firm's earnings 
reports and the more noisy the earnings reports, the larger 
will be the dispersion in the forecasts made by analysts. 
Elliot and Philbrick (1990,p. 173) find that the dispersion 
of analysts' forecasts were significantly larger in the year 
of an accounting change. In general, the mean dispersion of 
analysts' forecasts will be greater for low quality of 
earnings firms as compared to the mean dispersion of 
analysts' forecasts of high quality of earnings firms. 
Every firm has to file within 90 days of the close of 
its financial year, its annual report with other details on 
Form 10-k with the SEC. This report includes a summary of 
the firm's operation over the last two years. For each firm 
q in the sample, the date the SEC 10-k report was filed in 
year y (i.e., for the previous year's earnings data) was 
obtained for the years 1984 to 1989. The consensus 
financial analysts forecast for the current year y 
(CYFq y,y=1984 to 1989) made subsequent to the filing date 
has been used in this study^. This forecast is assumed to 
incorporate the information contained in the 10-k reports 
(Swaminathan,1991; Stice,1991). The actual annual earnings 
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per share for each firm q for the years y=1984 to 1989 
(AEPSq ) was obtained from COMPUSTAT and the standardized 
absolute forecast error (SAFEq y) was calculated as follows: 
(CYFq>y - AEPSq y) / (AEPSq<y) = SAFEq>y ...(1) 
Note that the AEPSqy number is primary earnings per 
share before extra-ordinary items, etc. and is consistent 
with the definition of earnings in forecast data (see Elliot 
and Philbrick, 1990;p. 164, footnote 8). To be included in 
the sample forecast data for each firm must be available for 
at least four out the six years from 1984 to 1989. For each 
firm the mean standardized absolute forecast error is 
calculated as follows: 
SAFEq = 1/K £SAFEqjy ...(2) 
where, K may take the value 4 to 6, depending on data 
availability. 
In addition to the standardized absolute forecast 
error, for each firm q and each year y the relative 
dispersion of analysts' forecasts is obtained for the 
consensus forecast issued just after the date of filing the 
10-k report (Elliot and Philbrick, 1990). Note that firms 
with only one analyst following them will have a dispersion 
of zero. 
(Dispersion of Analysts' Forecastq>y) / (CYFqfy) = DAFq>y ..(3) 
As was done for the mean standardized absolute forecast 
error, for each firm q and for each year y (at least four 
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years out of six) the mean relative dispersion of analysts' 
forecasts surrounding the 10-k report was estimated: 
DAFq = l/K EDAFq#y ...(4) 
Once again, K may vary from 4 to 6 depending on data 
availability. 
For the overall sample, the medians for SAFE and DAF 
q q 
i.e. SAFE AND DAF were estimated. These were used for the 
quality of earnings scores. 
The scores are calculated as follows: 
Scores: 
SAFEq DMq 
4 > SAFE > DAF 
3 > SAFE < DAF 
2 < SAFE > DAF 
1 < SAFE < DAF 
A score of '1' represents a firm with high annual 
earnings predictability and is classified as a high quality 
of earnings disclosure firm. An implicit assumption in the 
scoring system with respect to the assessment of the 
earnings quality score is that lower forecast errors (bias) 
are a more desirable property in forecasts than lower 
dispersion in analysts beliefs. Hence, a score of x4' 
represents a firm with the lowest quality of earnings 
disclosures. In effect, all firms retained in the sample 
have been allotted scores which range from '1' to '4', i.e., 
from high quality to low quality of earnings disclosures. 
The earnings predictability score evaluates the quality 
of a firm's earnings disclosure in terms of the ex-post 
forecasting performance of the financial analysts 
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following the firm. An alternative measure of the quality 
of the earnings reports used in this study involves more 
traditional financial statement analysis variables/ ratios 
and has been based on Bernstein (1978) and 0'Glove (1987) . 
3.3.3.2 Earnings Noise Measure 
The alternate measure of the quality of earnings 
reports has been based on more traditional financial 
statement analysis variables and ratios (for e.g., see 
Bernstein,1978; O'Glove,1987; Hector,1989). Specifically, 
the study looks at (i) earnings per share, (ii) the per 
share effect of extra-ordinary items, discontinued 
operations, and accounting policy changes, and (iii) the 
allowance for uncollectible accounts or loan losses, as the 
case may be. The actual assessment of the earnings quality 
score is based on the volatility of these variables/ratios 
over the 10 year period from 1980 to 1989. 
In general, the greater the stability of the earnings 
stream, the better is the quality of earnings disclosures. 
Further, the greater the difference between the reported 
earnings and the adjusted earnings, the greater will be the 
standard deviation of all these financial items over 1980 to 
1989, given that these items are often used to manage 
earnings. In addition, another factor which increases the 
noisiness of a earnings signal, namely accounting policy 
changes (Elliot and Philbrick, 1990) has also been 
incorporated in this measure of the quality of earnings 
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reports of a firm. Hence, for each firm the number of 
accounting policy changes made over the last 10 years has 
been calculated using the COMPUSTAT database. The greater 
the number of accounting policy changes made in the ten 
years, the more noisy the reported earnings figures. 
The following has been calculated for each firm for the 
10 years based on the SEC 10-k reports: 
(i) the standard deviation of the primary earnings per share 
stream (SPESq) ; 
(ii) the standard deviation of the difference between the 
earnings per share after extra-ordinary items, discontinued 
operations and the cumulative effect of accounting changes 
and, the primary earnings per share (SSESq) ; 
(iii) the standard deviation of the allowance for 
uncollectible accounts (or, loan losses in the case of banks 
and financial companies) standardized as a percentage of net 
income (SALLq) ; 
(v) the number of accounting policy changes made over the 
last 10 years (NAPCq) . 
For each of these 5 variables, the median values across 
the sample of firms has been estimated (i.e. SDE, SPES, 
SSES, SALL, and NAPC). For each variable, each firm has 
been given a score of ' 2 ' if the value of the variable is 
above the median of that variable. Otherwise, the firm has 
got a score of ' 1 ' on that variable. The maximum 
possible score a firm can get is '8', which represents a 
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firm with low quality of earnings disclosures. The minimum 
score a firm can get is ' 4 ', which represents a firm with 
high quality of earnings disclosures. 
3.3.4 The Cross-sectional Control Variables 
This su\section deals with the other cross-sectional 
control variables used in the study and the motivation for 
incorporating them. 
3.3.4.1 Unexpected Earnings (UE,-) 
Senteney (1990) found an association between the 
unexpected earnings component and the increase in the bid- 
ask spread around quarterly earnings announcements. In 
general, the greater the unexpected earnings component, the 
greater will be the value of any unique information regards 
the future earnings potential of a firm and the higher will 
be the incentive for an informed trader to trade on this 
unique information. Hence, in the cross-sectional tests, 
the magnitude of the unexpected earnings in the earnings 
announcement is controlled for. 
Unexpected earnings for each firm-event i is measured 
as: 
UEi = [EPS,- - E ( EPS,- )] / [ Pf ] ...(5) 
where, 
EPS,- = the reported primary earnings per share for firm- 
event i ; 
79 
E (EPSi ) = the last IBES consensus analyst forecast of the 
firm's primary earnings per share for the second quarter, 
issued prior to the earnings announcement date; and, 
Pf = ( Bi + A. ) / 2 and, Bi and A. are the mean bid price 
and the mean ask price of the firm-event i in the related 
estimation period, starting from t =-147 and ending t = -21 
days before the first or joint announcement. 
3.3.4.2 Reporting Lag (LAG^ 
In general, the greater the reporting lag, the greater 
will be the adverse selection costs of the market maker. 
A larger reporting lag increases the level of uncertainty 
associated with the expected announcement and provides 
informed traders a larger window to trade on their unique 
information. Further, a larger reporting lag for earnings 
may also reflect on the quality of the earnings disclosure, 
itself. On this note, Trueman (1990) has hypothesized that 
managers of firms with unfavorable news attempt to shift 
the recognition of income across periods with a view to 
increase the current periods reported income. However, 
this action takes time and hence causes a delay in the 
earnings announcement and is a probable explanation for the 
negative abnormal returns for delayed earnings 
announcements. 
For the purposes of this study, the expected date of 
earnings announcements is calculated using the "naive" model 
of Chambers and Penman (1984). The expected date of the 
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earnings announcement is based on the date of the earnings 
announcement in the previous year. The actual lag in the 
previous fiscal year is used as the expected lag between 
the quarter end and the earnings announcement date in the 
analysis period. The dummy variable, LAGi, takes the value 
of ' 1 if the firm reports later than the expected lag 
period in that quarter and is ' 0 ' otherwise. 
3.3.4.3 Volatility of Returns (VT^ 
The bid-ask spread is positively related to the 
variability of returns. The inventory holding costs 
increase in proportion to the volatility of returns as the 
risk of holding a non-diversified portfolio increases. 
Further, the increase in the variability of returns makes it 
difficult for the dealer to perceive the true price of the 
stock and increases his adverse selection costs (Copeland 
and Galai,1983). Hence, the variance of returns positively 
increases both the adverse selection cost component of the 
spread and the inventory holding cost component of the 
spread. To control for the effect of risk on the inventory 
holding cost component, the estimation model includes a 
risk variable, namely, the absolute change in price (Branch 
and Freed,1977). This variable is used as a proxy of the 
"bid-ask bounce" in transaction returns. 
French and Roll (1986) and Glosten (1988) point out 
that the inventory holding and order processing cost 
component of the spread cause an upward bias in the 
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variance of returns. The variance in returns due to the 
adverse selection costs (i.e. arrival of new information) 
reflects the true underlying variance of a stock's returns. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Glosten (1988) and Stoll (1989) 
demonstrate that the serial correlation in returns is caused 
by the non-adverse selection costs. This study, in 
addition, controls for the confounding influence of the 
variability of returns on the spread in the analysis period 
by making use of this latter result. 
Based on Schwert (1990) and Fama (1976,p. 114-119) the 
following regression was run for the entire estimation 
window: 
- b 
1.0 bi. 
J“1 
Ri, t-j + . . . (6) 
The regression was restricted to 8 lags as Schwert (1990) 
found only the first 8 lags to be significant. The R2 of 
this regression is the proportion of the variability of 
returns explained by the lagged values of returns (i.e. the 
trading noise element of the variance,French and Roll,1986), 
and is taken to be the proxy for the serial correlation in 
returns. The sample firms are sorted on the basis of their 
respective R-squares, and for firms with R-squares greater 
than the sample median, the variable VT. will take the value 
of ' 1 '. It is conjectured that the increase in the 
variance of returns will positively affect the inventory 
holding costs of such firms, and the variable VT. 
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controls6Xforthis confounding effect5 in the event period. 
This variable takes a value of zero for firms with R- 
squares lower than the median R2. 
Other control variables incorporated in the cross- 
sectional model are examined next. 
3.3.5 Other Control Variables 
1. The number of market makers (MM;) : For each firm-event i, 
the average number of market makers dealing in the firm's 
security over the estimation period for that quarter's 
earnings and dividend announcements is estimated and used 
in the cross-sectional study. This data has been extracted 
from the CRSP-NASDAQ data tapes. In general, the greater 
the competition between dealers and the larger the capital 
backing for the market making activities, the smaller will 
be the bid-ask spread of a firm (Stoll,1978). 
2. The number of institutional shareholders (INST^ and the 
number of insider shareholders (INSIDj) : For each firm, 
this data has been obtained from the Standard and Poor's 
OTC Handbook for each year in the sample period. In 
general, the larger the share holding of institutions, the 
greater will be the relevance of the quality of earnings 
issue. With a large set of institutional and insider 
shareholders, the adverse selection costs faced by the 
market maker will increase (Seyhun,1986; Glosten and 
Harris,1988), given lower quality of earnings disclosures 
(Hand,1990). Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) find that insider 
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holdings are a significant proxy for a dealer's adverse 
information costs and that there is a positive relationship 
between insider holdings and the dealer's perception of 
information asymmetry, and therefore the size of the spread. 
On the other hand, Chiang and Venkatesh do not find any 
significant relationship between institutional holding and 
the adverse information cost component of the spread. 
Hence, they conclude that dealer's do not regard 
institutions as information traders. On a different note, 
Bhushan (1989) demonstrates an negative association with 
the differential information environment of a firm and the 
number of institutional shareholders, which provides an 
alternative rationale to expect a negative relationship 
between the spread and these two variables. 
3. The day of the week the firm makes its announcement 
(DAYj) : This variable takes on the value ' 1 ' , if the 
earnings or dividend announcement is made on a Friday and a 
value ' 0 ' otherwise. In general, the adverse selection 
costs will increase by a larger amount if the announcement 
is made on a Friday. This is because of the increased 
level of uncertainty associated with the consequent non¬ 
trading period due to the increased possibility of the 
release and the selective access to some unique information 
by informed traders (Brock and Kleidon,1989; Ma et 
al.,1989) . 
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3.4 The Tests: Background 
All tests carried out on the bid-ask spread in the 
analysis period are based on the standard methodology 
developed by Brown and Warner (1985) assuming cross- 
sectional dependence in the dependent variable across the 
sample of firms. The tests for the hypotheses involve the 
calculation of the daily unexpected values of the dependent 
variable ( U^d) in the analysis period and the standardized 
unexpected value of the spread (SU- d) in the same period. 
Ui.d - ■ Si.d- E(Slid) ... (7) 
suifd - ui.d /i(Ud) ... (8) 
-21 ( D.5 
-< E t-Ui)2/l25) • 
t—147 
-21 
1 (U, ,E) /126 . . . (10 
t—147 
where, 
(a) d = -15...0...+10 days i.e. the analysis period and t = 
-147 to -21 days in the estimation period; 
(b) the E (S]. d) is the estimation period mean bid-ask spread 
(i.e. Uj) for the initial sets of hypotheses HI to H3. For 
all subsequent hypotheses i.e. for H4 to H7, however, a 
simultaneous equation system is used to estimate the 
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expected value of the spread on a day d in the analysis 
period. 
(c) s(Ud) is the time-series standard deviation of u. t 
over the estimation period and is the proxy for the event 
period standard deviation of the unexpected spread. This 
is used to standardize the unexpected spread component for 
the cross-sectional regressions. 
The following test statistic developed by Brown and 
Warner (1985) is calculated for the entire sample of firm- 
events i for each day d in the analysis period for the 
univariate tests on the standardized unexpected value of 
the spread: 
Ud/§{Ud) ...(11) 
This statistic has a t-distribution with 125 degrees of 
freedom. Further, 
. . . (12) 
where, M = N the number of firm-events in the sample. Also, 
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0.5 
• ■ ■ (13) 
-21 
£(ud) - { £ 
t—147 
(Ut-U)2/125) 
and 
- i M 
Ut - — F t 
t m4-^ 1’t 
“ 2-1 
. . . (14) 
-21 
U - { Yj tfJ/126 . . . (15) 
t—147 
The initial tests carried out on the bid-ask spread are 
described next. 
3.5 The Initial Tests 
3.5.1 Univariate Test of the Behavior of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Around Second Quarter Earnings and Dividend 
Announcement Dates 
For the initial hypotheses HI, the expected value of 
the dependent variable in the analysis period for each 
firm-event is the average bid-ask spread over the 
estimation period. This is calculated as follows: 
E(sl-d) - £ (Ai<c-flJ-t) /126... (16) 
t—147 
where, t = estimation period days. 
The time-series standard deviation of the deviation of 
the actual spread from the expected spread (s(Ud) estimated 
as in (9)) over the estimation period, is also calculated. 
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This hypothesis (HI) examines the behavior of the 
spread around second quarter earnings and subsequent 
dividend announcement dates. The test involves examining 
whether there has been a significant increase in d over 
the 2 6 day event period6. The Brown and Warner test 
statistic is calculated to examine the hypothesized 
increase in Ui d. The test statistic is also calculated, to 
examine the behavior of the bid-ask spread7, for each 
differential information portfolio. In these cases, M will 
be equal to the number of firm-events in each portfolio. 
Though Brown and Warner (1985) found this test statistic8 
to be robust to deviations from normality, following 
Ajinkya and Jain (1989) the tests are carried out once 
again after log transforming the spread variable. Ajinkya 
and Jain found that the test statistic is better specified 
after such a log transformation, given that their dependent 
variable (trading volume) had a non-normal distribution. 
3.5.2 Univariate Test of the Behavior of the Adverse 
Selection Cost Component Proxy Around Second Quarter 
Earnings and Dividend Announcement Dates 
This test of hypothesis H4 is carried out on the 
adverse selection cost component of the spread. 
Specifically/ the prediction error in the analysis period, 
i.e., the difference between the actual spread and the 
expected spread in the analysis period proxies for the 
adverse selection cost component of the spread. For this 
set of univariate tests, the expected spread in the 
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analysis period [E(S-) ] is estimated using a system of two 
structural equations. The system of equations will 
simultaneously adjust for inventory holding costs and order 
processing costs, as well as, adjust for the effect of the 
dealer's inventory policy on the bid-ask spread. Hence, in 
the estimation period, the following system is estimated by 
using Three Stage Least Squares, assuming cross-correlation 
between the structural error terms: 
Si t - a0 + a1(TVi t) + a2(Pi t) +a2 (R± t) + a^(Si ,_,) +1^ t . . (17a) 
+b2{MF;it) +b3 (TVj" t_i) ' . . dlb) 
where, (8a) and (8b) are the structural equations; and, 
i = 1.N sample firms-events; 
t = -147..to.-21 days before the first or joint 
announcement; 
S- = the daily spread; 
TV- = the daily trading volume; 
P. = the daily price; 
R. = the absolute change in price i.e. from day t-1 to 
day t, as a measure of the security's risk (used by Branch 
and Freed (1977); 
MF. t = the proxy for the market volume (Bamber 1986). 
The variables P1(t,Rjft, ®ift# an<^' are a^ Pre_ 
determined, while Sj t and TV^t are the endogenous 
variables9. The pre-determined variables in equation 
(17a) control for the holding and order processing cost 
components of the spread, and equation (17b) accounts for 
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the simultaneous relationship between the dealer's spread 
and the trading volume, given the inventory policy of the 
dealers in the market10. 
After the expected spread is determined, the adverse 
selection cost component proxy or the abnormal spread is 
estimated by subtracting the expected spread from the actual 
spread in the analysis period as was done before to get Ui d. 
Calculations listed in equations (7) to (10) are also 
carried out on the abnormal spread. 
The estimation of the E (Sl- d) basically involves the 
calculation of the reduced form coefficients from the 
structural coefficients, and combining the reduced form 
coefficients with the values of the exogenous variables to 
get the forecasted values of the dependent, endogenous 
variables (Kmenta,1986; Fomby, Hill and Johnson,1984). The 
hypothesis is tested using the test statistic developed by 
Brown and Warner (1985) as was done before with the mean- 
adjusted spread11 (refer to equations (11) to (15) ) . These 
tests were repeated with log transformed endogenous and 
exogenous variables, i.e., by running the estimation models 
as loglinear models, in order to check the robustness of 
the results to the presence of non-normalities in the data. 
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3.6 The Subsequent Tests 
3.6.1 Cross-sectional Tests on the Cumulative Standardized 
Unexpected Spread 
The cumulative prediction error for the unexpected 
spread in the analysis period is calculated as follows for 
each firm-event i: 
+ 10 
CSU11 - £ suiid . . . (18) 
t—15 
In the above formulation, the expected spread is the mean 
estimation period bid-ask spread. 
To test the hypotheses H2 and H3, specifically, the 
following cross-sectional tests is carried out on the 
variables CSUli : 
CSUli - a0 + a1(INFOli) + a2 (INF02i) +a3(QSi) + aA(INF01*QSi) 
+ a5 (INF02*QSi) +a6(JDli) +a1(D2i) 
+ ae(D31) +1^. 
where, 
i i = the firm-events ranging from i = 1 to N ; 
INF01. = ' 1 ' , for low differential information 
environment, and, ' 0 ' otherwise; 
INF02- = ' 1 #, for median differential information 
environment, and, ' 0 ' otherwise; 
QS. = the quality score of the firm. This score takes the 
value of ' 1 ' (for high quality of earnings disclosures) 
to ' 4 f (for low quality of earnings disclosures) if the 
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earnings predictability approach is used, or, takes the 
value of ' 4 7 ( high quality of earnings) to ' 8 7 (low 
quality of earnings) in the case of the earnings noise 
approach. 
Dli = ' 1 ’, if it is a joint announcement and ' 0 7 
otherwise; 
D2i = ' 1 7, if it is a sole earnings announcement and 
'0 7 otherwise; 
D3i = ' 1 7, if it is a dividend announcement subsequent 
to a earnings announcement and ' 0 7 otherwise. 
As per the hypotheses, it is expected that both a1 
and a2 will be significantly positive, i.e., the cumulative 
change in the bid-ask spread is larger for firms in the low 
differential and, possibly also, in the median differential 
information environment than change for the high 
differential information firms. It is expected that a3 
will also take on a significant positive value, indicating 
that as the firms quality of earnings disclosures 
decreases, the cumulative change in the bid-ask spread will 
be larger. Further, it is expected that the cumulative 
change in the spread of the low and high quality of earnings 
firms will depend on the degree of differential information 
in the environment, and both a4 and a5 will take positive 
values. 
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3.6.2 Cross-sectional Tests on the Cumulative Standardized 
Abnormal Spread 
The cumulative abnormal spread, the proxy for the 
cumulative unexpected adverse selection cost component, is 
estimated as follows: 
CSU2i 
+10 
C--15 
3Uitd . . . (20) 
Note that the estimated spread used to calculate the above 
formulation is estimated by the system of two equations 
mentioned before. As the adverse selection cost is 
essentially a time series cost, the cumulative prediction 
error, i.e. the cumulative abnormal spread, is taken as the 
proxy for the market maker's perception of the cumulative 
adverse selection cost with the arrival of informed traders 
with superior information12. 
The following cross-sectional test is carried out on 
the cumulative abnormal spread, CSL^., to specifically test 
the hypotheses H5 to H7 and the cumulative implication on 
the adverse selection costs: 
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CSU21 - C0 + c1( INFOli) + c2 (INF021) + C3 (0SX) + c4 (INF01 * QS1) 
+ C5 (INF02*QS1) + C6 (UEi) +C, (LAG,) + C8 (AW,) 
+ C9 (INSIDj) + c10 (INSTj) + Cu (QSi*INST1) + c12 (DAY}) 
+ C13(Dli) +0^(02^ *0^(03}) +C16(VTj) +Yi ... (21) 
where, 
i = 1.N firm-events; 
INFOl. = '1', for low differential information environment 
and 'O' otherwise; 
INF02i = '1', for medium differential information 
environment and 'O' otherwise; 
QS1- = the quality score of the firm; 
UE1- = the unexpected earnings of the firm in that quarter; 
LAGj = ' 1 ', if the earnings or dividend announcement is 
delayed and, '0 ', otherwise i.e. if it is timely or early; 
MM- = the average number of market makers dealing in the 
security in the estimation period; 
INSID. = the fraction of insider share holding; 
INST. = the fraction of institutional share holding; 
DAYi = ' 1 ', if the announcement is made on Friday and 
' O' otherwise; 
D1. = ' 1 ', if it is a joint announcement and ' 0 ' 
otherwise; 
D2. = ' 1 ' , if it is a sole earnings announcement and 
'0 ' otherwise; 
D3 = ' l ' if it is a dividend announcement subsequent 
i 
to a earnings announcement and ' 0 ' otherwise. 
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VT. = ' 1 ' if the variability of returns explained by 
lagged returns is greater than the median R2, and is ' 0 ' 
otherwise. 
It is expected that both c., and c2 will be 
significantly positive, as cumulative change in the abnormal 
spread and, therefore, the cumulative effect on the adverse 
selection costs is expected to be greater for firms in the 
low differential information environment than for those in 
the high differential information environment. This will 
indicate that the role of earnings and dividend 
announcements and their influence on dealer's perception of 
the level of information asymmetry increases inversely to 
the level of predisclosure information of the firm. 
As per the hypothesis, it is expected that c3 will be 
significantly positive as the change in the cumulative 
abnormal spread and the adverse selection costs is expected 
to be greater for firms with low quality of earnings (i.e. 
high quality of earnings scores). This will indicate that 
the dealer's perception of the level of the information 
asymmetry in the firm's environment decreases as the quality 
of the firm's earnings reports improves. Similarly, the 
dealer's perception of the level of information asymmetry, 
given a high level of institutional holdings, will also 
depend on the quality of the earnings reports. The better 
the quality of earnings signals and the lower the potential 
rewards for sophisticated analysis by institutional 
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investors, the smaller will be the adverse information cost 
component of the spread. Hence, it is expected that cn 
will be significant and positive. 
Both c6 and c7 are expected to be significantly 
positive. The larger the unexpected earnings component, 
the greater the will be the value of the unique information 
in the hands of the informed traders and, hence, the higher 
will be the dealer's losses in the hands of such traders. 
Given this, the cumulative change in the abnormal spread may 
be directly proportional to the magnitude of the unexpected 
earnings. The greater the delay in the earnings or dividend 
announcement, the larger the window available to the 
informed trader to operate with his unique information. 
This suggests that the dealer may face heightened adverse 
information costs given delayed reports, and hence the 
cumulative change in the abnormal spread may be larger for 
lagged earnings or dividend reports. 
Given the result that the spread reduces with an 
increase in the competition between dealers (Copeland and 
Galai,1983), it is expected that c8 will be 
significantly negative. The larger the set of dealers, the 
more liquid will be the market for the security. Given 
this, the dealers will be able to recoup their adverse 
selection costs with a smaller change in the abnormal 
spread. Further, it is expected that c9 will be 
significantly positive. As the number of insiders with 
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unique information increases, the dealers adverse 
information costs will also increase in proportion. 
However, the sign and magnitude of c9 and c10 may be 
confounded by the empirical observation made by Bhushan 
(1989) of a negative relationship between the number of 
institutional and insider shareholders, and the level of 
predisclosure information available for a firm. 
The coefficient on the DAYi variable, i.e. c12 , it is 
expected will be significantly positive because of the 
higher level of uncertainty regards the selective access by 
the informed traders to superior information, given the 
ensuing non-trading period. 
It is expected that the coefficients c13 to c15 will 
be positive and significant. To test whether joint 
announcements contain more information and are less noisy 
than sole earnings signals involves checking whether c13 is 
equal to cu. It is expected that cu, the sole earnings 
announcement coefficient, will be significantly larger than 
c13, the joint earnings announcement coefficient, because 
the level of noise in the latter will be reduced to the 
extent of the information contained in the joint dividend 
signal. Similarly, to check whether sequence matters for 
dividend announcements the significance of c15 is tested. 
It is expected that this coefficient will be positive; the 
information contained in a subsequent dividend announcement 
is conditioned by the information contained in the 
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preceding earnings announcement. Note that tests on CSl^. 
have been redone after log-transforming the endogenous and 
the exogenous variables to check the robustness of the 
cross-sectional results, given possible deviations from 
normality. 
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Notes 
1. According to Copeland and Galai (1983), the dealer 
offsets the losses he suffers in the hands of the informed 
traders with the gains he earns from the liquidity traders 
by increasing the bid-ask spread. While the dealer may 
widen the spread prior to earnings and dividend 
announcements, this has to be balanced with the expected 
increase in the trading volume (i.e., an increase in 
liquidity traders) around such public announcements. For 
e.g., Beaver (1968), Bamber (1986), Morse and Ushman (1986) 
have documented a significant increase in volume around 
earnings announcement dates. This trade-off between spread 
and volume is captured by the use of a simultaneous equation 
model in the estimation period. 
2. This requirement was raised to $3 million in 1982 and $% 
million in 1985. The sample firms have been checked to 
ensure that they meet this requirement. 
3. The lag of 35 days is necessary as the event period for 
both the first and the second announcement starts 15 days 
before and ends 10 days after the specific announcement. In 
addition, there is a gap of 10 days between the end of the 
estimation period and the start of the event period. Morse 
and Ushman (1983) used [-10,+10] as their event window. The 
use of a lag of 10 days between the first and the second 
announcement, as was done by Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), 
would have resulted in overlapping event periods between the 
first and the second announcement. In their study, 
Venkatesh and Chiang examined the behavior of the spread for 
only 7 days prior to the sample announcements. 
4. For firms where the SEC date stamp was not clear or was 
not found on the 10-k report, the May consensus forecast was 
used to derive the earnings predictability score. This is 
consistent with Swaminathan (1991). 
5. The regression residual with an appropriate 
transformation can be taken as the proxy for the daily 
standard deviation of returns on day t (Schwert,1990). The 
variable |ut| (7r/2)0*5, however, will be correlated with the 
variability in returns caused by the arrival of new 
information (and, therefore, the adverse selection cost 
component) and, hence, is not used as a proxy for risk in 
the spread estimation model. 
6. Similar tests are carried out for trading volume 
surrounding the second quarter earnings and subsequent 
dividend announcements. As in the case of the bid-ask 
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spread, the behavior of the trading volume variable has been 
re-examined after log-transforming the variable (Ajinkya and 
Jain,1989) . 
7. An alternate explanation for the increase in the spread 
surrounding the announcement dates is the 
"liquidity/inventory hypothesis", i.e., due to the dealers 
inventory and pricing policy and the need to maintain the 
inventories within a certain optimum range. In the period 
prior to the earnings and dividend announcement, the 
uninformed investors may sell their holdings of a firm's 
securities to minimize their risk exposure due to the 
uncertainty associated with the contents of the 
announcement. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) show that the 
dealer's bid and ask prices decrease as the dealers 
inventory increases beyond an optimal point, and that the 
dealer will lower the bid price more than the ask price to 
discourage sellers. Hence, the entire analysis (with the 
test statistics) has been repeated for ask prices and bid 
prices. If there is a systematic decrease in the bid and 
ask prices with the decrease in the bid prices being greater 
than the decrease in the ask prices, and an associated 
increase in the trading volume in the days prior to the 
announcements, there is reason to believe that the 
liquidity\inventory hypothesis is a valid description of 
events. A more direct test of this has been made by 
examining the behavior of the adverse selection cost 
component itself. 
8. To test the behavior of unexpected bid-ask spread in the 
presence of non-normalities, Corrado's Rank Test statistic 
has also been estimated over the event periods. This 
statistic involves the ranking of each U. t, where t = 1 to 
152 days in the estimation and event period. Further: 
(i) Kf t = rank (Uf t) 
(ii) J.' = (Ki t - 7*6.5), where 76.5 is the average rank over 
the 152f days.1' 
For each t=127 to 152 days, the z-statistic is computed as 
follows: 
Jt/§ (Jt) 
where, 
N 
- - Y,Ji kt 4-*/ Z' Nf. i 
and, 
S(J,) - 
152 
\| 152 (Jc) 
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9. The Hausman specification test is used to examine the 
exogeneity of the relevant endogenous variables on the 
right-hand side of each of the structural equations. The 
null hypothesis of this test is that there is no 
simultaneity in the structural equations, i.e., the 
variables S. and TVi are in fact exogenous in nature. If 
the study fails to reject the null hypothesis, the first 
structural equation of the model can be estimated by using 
Ordinary Least Squares to get consistent and efficient 
estimates. The results are discussed in Chapter 4. 
10. The first structural equation controls for the inventory 
and order processing costs of the spread assuming that the 
adverse selection costs are uncorrelated and orthogonal to 
these components. In the first structural equation of the 
estimation model, price proxies for the minimum holding cost 
and the capital locked up for a security's market making. 
Price is positively related to the quoted spread. The 
trading volume variable proxies for the holding period of 
the dealer and is negatively related to the total spread. 
The risk variable is positively related to the spread. As 
the absolute change in price increases, the dealer's risk of 
holding a non-diversified portfolio increases and, hence the 
spread. The choice of the proxies for the holding and the 
order processing costs (i.e. price, trading volume and risk) 
and the rationale behind them is based on Morse and Ushman 
(1983), Stoll (1978), Branch and Freed (1977), and, Glosten 
and Harris (1988). The second structural equation accounts 
for the dealer's inventory policy, which involves adjusting 
the spread to keep the inventory levels within the optimal 
range (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980), after adjusting for 
market-wide movements. Note that the market volume variable 
is the aggregate market volume of firms in the sample. The 
lagged variables account for possible first-order 
autocorrelation in volume (Ajinkya and Jain,1989) and spread 
(Conrad and Niden,1990; Seyhun,1986). Similar structural 
equations were used by Hegde and Miller (1989), Conrad and 
Niden (1990), Glosten and Harris (1988) for cross-sectional 
studies. 
11. In addition, the Rank Test of Corrado (1989) has been 
carried out on the adverse selection cost component proxy or 
the abnormal spread as was done with unexpected spread. 
12. Hasbrouck (1991) uses a vector autoregressive approach 
to look at the cumulative quote revision to measure the 
information content of stock trades (or, trade innovations) 
over time. Such a measure will look at the persistent 
impact on the price of information arrivals as opposed to 
immediate impacts on price due to transient liquidity 
considerations. Hasbrouck suggests that the full 
information effect of a trade on security price is felt with 
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12. Hasbrouck (1991) uses a vector autoregressive approach 
to look at the cumulative quote revision to measure the 
information content of stock trades (or, trade innovations) 
over time. Such a measure will look at the persistent 
impact on the price of information arrivals as opposed to 
immediate impacts on price due to transient liquidity- 
considerations. Hasbrouck suggests that the full 
information effect of a trade on security price is felt with 
a protracted lag and is not instantaneous. Unlike transient 
inventory related effects on price, the information impact 
of a trade persists over a period of time and, according to 
Hasbrouck, is the ultimate impact of the stock price or 
quote resulting from the unexpected component of the trade. 
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API = Analysis period for first or joint 
announcements [-15,+10] made on 0, 
AP2 = Analysis period [+20,+45] for second (dividend) 
announcement (02) , for e.g., on +35 
* = Earliest possible second announcement date i.e. +25 
551 = Sample selection criteria 1: Second announcement 
should be at least 25 days after the first 
announcement. Firms with second announcements in the 
[0,,+25] window have been omitted 
552 = Sample selection criteria 2: Second announcement no 
later than 35 days after the first one 
553 = No other confounding events in the [-35,0,] window 
NOTE: 21 trading days per calendar month assumed 
Analysis of Quarter Two Results: Research Design 
Figure 1 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA DESCRIPTION, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, a brief description of the sample 
data, and the results of the Hausman specification test will 
be provided along with a discussion of the normality of the 
spread variable. Further, the results of the univariate 
tests and the cross-sectional tests will be discussed for 
each hypothesis. 
The initial three hypotheses relate to the behavior of 
the unexpected spread and log spread in the event \riods. 
The rest of the hypotheses relate to the abnormal spread 
which is taken to be the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. The hypotheses have been 
grouped together as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS NO REMARKS 
1. HI AND H4 
2. H2 and H5 
Full sample hypotheses 
Differential information hypothesis 
3. H3 and H6 Quality of earnings hypothesis 
4. H7 Signal sequencing hypothesis 
The discussion of the hypotheses results is in the sequence 
mentioned above. In all cases, initially, the detailed 
results for unexpected spread and log spread have been 
presented. Detailed results for the daily volume and log 
volume variables have been reported as endnotes. These 
results are followed by the detailed results for abnormal 
spread and log spread for the same set of portfolios. 
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Finally, based on these detailed results, the implications 
of these results for each set of hypotheses has been fleshed 
out in a separate section. Explanations for the results 
based on the adverse selection cost theory of Copeland and 
Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) have been 
examined. Alternate explanations for those results not 
consistent with this theory have also been forwarded. 
Further, for the purposes of this analysis, the event period 
has been divided into three sub-periods (i) the pre- 
announcement period from day -15 to day -2, (ii) the 
announcement period from day -1 to day 0, and, (iii) the 
post-announcement period from day +1 to +10. 
4.1 Data Description 
The final sample consists of 54 firms and 153 firm 
events i.e. earnings announcements (Table 1). Out of the 
153 earnings announcements, 73 firm events have subsequent 
dividend announcements. The rest (Table 2) are either joint 
earnings and dividend announcements (36 firm-events) or sole 
earnings announcements (44 firm-events). The sample (Table 
3) is well spread out over the five sample years from 1985 
to 1989 with no year-wise clustering of firm-events . While 
a majority of the firms in the sample (Table 4) are from 
various manufacturing industries, there is a cluster of 
firms from the banking sector and may cause some cross- 
sectional dependence in the behavior of the bid-ask spread 
in the event period. Hence, the Brown and Warner test 
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statistic which accounts for such cross-sectional dependence 
has been used in this study for the univariate tests. An 
overall description of the estimation period sample means 
for spread, volume, price and firm has been provided in 
Table 5. In addition. Tables 6 and 7 describe the quality 
of earnings variables and the median scores for each 
portfolio, while Tables 8 and 9 list the yearwise sample 
means of the differential information portfolios. 
Table 11 describes the effect of the log transformation 
on the bid-ask spread. The proportion of firm-events with a 
coefficient of skewness and kurtosis that is significantly 
different from the expected value of zero for a normal 
distribution reduces significantly after log-transformation 
of the spread variable. This analysis is based on a Chi- 
square test of proportions at 95% confidence levels1. 
Hence, the univariate tests have also been carried out for 
log spread. However, there is some degree of non-normality 
still present in the log spread variable. Hence, to further 
verify the robustness of the parametric results, the Corrado 
Rank Test, a non-parametric test, has also been estimated at 
the univariate level. 
4.2 The Simultaneous Equation Estimation Models 
The Hausman specification test2 ( Table 13) was 
carried out to test the endogeneity of the volume variable 
in the spread equation and, at the same time, the spread 
variable in the volume equation. A Chi-square goodness of 
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fit test was carried out at 95% confidence levels to test 
the significance of the proportion of firm-events for which 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected. Overall, 
the results demonstrate that these variables are endogenous 
in nature for a significant proportion of firm-events3. 
For both the spread and the log spread equation, all 
independent variables have a positive mean coefficient 
(Tables 14 and 15). Interestingly, the mean R-square does 
not change with the log transformation of the structural 
models. In both versions, lag spread and the risk variable 
are significant a larger proportion of times4 compared to 
the other independent variables. Table 16 provides the mean 
reduced form coefficients (the impact multipliers) which 
quantify the change in spread (log spread) for a unit change 
in the independent variable. 
The detailed results of the various sets of hypotheses 
have been presented below in the remaining sections. 
4.3 Hypothesis 1 (HI): Univariate Results 
This hypothesis relates to the behavior of the 
unexpected spread and log spread surrounding earnings and 
dividend announcements. 
The results for the earnings signal are provided first 
followed by the results for the dividend announcements. 
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4.3.1 The Earnings Signal 
There is no evidence of any significant increase or 
decrease in the bid-ask spread around second quarter 
earnings (Table 17). 
The results for log spread are, essentially, the same 
as the results obtained for spread. However, in the pre- 
announcement period the decrease in spread is significant on 
days -11 and -4. These results are confirmed by the Rank 
test-statistic at lower significance levels. 
4.3.2 The Dividend Signal 
There are no significant changes in the daily spread 
around the dividend signal issued after a second quarter 
earnings announcement (Table 19), except for significant 
decreases in the spread on days -9, -2, and -1 as per the 
Rank test-statistic. With the log transformation, however, 
there is evidence of a significant spread decrease on day 
-10 in the pre-announcement period. While log spread 
increases on days 0 and +1, the increase is significant only 
on day +1, and is not corroborated by the Rank test- 
statistic. After the announcement, there are significant 
decreases in the daily spread and log spread on day +4 and 
+ 6 . 
4.3.3 Univariate Test Of HI: Observations on the Earnings 
and Dividend Signals 
Based on the results of the univariate tests, there do 
not appear to be any significant changes in the daily spread 
and log spread around the earnings signal^ except for 
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significant decreases on certain days in the pre¬ 
announcement period. However, there is some evidence of 
significant changes in the daily log spread around the 
dividend announcement6 in the pre and post-announcement 
period. 
4.4 Hypothesis 4 (H4): Univariate Results 
This hypothesis relates to the behavior of the abnormal 
spread and log spread surrounding earnings and dividend 
announcements. The abnormal spread and log spread proxy for 
the adverse selection cost component of the spread. 
The behavior of the abnormal spread and log spread 
surrounding the earnings announcement is examined first, 
followed by an examination of the results for the dividend 
announcement. 
4.4.1 The Earnings Signal 
No significant change in the abnormal spread is 
observed during the event period (Table 53). However, there 
are significant decreases in the abnormal log spread on days 
-11, -6, and -4 in the pre-announcement period. These 
results are also documented by the Rank test-statistic. 
There is evidence of non-significant increases in abnormal 
spread and log spread on days -1 and 0. In the post- 
announcement period, significant decreases in the abnormal 
log spread are observed on day +1 and + 6. Some evidence of 
this decrease is also provided by the Rank test-statistic 
for the days +1, +6, + 9, and +10. 
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4.4.2 The Dividends Signal 
In the pre-announcement period, as per the parametric 
tests, abnormal spread and log spread decrease significantly 
on days -15 and -10 (Table 54). As per the Rank test, the 
days of significant decrease are -9 and -2. Interestingly, 
the non-parametric tests provide some evidence of an 
increase in abnormal spread on day -12. 
While there is some evidence of an increase in abnormal 
spread on day 0 as per the Brown and Warner test-statistics, 
these results are not supported by the Rank test-statistic. 
Abnormal log spread increases significantly on day +1, the 
day after the announcement. Similarly, there is a 
significant decrease in abnormal spread on day +6 which is 
not corroborated by the Rank test-statistic. However, 
abnormal log spread does decrease significantly on days + 6 
and +7. Significant decreases in abnormal log spread are 
also evident on days +2 and +4 (the latter day is confirmed 
by the Rank test-statistic). 
4.4.3 Univariate Tests of H4: Observations on the Earnings 
and Dividend Signals 
For the earnings signal, there are significant 
decreases in the dependent variable in the event period. 
The evidence is mixed for the dividends signal. There is 
evidence of significant decreases in the pre-announcement 
period. As per the Rank test only, there is weak evidence 
of an increase in abnormal spread on day -12. Abnormal log 
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spread significantly increases on the day after the dividend 
announcement. 
4.5 Overall Conclusions: Full Sample Hypothesis 
4.5.1 The Full Sample Hypotheses (HI and H4): Results for 
the Earnings Signal 
The results for the pre-announcement period demonstrate 
that there are significant decreases in the daily bid-ask 
spread and log spread. This may be due to a decrease in 
either the order processing and the holding cost component 
or the adverse selection cost component, or, both. In the 
pre-announcement period there is no increase in the daily 
volume (see footnote 5). Given that there is evidence 
available in other studies that would indicate that return 
variances and, therefore, risk does not decrease in this 
period (Patell and Wolfson (1982), Chari, et. al (1988)), 
it is reasonable to assume that there is no decrease in the 
order processing and holding cost components of the spread. 
Hence, the significant decreases in the daily bid-ask spread 
may possibly be explained by the significant decreases in 
the adverse selection cost component proxies in the pre¬ 
announcement period. This suggests that there is a 
decrease in the market makers' perception of the relative 
information asymmetry in the environment prior to second 
quarter earnings announcements of OTC firms. Assuming that 
insiders and other informed traders possess finer 
information than the market-makers (Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985), this may imply the following: 
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(i) that the ratio of the informed to the uninformed arrival 
rates does not increase given the SEC "abstain or disclose" 
requirements7; 
(ii) that the uniformed demand and supply is inelastic and 
the market-makers can easily recoup the losses suffered in 
the hands of informed traders; 
(iii) that insiders do trade around such announcements 
despite SEC regulations but the market-makers perceive such 
trades and the subsequent earnings signals as joint signals 
that complement each other (see John and Mishra, 1990)8. 
The decrease in the abnormal spread in the post- 
announcement period (days +1 and +6), given the increase in 
volume on day -1 and 0, suggests that there is a decline in 
the adverse selection costs and the perceived level of 
information asymmetry in the environment once the earnings 
information is impounded in the prices (Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985) . 
4.5.2 The Full Sample Hypotheses (HI and H4): Results for 
the Dividends Signal 
In the pre-announcement period -15 to -10 log volume 
decreases significantly (see footnote 6). The Rank test- 
statistic demonstrates a decrease in volume in this period 
especially a weakly significant decrease on day -13. 
Assuming that risk levels remain the same, in this time 
period, this suggests an increase in the order and holding 
cost components of the spread. Hence, the decrease in log 
spread on days -15 and -10 is driven by the significant 
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decrease in abnormal log spread on the same days. 
Similarly, as per the Rank test-statistic abnormal spread 
decreases on day -9. However, there is weak evidence of an 
increase in abnormal spread on day -12, as per the non- 
parametric test results, which reflect increased perceptions 
of informed trading on that day. 
In the rest of the pre-announcement period, log volume 
increases significantly on day -7 and -5, and declines on 
days -4 and -2. The decrease in volume on day -1 is 
significant as per the Rank test-statistic. As per the Rank 
test-statistic, abnormal spread declines on day -2 and -1 
causing a significant decrease in the bid-ask spread on days 
-2 and -1. There is an increase in the bid-ask spread and 
abnormal spread on day -3 possibly due to informed trading 
on day-3. 
These results in the pre-announcement event period 
suggest that the market-makers perceive a decrease in the 
relative information asymmetry prior to dividend signals 
given the "abstain or disclose" requirements of the SEC. An 
alternate explanation may relate to the insider trade data 
that is filed with the SEC for trades made by insiders 
around the earlier earnings announcement9. The market 
makers have access to such public information and may view 
such trades as signals that complement the information 
contained in the earnings announcements. Hence, the 
associated decrease in the perceived information asymmetry 
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in the pre-announcement period. However, the increase in 
abnormal spread on day -3 is not consistent with the 
hypothesis that insider trades are viewed as informative 
joint signals by investors. 
The increase in the log spread variable on day +1 may 
be driven by increased order processing and holding costs 
given increased risk levels and, also, by an increase in the 
adverse selection costs (abnormal log spread increases on 
day +1). This suggests that the dividends signal contains 
information that is perceived to be noisy in nature. Note 
that while this particular result is not corroborated by the 
Rank test-statistic, there is evidence of an increase in 
adverse selection costs on day +9 based on the non- 
parametric results. The significant decreases in the 
abnormal spread on days +2, +6 and +7 in the post¬ 
announcement period reflects the reduced level of 
information asymmetry once information gets impounded in the 
stock price. 
4.6 Hypothesis 2 (H2): Univariate and Cross-sectional 
Results 
This hypothesis relates to the behavior of unexpected 
spread and log spread surrounding earnings and dividend 
announcements across differential information portfolios. 
The univariate results for the earnings signal and the 
dividend signal have been documented initially. Due to 
inadequate sample size, only the results for the analysts 
following based differential information portfolios have 
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been discussed for the dividend announcement. Following 
this discussion of the univariate results, the cross- 
sectional results for both earnings and dividend 
announcements have been provided. 
4.6.1 The Low Differential Information Portfolio: Univariate 
Results for the Earnings Signal 
4.6.1.1 Firm Size Based Portfolio 
There is no significant change in the daily spread and 
log spread in the event period surrounding the earnings 
signal except for a significant decrease on day +6 (Table 
21). Note that as per the Rank test-statistic, this is a 
non-significant decrease. 
4.6.1.2 Analysts' Following Based Portfolio 
The evidence is very similar to the firm-size based 
portfolios (Table 22). There is no evidence of a change in 
the daily spread and log spread in the event period except 
for a significant decrease in the spread and log spread on 
day +6. In addition, as per the Rank test-statistic, 
abnormal spread decreases significantly on day -9. 
4.6.2 The Medium Differential Information Portfolio: 
Univariate Results for the Earnings Signal 
4.6.2.1 Firm Size Based Portfolio 
Both spread and log spread demonstrate a significant 
decreases in the daily spread and log spread on days -11 and 
-3 in the pre-announcement period (Table 25). This is 
followed by a significant increase in the spread and log 
spread on the announcement day in the Wall Street Journal 
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(WSJ), i.e. day 0. In addition, spread and log spread 
demonstrates a significant decrease on day +10. 
4.6.2.2 Analysts' Following Based Portfolio 
Both spread and log spread (Table 26) demonstrate a 
significant increase on day 0, the day of announcement of 
earnings in the WSJ, as per the parametric tests. However, 
these results are not confirmed by the Rank test-statistic. 
4.6.3 The High Differential Information Portfolio: 
Univariate Results for the Earnings Signal 
4.6.3.1 Firm Size and Analysts' Following Based Portfolios 
Both spread and log spread decreases significantly on 
day -4 for both types of differential information portfolios 
(Tables 29 and 30). 
4.6.4 Univariate Tests on H2: Observations on the earnings 
Signal 
For the low differential information portfolios, with 
and without log transformation of spread, there are no 
significant changes in the dependent variable except for 
some weak evidence of a significant decrease on day +610. 
All the medium differential information portfolios show 
a significant increase in daily spread and log spread on day 
0 with a significant decrease on day +10. In addition, for 
the firm size based portfolios there are significant 
decreases on days -11 and -3 in the pre-announcement 
period11. 
Essentially, the high differential information 
portfolios show no significant change in daily spread and 
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log spread in the event period12 except for a significant 
decrease on day -4. 
Hence, other than the significant increase in the 
dependent variables on the day of the announcement for the 
medium differential information portfolios there appear to 
be no significant differences in the behavior of the daily 
spread and log spread between portfolios across all 
univariate tests. 
4.6.5 The Low Differential Information Portfolio: Univariate 
Results for the Dividend Signal 
Both unexpected spread and log spread demonstrate 
significant decreases (Table 33), as per the Brown and 
Warner test-statistics, in the initial eight days of the 
pre-announcement period. This evidence is weakly supported 
by the Rank test-statistic. There is some evidence of 
increases in spread on days -6 and -3. Unexpected log 
spread decreases on day -1 and, in addition, both unexpected 
spread and log spread decrease significantly on day +1 in 
the post-announcement period. In the rest of the post- 
announcement period there are days of significant decreases 
in unexpected log spread13. 
4.6.6 The Medium Differential Information Portfolio: 
Univariate Results for the Dividend Signal 
There is a significant decrease in unexpected log 
spread on day -15 and day -2 (Table 35). The latter 
decrease is confirmed by the Rank test. Unexpected log 
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spread decreases significantly on day +2 and day + 7 as per 
the parametric tests14. 
4.6.7 The High Differential Information Portfolio: 
Univariate Results for the Dividend Signal 
There is no significant increase in unexpected log 
spread (Table 37) but there is evidence of a significant 
increase on day -14 and -1 as per the non-parametric test. 
While the Rank test-statistic demonstrates no significant 
change in this variable over the post-announcement period, 
unexpected log volume decreases significantly on day +715. 
4.6.8 Univariate Tests of H2: Observations on the Dividend 
Signal 
The low differential information portfolio demonstrates 
weak evidence of decreases in spread followed by increases 
in spread in the pre-announcement period. Unexpected log 
spread decreases significantly on day -1. Unexpected spread 
and log spread increase significantly on the day after the 
announcement and, then, demonstrate evidence of significant 
decreases in the post-announcement period. 
The medium differential information portfolio 
demonstrates significant decreases in spread on days -15 and 
-2. There is a significant decrease in unexpected spread on 
day -1 as per the Rank test-statistic. In the post¬ 
announcement period, significant decreases are evident for 
the unexpected log spread variable. 
The high differential information portfolio 
demonstrates no significant change in unexpected spread and 
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log spread except for a significant increase on day -14 as 
the Rank test-statistic. Similarly, as per the Rank 
test-statistic, there is evidence of a significant increase 
in spread. In the post-announcement period, there is no 
significant change in the dependent variables except for a 
significant decrease on day + 7. 
4.6.9 Cross-sectional Tests on Cumulative Standardized 
Unexpected Spread and Log Spread: Results for Earnings and 
Dividend Signals 
The results of the analysts' following based portfolios 
are discussed first (Tables 88 to 93). For cumulative 
standardized unexpected spread, none of the coefficients 
(i.e. of INF01- and INF02.) were significant. In addition, 
the overall regression F-statistics were not significant in 
all cases. This suggests that there is no significant 
difference in the cumulative standardized unexpected spread 
across differential information portfolios. Identical 
results were obtained for cumulative standardized unexpected 
log spread suggesting no significant differences in 
cumulative standardized unexpected log spread between the 
low and medium differential (low and medium analysts' 
following) and the high differential (high analysts' 
following) groups. The results for the firm-size based 
portfolios are discussed next ( Tables 47 to 52) . 
Both, the coefficient of INF02i as well as the overall 
regression are significant with the firm size and earnings 
noise combination with cumulative standardized unexpected 
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log spread as the dependent variable (Table 49) . This 
coefficient was significant and negative at reduced 
probability levels in the case of cumulative standardized 
unexpected spread. The significant negative coefficient 
suggests that the cumulative decrease (increase) in the 
cumulative standardized unexpected log spread was 
significantly larger (smaller) for medium differential 
information firms than firms in the high differential 
information portfolio based on firm size, after controlling 
for the effect of other covariates. A study of the means 
demonstrates that, without adjusting for the influence of 
other covariates, there is a cumulative decrease in the 
standardized unexpected log spread for the medium 
differential information firms and a cumulative increase in 
the standardized unexpected log spread for the high 
differential information firms (Table 47). Further, for 
both standardized unexpected spread and log spread the 
cumulative decrease for the low differential portfolio is 
lower than the decrease for the medium differential 
information portfolio. 
None of the other firm-size based cross-sectional 
regressions were significant (Tables 51 and 52). 
4.7 Hypothesis 5 (H5): Univariate and Cross-sectional 
Results 
This hypothesis relates to the behavior of abnormal 
spread and log spread surrounding earnings and dividend 
announcements across differential information portfolios. 
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The univariate results for the earnings signal are 
discussed first. The results surrounding the dividend 
announcement are examined next. For the dividend signal 
only the analysts' following based differential information 
portfolios have been examined for sample size reasons. 
Finally, the cross-sectional results relating to both types 
of announcements have been discussed. 
4.7.1 The Low Differential Information Portfolio: Univariate 
Results for the Earnings Signal 
4.7.1.1 Firm Size Based Portfolio 
While the daily abnormal spread and log spread (Table 
55) demonstrate non-significant decreases in the pre¬ 
announcement period, the decrease in the log abnormal spread 
is significant on day -11. Both abnormal spread and log 
spread decrease significantly on days +2 and +6. However, 
as per the Rank test only the decrease on day +6 is 
significant. 
4.7.1.2 Analysts' Following Based Portfolio 
While there is a significant decrease, as per the Brown 
and Warner tests, in the abnormal spread on day -11, both 
abnormal spread and log spread show non-significant 
decreases in the rest of the pre-announcement period. The 
decrease in abnormal spread on day -9 is significant as per 
the Rank test-statistic (Table 56). Both variables display 
non-significant increases on day -1 and 0. There is a 
significant decrease in the abnormal spread and log spread 
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on days + 2 and +6. In addition, as per the Rank test there 
is weak evidence of a decrease on day +8. 
4.7.2 The Medium Differential Information Portfolio: 
Univariate Results for the Earnings Signal 
4.7.2.1 Firm Size Based Portfolio 
Both, abnormal spread and log spread demonstrate 
significant decreases on days -11,-7,-4,and -3 in the pre¬ 
announcement period (Table 57). Daily abnormal spread and 
log spread increases significantly on day 0, though this 
increase is not significant according to the Rank test- 
statistic. In the post-announcement period the variables 
decrease significantly on days +l,+3,+7,+8, and +10. 
4.7.2.2 Analysts' Following Based Portfolio 
On days -11 and -4 in the pre-announcement period there 
are significant decreases in abnormal spread and log spread 
(Table 58). In addition, daily abnormal log spread 
decreases significantly on day -6. Both abnormal spread and 
log spread demonstrate a significant decrease on day +1, the 
day following the announcement. 
4.7.3 The High Differential Information Portfolio: 
Univariate Results for the Earnings Signal 
4.7.3.1 Firm Size and Analysts' Following Based Portfolios 
There is no significant change in the daily abnormal 
spread and log spread for both firm size based and analysts' 
following based portfolios (Tables 59 and 60) except for a 
significant decrease on day -4. In addition, the analyses 
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following based portfolios demonstrates a significant 
decrease on day -10 as per the Rank test-statistic. 
4.7.4 Univariate Tests of H5: Observations on the Earnings 
Signal 
The low differential information firms demonstrate 
evidence of some non-significant decreases and some 
significant decreases (day -9 and -11 for abnormal spread 
for the analysts' following based portfolio and, also, for 
log abnormal spread for the firm size based portfolio) in 
the pre-announcement period. For none of the low 
differential information portfolios is the increase in the 
abnormal spread and log spread on day -1 and 0 significant. 
However, both variables decrease significantly on day +2 and 
+6 in the post-announcement period. 
The medium differential information firms have days of 
significant decrease in abnormal spread and log spread in 
the pre-announcement period. While the firm size based 
portfolios show significant decreases on several days in the 
post-announcement period, the analysts' following based 
portfolios show significant a decrease only on day +1 
followed by non-significant decreases after this day. 
While there is a significant decrease in abnormal 
spread and log spread on day -4 ( and on day -9 for the 
analysts' following based portfolio), the high differential 
information firms essentially demonstrate no significant 
change in the event period. 
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4.7.5 The Low Differential Information Portfolio: Univariate 
Results for the Dividend Signal 
The Brown and Warner test-statistic based results are 
discussed initially followed by the results of the non- 
parametric test (Table 61). 
Both abnormal spread and log spread decrease 
significantly from day -15 to day -8. While abnormal spread 
increases significantly on days -6 to -3, abnormal log 
spread increases significantly only on day -3 in the pre¬ 
announcement period. There is a significant increase in 
abnormal spread on days 0 and +1 followed by significant 
decrease on day +2, +4, and +6. While daily abnormal log 
spread increases on days 0 and +1 the change is significant 
only on the latter day. In the post-announcement period, 
abnormal log spread decreases significantly on day +2 and 
+4. Interestingly, abnormal spread demonstrates a 
significant increase on day +7. 
It is evident that there are significant non¬ 
normalities existing in this portfolio. The results based 
on the Rank test statistic are much weaker. According to 
these results, there is a significant decrease on day -9. 
The increase on day -6 is significant only at reduced levels 
of significance as is the case with the decrease on day +2. 
In sum, there is weak evidence of a decrease followed by an 
increase in the pre-announcement period. 
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4.7.6 The Medium Differential Information: Univariate 
Results for the Dividend Signal 
The results of the parametric tests are discussed 
first. There is a significant increase in daily abnormal 
spread on day -8 followed by a significant decrease on day 
-1 (Table 62). The increase on day 0 is not significant but 
is succeeded by significant decreases on day +1 and +7 in 
the post-announcement period. 
The evidence is very similar with abnormal log spread. 
This variable shows a significant decrease in the spread on 
day -5, a mild decrease on day -1 in the pre-announcement 
period and no significant increase on day 0. The daily 
abnormal log spread decreases significantly on day +1, +3, 
and +7 in the post-announcement period. 
The Rank test-statistic confirms only the decrease in 
abnormal spread on day +1. On the other hand, there is weak 
evidence of an increase on day -12 followed by a decrease on 
day -11. 
4.7.7 The High Differential Information: Univariate Results 
for the Dividend Signal 
For the high differential information portfolio (Table 
63), there is no significant change in the daily abnormal 
spread in the event period except for a significant increase 
on day -14. However, daily abnormal log spread shows 
significant increases on day -14 and day -11 as well as a 
significant decrease on day -10. Interestingly, in the 
post-announcement period, there is a significant increase on 
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day +1 and +10 for the abnormal log spread. These last 
results are not confirmed by the Rank test-statistic. 
4.7.8 Univariate Tests on H5: Observations on the Dividend 
Signal 
The low differential information portfolio shows weak 
evidence of a significant decrease followed by a significant 
increase in the pre-announcement period. The increase in 
the abnormal log spread on day +1 is significant but not 
corroborated by the non-parametric results. There is some 
evidence of significant decreases in abnormal spread and log 
spread in the post-announcement period based on the 
parametric tests. 
Unlike the low differential information portfolio, the 
medium differential information portfolio displays a 
significant decrease only on days -5 and -1, for abnormal 
log spread, and day -11 for abnormal spread as per the Rank 
test-statistic. The increase on the announcement day is not 
significant. In the post-announcement period abnormal log 
spread decreases significantly on days +l,+3, and +7. 
The high differential information firms demonstrate a 
significant increase in the abnormal spread and log spread 
on day -14. In addition, abnormal log spread shows a 
significant increase on day -11 followed by a significant 
decrease on day -10. These results are not evident on 
examining the Rank test-statistic for these days. Abnormal 
log spread increases significantly on days +1 and +10 in the 
post-announcement period. 
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4.7.9 Cross-sectional Tests on Cumulative Standardized 
Abnormal Spread and Log Spread: Results for Earnings and 
Dividend Signals 
4.7.9.1 Analysts' Following Based Portfolio 
For the analysts' based portfolios, none of the 
coefficients (i.e. INF01l-, INF02l-, INFOl^QE., INF021- *QEi) are 
significant (Table 106 and 107). This suggests that there 
is no significant difference in the cumulative change in the 
standardized abnormal spread and log spread across the 
differential information portfolios. Further, for both the 
low and medium differential information portfolios, there is 
no significant change in the cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread and log spread with a change in the quality 
of the earnings signal. 
4.7.9.2 Firm Size Based Portfolio 
The evidence is mixed for the firm size based 
portfolios depending on whether the quality of earnings 
variable is defined by the earnings noise measure or the 
earnings predictability measure. However, in all cases the 
overall regression F-statistic is significant. 
With the earnings noise measure as the basis, the 
coefficient of INFOl,. (i.e. the low differential information 
group) is significant and positive (Tables 73 and 74). On 
the other hand, the coefficient of INF02i (i.e. the high 
differential information) is not significant. The direction 
of the INFOl- coefficient is as hypothesized. It suggests 
that the cumulative increase (decrease) in the cumulative 
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standardized abnormal spread and log spread will be greater 
(smaller) for the low differential information firms as 
compared to the high differential information firms. 
However, the portfolio means (Table 72) demonstrate a 
cumulative decrease in the dependent variables for the low 
differential information portfolio while there is an 
cumulative increase for the high differential information 
firms16. 
With earnings predictability measures as a basis of 
classifying firms into quality of earnings portfolios (Table 
76), the coefficient for the low differential information 
portfolio is not significant (INF011-) but the coefficient of 
the medium differential information portfolio (INF02i) is 
significant and negative for cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread only. This suggests that the cumulative 
decrease (increase) in the standardized abnormal spread is 
greater (smaller) for the medium differential information 
firms than that of the high differential information firms. 
Note that it was hypothesized that the sign of this 
coefficient would be positive and that the medium 
differential information firms would have a larger increase, 
or, a smaller decrease than the large firms. In fact, a 
study of the portfolio means suggests a cumulative decrease 
in the dependent variable for the medium differential 
information firms and a cumulative increase for the high 
differential information firms (Table 75). Further, the 
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cumulative decrease in the standardized unexpected spread 
and log spread (Table 76) is greater (smaller) for the firm 
size (analysts' following) based portfolio. 
4.7.10 Overall Conclusions: The Differential Information 
Hypotheses (H2 and H5) 
The implications of the results of the differential 
information portfolios are discussed in the next few 
sections. 
4.7.10.1 Differential Information Portfolios: Earnings 
Signal 
For the low differential information portfolios the 
pre-announcement period is characterized by a decrease in 
volume (see endnote 10) with some evidence of decreases in 
spread, log spread, abnormal spread and log spread in the 
same period especially on day -9. With the decrease in the 
volume (assuming that risk levels remain constant for the 
market makers) these results imply an increase in the order 
processing and holding cost components in the pre¬ 
announcement period which have been compensated by a 
decrease in the adverse selection costs. Following a 
significant increase in volume on the announcement day , it 
is not surprising to observe significant decreases in the 
adverse selection cost proxies in the post-announcement 
period. The latter result reflects the fact that the 
information from the public disclosure has been impounded in 
the security price. 
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In the case of the medium differential information 
portfolios and especially for the firm-size based 
portfolios, there is weak evidence of significant decreases 
in the volume variable (see endnote 11) in the pre¬ 
announcement period. The decrease in spread in the pre¬ 
announcement period, hence, seems to be driven by the 
reduced levels of information asymmetry as evidenced by 
significant decrease in abnormal spread and log spread. The 
increase in bid-ask spread on day 0 may be driven by an 
increase in the order and holding cost component due to an 
increase in the perceived levels of risk and no change in 
the trading volume. The adverse selection costs do not 
change significantly in this period. For this portfolio, 
there is evidence that the adverse selection costs decrease 
after the earnings announcement starting with day +1. 
In the case of the high differential information 
portfolios there are significant increases in the volume 
variable (see endnote 12) on days -1 and 0. However, there 
are no significant changes in the adverse selection cost 
component proxies over the entire event period. 
4.7.10.2 Differential Information Portfolios: Dividends 
Signal 
The low differential information portfolios demonstrate 
some evidence of a significant decrease (day -9) in the 
adverse selection cost component proxies followed by 
significant increase (day -3 for abnormal log spread and day 
-6 for abnormal spread) in the same, in the pre-announcement 
130 
period. The significant increase in the pre-announcement 
period and on the announcement day are consistent with the 
theory of Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), that predicts such an increase in the adverse 
selection costs with an increase in rate of informed 
trading. On the other hand, the initial significant 
decreases in these costs are not consistent with this 
theory. These decreases suggest that the market makers 
perceive a reduction in the relative level of information 
asymmetry in the environment and, hence, reduced adverse 
selection costs. This sequence of decreases in the adverse 
selection costs followed by a sequence of increases in the 
same is puzzling. There is some evidence on significant 
decreases in the post-announcement phase. This reduction in 
the adverse selection costs in the post-announcement period 
implies that the information contained in the dividends 
signal has been impounded in the security prices. 
The medium differential information portfolios 
demonstrate significant decreases in the adverse selection 
costs in the pre-announcement period. There is weak 
evidence of an increase in these costs as per the Rank test. 
However, there is strong evidence of a decrease in these 
costs on day +1 in the post-announcement period. A decrease 
in the adverse selection costs implies that the market 
makers perceive a reduction in the relative level of 
information asymmetry. 
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In contrast, in the case of the high differential 
information portfolio there is evidence of significant 
increases in abnormal log spread on days -14 and -11 
followed by a significant decrease in the abnormal log 
spread on day -10. This is consistent with the adverse 
selection theory which predicts an increase in the adverse 
selection costs with the arrival of informed traders and a 
subsequent decrease in these costs as information is 
impounded by the market. As per the Rank test-statistic 
abnormal spread increases on day -14 and -1. There are 
significant increases in abnormal log spread on days +1 and 
+10 during the post-announcement period. The Rank test- 
statistic demonstrates non-significant increases on these 
days. The results suggest that the market makers of firms 
in the high differential information perceive an increase in 
the relative information asymmetry prior to dividends 
announcements and that this perception may be heightened 
after the dividend announcement. A possible explanation is 
that informed traders dealing with the high differential 
information firms, i.e. firms with relatively high market 
capitalization, are better able to disguise their trades17. 
4.7.10.3 Differential Information Portfolios: Cross- 
sectional Results 
As indicated before the results for the firm size based 
cross-sectional regressions provide mixed evidence depending 
on whether the quality of earnings variable is measured by 
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the earnings noise score or the earnings predictability 
score. 
With firm size and earnings predictability as the 
defining variables, there is evidence to suggest that, after 
controlling for the effects of other covariates, the 
cumulative increase (decrease) in standardized abnormal log 
spread is smaller (greater) for small firms versus large 
firms. Similarly, the evidence suggests that the cumulative 
increase (decrease) in standardized abnormal log spread is 
smaller (greater) for medium size firms versus large firms. 
The cell means of the various portfolios ( not adjusted for 
effect of covariates; Tables 75 and 76) reflect these 
underlying patterns as they demonstrate a cumulative 
decrease in the standardized abnormal spread and log spread 
for medium and low differential firms, and a cumulative 
increase for high differential information firms. These 
results suggest that earnings and dividend announcements 
are more efficient in reducing the relative information 
asymmetry of small and medium size firms than for the large 
firm environments. 
An explanation for these results may be related to the 
fact that informed traders are better able to disguise their 
trades for the large market capitalization firms (see 
endnote 17) . Hence, the results maybe compatible with the 
adverse selection cost theory that market makers increase 
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the adverse selection costs in the presence of informed 
trades18. 
When earnings noise score is used to define quality of 
earnings the results are as hypothesized in Chapter 3. 
These results demonstrate that, after controlling for the 
influence of the other covariates, the increase (decrease) 
in cumulative standardized abnormal spread and log spread is 
greater (smaller) for small firms as compared to large 
firms. Given the results of Seyhun (1985), Chiang and 
Venkatesh (1988) and Hasbrouck (1991) that the probability 
of facing an insider increases inversely to the size of a 
firm, these results are not unexpected. The results suggest 
that the market makers perceive a larger degree of informed 
trade activity for small firms as compared to large firms 
and hence, the larger increase in the adverse selection 
costs for the former set of firms19. Note that the cell 
means, which represent the cumulative change in the 
standardized abnormal spread and log spread without 
adjusting for the effect of other covariates, do not mirror 
these results. Also, these results for the earnings noise 
score based portfolios are inconsistent with the results 
obtained for the earnings predictability score based 
portfolios. 
4.8 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Univariate and Cross-sectional 
Results 
This hypothesis relates to the behavior of the 
unexpected spread and log spread surrounding earnings 
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announcement and dividend announcement across quality of 
earnings portfolios. The univariate results for the 
earnings predictability score based portfolios are examined 
first, followed by the cross-sectional results for both the 
earnings and the dividend announcements. Next, the 
univariate results for the earnings noise score based 
portfolios have been examined. In the case of this quality 
of earnings varaiable, the dividend announcement results 
could not be examined as the sample size was not adequate 
for reliable results. Further, the two low quality of 
eanings portfolios (earnings noise score equal to '77 and 
'8' could not be examined for the same reasons. Finally, 
the cross-sectional results for the earnings and dividend 
signals for the earnings noise score based portfolios are 
listed. 
4.8.1 Earnings Predictability Score Based Portfolios: 
Univariate Results for the Earnings Signal 
For the earnings predictability score only the extreme 
portfolios (i.e. earnings predictability score equal to '1' 
and '4') have been examined for sample size reasons. For 
the high quality of earnings portfolio with a score of 'l7, 
there are no significant changes in the daily spread and log 
spread in the event period (Table 39). For low quality of 
earnings portfolio with earnings predictability score equal 
to ' 4 7 , there is a significant decrease in spread and log 
spread on day -11 followed by non-significant decreases in 
the spread in the pre-announcement period (Table 41) . As 
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per the parametric tests, there is some evidence of an 
increase in spread and log spread on day -1 with a non¬ 
significant increase on the announcement day. In the post- 
announcement period, the decrease in daily spread and log 
spread is significant on day +320. 
4.8.2 Univariate Tests of H3: Observations on the Earnings 
Signal 
Essentially the significant decreases in spread on days 
-11 and +3 distinguishes the low quality of earnings 
portfolio from the high quality of earnings portfolio. The 
latter portfolio demonstrates no significant changes in the 
event period. 
4.8.3 Earnings Predictability Score Based Portfolios: 
Univariate Results for the Dividends Signal 
For the high quality of earnings portfolio (Table 43), 
there is weak evidence of a significant increase in 
unexpected log spread on days -7 and -3. The increase on 
day -7 is also weakly supported by the Rank test. 
Unexpected log spread increases significantly on day +1 and 
decreases significantly on day +4. Both, unexpected spread 
and log spread decrease significantly on day +5. There is 
some evidence of a significant decrease in unexpected log 
spread on days +9 and +10 in the post-announcement 
period21. 
For the low quality of earnings portfolio (Table 45), 
there is a significant increase in unexpected log spread on 
day -14 with significant decreases on days -8 and -4. 
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Unexpected log spread decreases significantly on day -1. In 
the post-announcement period, unexpected log spread 
decreases significantly from days +3 to +9. The decreases 
in spread on day +4 and +5 are significant as per the Rank 
test22. 
4.8.4 Univariate Tests of H3: Observations on the Dividend 
Signal 
The pre-announcement period of the low quality of 
earnings portfolio is characterized by a significant 
increase in spread followed by significant decreases in 
spread. The high quality of earnings portfolio demonstrates 
only some weak evidence of an increase in this period. In 
the announcement period, the low quality of earnings 
portfolio demonstrates weak evidence of a significant 
decrease while the high quality of earnings portfolio 
demonstrates no significant change. The high quality of 
earnings portfolio demonstrates a significant increase in 
unexpected log spread on day +1 followed by significant 
decreases in the post-announcement period. On the other 
hand, the post-announcement period of the low quality of 
earnings portfolio is characterized by significant decreases 
in the dependent variables. 
4.8.5 Cross-sectional Tests on Cumulative Standardized 
Unexpected Spread and Log Spread: Results for Earnings and 
Dividend Signals 
These set of cross-sectional regressions (Tables 92, 
93, 51 and 52 ) have quality of earnings defined by the 
earnings predictability score based measure. In all these 
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regressions, neither the coefficient for QE. nor the 
coefficients for INFOl^QE, and INFOl^QE,. the interaction 
terms) are significant. This suggests that there is no 
significant difference in the cumulative change in the 
standardized unexpected spread and log spread across 
earnings predictability based quality of earnings 
portfolios. For low and medium differential portfolio 
firms, a change in the quality of earnings does not 
significantly impact the cumulative change in the 
standardized unexpected spread and log spread. 
Interestingly, the earnings predictability portfolio 
with a score of ' 1' , i.e. high quality of earnings, is 
characterized by a cumulative increase while the low quality 
of earnings portfolio with a earnings predictability score 
of '4' is characterized by a cumulative decrease (Tables 50 
and 91). This is true for both the dependent variables, 
i.e. standardized unexpected spread and log spread. 
Further, the quality of earnings portfolio with earnings 
predictability score equal to '2' demonstrates a cumulative 
decrease for both these dependent variables. 
4.8.6 Earnings Noise Score Based Portfolios: Earnings Signal 
For the earnings noise based quality of earnings 
variable, only portfolios with scores equal to '4' (high 
quality) to '6' (medium quality) could be examined as the 
remaining portfolios did not have sufficient sample size. 
Further, only the behavior of unexpected spread and log 
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spread surrounding the earnings announcement has been 
examined. 
The high quality of earnings portfolio (earnings noise 
score equal to '4') demonstrates a significant increase in 
spread and log spread on day 0 (Table 82). For the same 
portfolio, spread and log spread significantly decreases on 
day +723. 
The high quality of earnings portfolio with earnings 
noise score equal to '5' was examined next (Table 84). 
There is a significant increase in daily spread and log 
spread on day -1 and 024. However, the Rank test-statistic 
provides only weak evidence of an increase on day -14 and on 
day -1. 
The quality of earnings portfolio with earnings noise 
score equal to '6' demonstrated no significant change in 
spread during the event period based on the parametric tests 
(Table 86). However, for the same portfolio there is a 
significant decrease in the log spread on days -11,-4, and 
-3 in the pre-announcement period25. The non-parametric 
tests confirm these results. 
4.8.7 Univariate Tests of H3: Observations on Earnings Noise 
Portfolios 
The high quality of earnings portfolios demonstrate a 
significant increase in spread and log spread on day 0, the 
announcement day. In addition, the earnings noise score 
equal to '5' portfolio has a significant increase in daily 
log spread and spread on day -1. On the other hand, the 
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earnings noise score equal to '67 portfolio (medium quality 
of earnings) demonstrates significant decreases in daily 
spread and log spread on certain pre-announcement days. Due 
to inadequate sample size the low quality of earnings 
portfolios based on the earnings noise score could not be 
examined. 
4.8.8 Cross-sectional Tests on Cumulative Standardized 
Unexpected Spread and Log Spread: Results for Earnings and 
Dividend Signals 
Given the univariate results, it is not surprising to 
observe that the coefficient for QEf is not significant when 
firm size (Tables 48 and 49) is used to classify firms into 
differential information portfolios. While the coefficient 
is significant and negative when analysts7 following is used 
to form the differential information portfolios (Tables 89 
and 90), the F-statistic for the overall regression itself 
is not significant. In all cases, the interaction terms 
between differential information and the quality of earnings 
is not significant. 
To conclude, the results suggest that there is no 
significant difference in the cumulative change in 
standardized unexpected spread and log spread across 
earnings noise portfolios. However, there is weak evidence 
that suggests that as the quality of earnings reports 
decreases the cumulative change in the standardized 
unexpected spread and log spread increases, given analysts' 
following based differential information portfolios (Table 
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88). Interestingly, the earnings noise equal to '4' 
portfolio (high quality of earnings) demonstrates a 
cumulative increase in the standardized unexpected spread 
and log spread while the earnings noise equal to '6' 
portfolio (medium quality of earnings) demonstrates a 
cumulative decrease in the same variables. This parallels 
the results obtained for the earnings predictability score 
based portfolios which demonstrate similar results. 
4.9 Hypothesis 6 (H6): Univariate and Cross-sectional 
Results 
The results of the earnings predictability score based 
portfolios are discussed initially. For these portfolios, 
the results for the earnings signal are discussed first 
followed by the results surrounding the subsequent dividend 
signal. Finally, a discussion of the cross-sectional 
results for the earnings and the dividend signal is 
provided. The subsequent sections relate to the earnings 
noise based portfolios. As the sample size was not adequate 
for reliable interpretation, the performance of the abnormal 
spread and log spread around the dividend signal could not 
be examined for the latter portfolio. The cross-sectional 
results, however, relate to both types of announcements. 
4.9.1 Earnings Predictability Score Based Portfolios: 
Univariate Results for the Earnings Signal 
The high quality of earnings portfolio with earnings 
predictability score equal to '1' demonstrates no 
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significant change in the abnormal spread and log spread 
during the event period (Table 64). 
For the low quality of earnings portfolio with earnings 
predictability score equal to '4', daily abnormal log 
spread demonstrates a significant decrease on day -11 (Table 
65). While abnormal log spread increases on days -1 and 0, 
the increase is significant only on day -1. The increase in 
the daily abnormal spread on day -1 and 0 is not significant 
as per the non-parametric tests. According to the non- 
parametric test-statistics, abnormal spread decreases 
significantly on day -4 as per the Rank test-statistic. 
In the post-announcement period there is a significant 
decrease in abnormal log spread on day +3. The Rank test- 
statistic confirms the decrease in abnormal spread on day +3 
and, in addition, demonstrates a significant decrease on 
days +9 and +10. 
4.9.2 Univariate Tests on H6: Observations on Earnings 
Signal 
There is no significant change in the daily abnormal 
spread and log spread for the high quality of earnings 
portfolios. The low quality of earnings portfolios 
demonstrate a significant increase on day -1 as per the 
parametric tests. However, the non-parametric tests do not 
corroborate these results. Further, abnormal spread and log 
spread decrease significantly on day -11 and on day +3. In 
addition, the Rank test-statistic points to a significant 
decrease on days +9 and +10. 
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4.9.3 Earnings Predictability Score Based Portfolios: 
Univariate Results for the Dividends Signal 
The daily abnormal spread and log spread decrease 
significantly on days -10, -6 and -2 in the pre-announcement 
event period of the high quality of earnings portfolio as 
per the Brown and Warner test-statistic (Table 64). 
However, as per the non-parametric tests, only the decrease 
on day -6 is significant. In addition, abnormal spread 
decreases significantly on day -15 while abnormal log spread 
decreases significantly on day -14. As per the Brown and 
Warner test-statistic, abnormal spread increases 
significantly on the announcement day and decreases 
significantly on days +2, +4, +8 in the post-announcement 
period. There is a significant increase in daily abnormal 
spread on day +9. None of these changes are significant as 
per the Rank test. On the other hand, abnormal log spread 
decreases significantly on day +2, +4 and increases 
significantly on day +5. The increase in the daily abnormal 
log spread on day 0, however, is not significant. 
In the case of the low quality of earnings portfolio, 
abnormal spread and log spread (Table 67) demonstrate a 
significant increase on day -14, -12, and -6 with a 
significant decrease on day -8 and -4. In addition, 
abnormal spread decreases significantly on day -3. While 
there is no significant change in the daily abnormal spread 
and log spread on days -1 and 0, there is a significant 
increase on day +1 as per the Brown and Warner test- 
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statistics. In addition, abnormal log spread decreases 
significantly on day +7. 
4.9.4 Univariate Tests of H6: Observations on the Dividend 
Signal 
For the high quality of earnings portfolios there are 
significant decreases in the daily abnormal spread and log 
spread in the pre-announcement period though the results are 
weaker for the Rank test. On the other hand, the low 
quality of earnings portfolio demonstrates significant 
increases and decreases on some days in the pre-announcement 
period. Neither abnormal spread nor log spread demonstrate 
any significant change on days -1 and 0 for any of the 
quality of earnings portfolios. There are significant 
decreases in abnormal spread and log spread in the post- 
announcement period of the high quality of earnings 
portfolio as per the parametric test. However, the low 
quality of earnings portfolio demonstrates a significant 
increase on day +1 for abnormal spread and log spread as 
per the Brown and Warner test-statistic. 
4.9.5 Results of the Cross-sectional Tests on the Cumulative 
Standardized Abnormal Spread and Log Spread: Earnings and 
Dividends Signal 
The coefficient of QE^ is not significant in all the 
cross-sectional regressions (Tables 76,77,109 and 110). 
This suggests that there is no significant difference in the 
cumulative increase (decrease) in the standardized abnormal 
spread and log spread across the quality of earnings 
portfolios. Similarly, none of the interaction terms (i.e. 
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INF011-*QEi and INF02i*QE1-) are significant indicating that 
cumulative change in the standardized abnormal spread and 
log spread is not dependent on the level of differential 
information available in the environment. 
An examination of the portfolio mean cumulative 
standardized abnormal spread and log spread (Table 75) 
reveals further information about the cumulative changes in 
the adverse selection costs without adjustments for the 
other covariates. The extreme earnings predictability score 
portfolios (i.e. earnings predictability score equal to '1' 
and '4') demonstrate a small cumulative decrease in the 
dependent variables. The middle two portfolios with 
earnings predictability score equal to '2' and '3', on the 
other hand, demonstrate a large decrease in the dependent 
variables with the former portfolio having the greater 
decrease. 
4.9.6 Earnings Noise Score Based Portfolios: Univariate 
Results for the Earnings Signal 
For the high quality of earnings portfolio with an 
earnings noise score of '4' both abnormal spread and log 
spread decrease significantly on day -6 and increase 
significantly on day -5 (Table 94). In the post¬ 
announcement period, the dependent variables decrease 
significantly on day +1 and +7. 
In the case of the high quality of earnings portfolio 
with an earnings noise score of '5', daily abnormal log 
spread decreases significantly on day -5 (Table 95). Both 
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abnormal spread and log spread increase significantly on day 
-1, the day before the announcement, and then decrease 
significantly on day +2. The Rank test confirms the 
significant decrease on day +2. The increase on day -1 is 
not significant as per this latter test. 
There is evidence of significant changes in the 
abnormal spread and log spread prior to the earnings 
announcement for the quality of earnings portfolio with 
earnings noise score equal to '6' (Table 96). The abnormal 
log spread decreases significantly on days -11, -4, and -3. 
4.9.7 Univariate Tests of H6: Observations on the Earnings 
Signal 
The high quality of earnings portfolio (earnings noise 
score equal to '4') has some mixed evidence in the pre- 
announcement period. The dependent variables decrease on 
day -6 and increase on day -5. However, there are days with 
significant decreases in the post-announcement period. The 
high quality of earnings portfolio (earnings noise score 
equal to '5') shows a significant increase on day -1 (not 
significant as per the Rank test) followed by a significant 
decrease on day +2 ( significant as per the Rank test). The 
quality of earnings portfolio (earnings noise score equal to 
'6') demonstrates significant decreases in the abnormal 
spread on certain days in the pre-announcement period. 
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4.9.8 Results of the Cross-sectional Tests on the Cumulative 
Standardized Abnormal Spread and Log Spread: Earnings and 
Dividends Signals 
When analysts' following is used as the differential 
information variable the coefficients for quality of 
earnings and the interaction terms are not significant 
(Tables 106 and 107). With firm size (Table 73) as the 
independent variable defining differential information, 
however, the coefficient for quality of earnings (QEj) is 
significant and positive for cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread. This is as expected and implies that as 
the quality of earnings decreases (i.e. as the earnings 
noise score increases), the cumulative change (increase or 
decrease) in the standardized abnormal spread will increase. 
The interaction term with the low differential information 
portfolio (i.e. INFOl^QE^) is significant and negative 
suggesting that as the quality of earnings decreases the 
cumulative increase (decrease) in the dependent variable 
decreases (increases). In fact, for low differential 
information firms there is a cumulative increase in the 
standardized abnormal spread when the earnings noise score 
is equal to '4', i.e. high quality of earnings. At the same 
time for low differential information firms, there is 
cumulative decrease in the standardized abnormal spread when 
the earnings noise score is equal to '7', i.e. low quality 
of earnings. 
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For cumulative standardized abnormal log spread, the 
quality of earnings coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero but the interaction term INF01.*QE. is 
i i 
significant and negative as before. A study of the 
portfolio means (Table 72) reveals that the cumulative 
decrease in the abnormal spread and the abnormal log spread 
does increase as the earnings noise score increases except 
for the portfolio with a score of '5'. This portfolio 
demonstrates a small cumulative increase in the abnormal 
spread and a small cumulative decrease for the abnormal log 
spread. 
4.10 The Overall Conclusions: Quality of Earnings Hypotheses 
(H3 and H6) 
The results for these portfolios vary depending on the 
variable used to define the quality of earnings namely the 
earnings predictability score, or, the earnings noise score. 
Hence the results for the portfolios are discussed 
separately. Hence, the results for each set of portfolios 
are discussed separately. The earnings predictability score 
based portfolios are examined first. 
4.10.1 Earnings Predictability Portfolios: Earnings Signals 
There is no evidence of any significant change in the 
spread and log spread variables, and, the abnormal spread 
and log spread variables during the event period of the high 
quality of earnings portfolio. On the other hand, volume 
and log volume increase significantly on some days in the 
pre-announcement period (see endnote 20). These results 
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imply that there are no significant changes in the adverse 
selection costs of the high quality of earnings portfolio 
around earnings announcements. 
In the case of the low quality of earnings portfolio 
there is weak evidence of a significant decrease in spread 
and log spread, and, abnormal spread and log spread on day 
-11. Further, there is weak evidence of a significant 
increase in the spread, log spread, abnormal spread and log 
spread on the day before the announcement day (day -1). On 
the days -1 and 0 both the volume variables demonstrate a 
significant increase. These results suggest a slight 
decrease in the adverse selection costs in the pre¬ 
announcement period with a slight increase a day prior to 
the earnings announcement. The significant increase in 
trading volume facilitates the impounding of the new 
information by the market and, hence, there is some evidence 
of a decrease in the adverse selection cost component 
proxies in the post-announcement period. 
4.10.2 Earnings Predictability Portfolios: Dividend Signals 
There is evidence of increases in the adverse selection 
cost proxies in the pre-announcement period of the low 
quality of earnings portfolio. On the other hand, the pre¬ 
announcement period of the high quality of earnings 
portfolio displays weak evidence of a decrease in the 
adverse selection cost proxies on certain days. Further, 
the high quality of earnings portfolios demonstrates 
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significant decreases in the abnormal log spread on some 
days in the post-announcement period with some weak evidence 
of increases especially after day +5. In contrast, the low 
quality of earnings portfolios show evidence of significant 
increases in the abnormal log spread immediately after the 
dividends announcement on days +1 and +2 followed by 
significant decreases after this day. 
These results suggest that the market makers of low 
quality of earnings portfolios perceive an increase in the 
relative information asymmetry around dividend announcements 
made subsequent to a second quarter earnings announcement. 
This increase in the information asymmetry persists for some 
time after the dividend announcement but reduces once the 
information gets impounded in the price. This is consistent 
with the adverse selection cost theory. For the high 
quality of earnings portfolio such an increase in adverse 
selection costs is apparent only in the latter half of the 
post-announcement period. The rest of the event period is 
characterized by significant decreases in the adverse 
selection cost. Hence, it is apparent that there is a 
perception of a relative reduction in the levels of 
information asymmetry surrounding the dividend announcement 
of a firm in the high quality of earnings portfolio prior to 
and for some time after the dividend announcement. However, 
there is some evidence to suggest that the adverse selection 
costs increase in the post-announcement period of this 
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portfolio in a manner not predicted by the adverse selection 
cost theory. 
4.10.3 Earnings Predictability Portfolios: Cross-sectional 
Results 
The results of the cross-sectional regressions, 
however, suggest that there is no significant difference in 
the cumulative standardized abnormal spread and log spread 
across the quality of earnings portfolios. Also for a given 
quality of earnings portfolio, there is no significant 
difference in the cumulative standardized abnormal spread 
and log spread across different levels of differential 
information, i.e. there is no interaction between quality of 
earnings and the predisclosure information environment of a 
firm26. 
A study of the means (Table 75) demonstrates that the 
extreme quality of earnings portfolios have a relatively low 
cumulative decrease in the standardized abnormal spread and 
log spread. On the other hand, the middle two portfolios 
demonstrate a higher decrease in the cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread and log spread. This suggests that the 
market makers perceive the earnings and dividend 
announcements of the firms in the two middle portfolios as 
being more efficient in reducing the relative information 
asymmetry in the environment. Note that these cell means 
represent gross movements in standardized abnormal spread 
and log spread without any adjustments for the various 
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covariates and, hence, should be interpreted with some 
caution. 
4.10.4 Earnings Nosie Portfolios: Earnings Signals 
For the high quality of earnings portfolio with an 
earnings noise score of '4' there is no evidence of any 
change in spread and log spread in the pre-announcement 
period. However, the adverse selection cost proxies show a 
significant decrease on day -6 followed by a significant 
increase on day -5. This behavior of the adverse selection 
costs is puzzling as it suggests a decrease in the perceived 
level of information asymmetry that is followed by a 
increase in the same. Spread and log spread increase on day 
0 as per the parametric tests. With no increase in the 
adverse selection cost proxies this increase in spread and 
log spread is probably due to an increase in the order 
processing and holding costs. The adverse selection costs 
decrease in the post-announcement period with the impounding 
of information through increased trades. 
In the case of the quality of earnings portfolio with 
earnings noise score equal to '5' spread, log spread and 
volume increase significantly on days -1 and 0 (see endnote 
12). The increase in spread on day -1 is driven by an 
increase in abnormal spread and log spread, the adverse 
selection cost proxies. This may be due to the occurrence 
of informed trades that are concurrent with the earnings 
announcement in keeping with the spirit of the SEC 
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regulations of "abstain or disclose". Note that these 
results for the spread variable are weaker when the Rank 
test-statistic is examined. In fact, this statistic 
demonstrates a non-significant increase in abnormal spread 
on these days. Hence, the results should be interpreted 
with some caution. However, once information gets impounded 
in the prices the adverse selection cost proxies decrease 
significantly in the post-announcement period suggesting 
lowered levels of information asymmetry. 
For the medium quality of earnings portfolio with a 
earnings noise score of '6' there is an increase in the 
daily volume on day -1 and 0 (see endnote 13). There is 
evidence of significant decreases in the adverse selection 
costs in the pre-announcement period but there is only weak 
evidence, as per the Rank test-statistic, of a decrease in 
the adverse selection costs and the level of information 
asymmetry in the post-announcement period. 
4.10.5 Earnings Noise Portfolios: Cross-sectional Results 
Significant and interpretable results are obtained when 
firm size is used as the cross-sectional variable defining 
the differential environment of a firm. After controlling 
for the effects of other variables, the coefficient of QEi 
is positive and significant as was hypothesized previously. 
This suggests that as the quality of earnings decreases, the 
cumulative decrease (increase) in standardized abnormal 
spread is smaller (greater). This suggests that the market 
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maker perceives an increase in the level of informed trading 
through the event period of low quality of earnings firms as 
compared to the event period of high quality of earnings 
firms27. 
The interaction term, INFOl^QE-, is negative and 
significant. After controlling for the other covariates, 
the sign of this coefficient is not in the hypothesized 
direction. This suggests that for small firms, as the 
quality of earnings decreases, the cumulative decrease 
(increase) in the standardized abnormal spread and log 
spread is greater (smaller). This suggests that for small 
firms, earnings and dividend announcements are more 
efficient in reducing the perceived levels of information 
asymmetry for the low quality of earnings firms as compared 
to the high quality of earnings firms (Table 72). 
4.11 Hypothesis 7 (H7): Univariate and Cross-sectional 
Results 
This hypothesis relates to the behavior of abnormal 
spread and log spread for different signal sequences. 
Results for unexpected spread, log spread, volume and 
unexpected log volume have been reported in the Appendix. 
4.11.1 Joint Announcements 
There is no significant change in daily abnormal spread 
during the event period except for a significant decrease on 
day -5 as per the Rank test-statistic (Table 68). Abnormal 
log spread significantly decreases on days -5 and -3 in the 
pre-announcement period. Further, abnormal spread and log 
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spread decreases significantly on days +2 and +10 in the 
post-announcement period. 
4.11.2 Earnings Followed by Dividends Signal Sequence 
There is a significant decrease on days -11 and -4 in 
abnormal spread and log spread in the pre-announcement event 
period of the earnings signal (Table 69) . For the same 
event, abnormal log spread decreases significantly on day 
+ 6 . 
For the dividend announcement, abnormal log spread 
decreases significantly on day -10 and increases 
significantly on day +4 (Table 70). No significant change 
in the abnormal log spread is observed as per the Rank test- 
statistic. 
4.11.3 Sole Earnings Announcements 
Both abnormal spread and log spread increase 
significantly on the announcement day as per the parametric 
tests (Table 71). In addition, abnormal log spread 
decreases significantly on day -10 and day +3. 
4.11.4 Univariate Tests: Observations on Signal Sequences 
Using abnormal log spread as the basis of comparison, 
it is evident that all types of announcements are 
characterized by some day(s) of significant decreases in the 
pre-announcement event period. As per the Brown and Warner 
test-statistic, there is a significant increase in the 
abnormal log spread on the announcement day of a sole 
earnings signal. On the other hand, joint announcements 
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demonstrate non-significant decreases on the announcement 
day. In the post-announcement period there are some 
significant decreases in the abnormal spread for joint 
announcements, sole earnings announcements, earnings and 
dividend announcement in the earnings-dividend sequence. 
4.11.5 Cross-sectional Results: Signal Sequencing Issue 
The coefficient of the dummy variables Dl]., D2lW and 03^ 
are never significant in any of the regressions. This 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the 
cumulative change in the standardized abnormal spread and 
log spread across joint announcements, sole earnings 
announcements and the earnings announcement in a earnings- 
dividend sequence. Further, the results suggest no 
significant difference in the behavior of the mean 
cumulative standardized abnormal spread and log spread 
around the earnings announcement and the subsequent dividend 
announcement. This result is surprising given the 
univariate results around the dividend announcement across 
analysts' following based differential information 
portfolios and the earnings predictability based quality of 
earnings portfolios. 
4.11.6 Overall Conclusions: Signal Sequencing Hypothesis 
All types of signal sequences (joint announcements, 
sole earnings announcements, and, earnings-dividend 
sequences) demonstrate significant decreases in the adverse 
selection cost proxies in the pre-announcement period 
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suggesting a reduced level of information asymmetry at this 
time. Further, only in the case of joint earnings-dividend 
announcements is there evidence of a decrease (non¬ 
significant) in the adverse selection cost proxies on the 
day of the announcements. For, both, the earnings 
announcement of the earnings-dividend sequence and the sole 
earnings announcement, there is weak evidence of an increase 
in abnormal spread on the announcement days. Also for all 
the earnings announcements (irrespective of the signal 
sequence), there is evidence of significant decreases in the 
adverse selection cost component in the post-announcement 
period suggesting reduced levels of information asymmetry 
with the impounding of new information. However, this 
decrease is strongly evident for the joint announcement 
portfolio. In the case of a dividend announcement 
subsequent to a second quarter earnings announcement there 
is evidence of an increase in the adverse selection costs 
after the announcement suggesting heightened levels of 
information asymmetry at this time, and only weak evidence 
of a decrease in adverse selection costs after the 
announcement. This would imply that joint announcements of 
earnings and dividends are more efficient in reducing the 
levels of information asymmetry than the earnings-dividend 
signal sequence, given the increase (non-significant) in the 
post-announcement period of the dividend signal. Similarly, 
joint announcements are more efficient than sole earnings 
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announcements given the significant increase in the adverse 
selection costs on the announcement day of the latter 
portfolio. 
The cross-sectional results, however, demonstrates no 
significant difference in the cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread and log spread across these different types 
of signal sequences. This suggests that the market makers 
perceive joint announcements, sole earnings announcements 
and earnings-dividend signal sequences as being equally 
efficient in reducing the relative information asymmetry in 
the environment. 
4.12 Other Control Variables 
■v 
The variables LAGi, DAYi, and UEi are significant in 
some of the cross-sectional regressions and these results 
are discussed next. 
4.12.1 LAG1- and DAYf: Firm Size x Earnings Noise Score 
Cross-sectional Regressions 
For both cumulative standardized spread and log spread 
the coefficient for the LAG1- variable is positive and 
significant at 95% confidence levels. This implies that the 
cumulative change in the standardized abnormal spread and 
log spread is greater if the earnings announcement is 
delayed. Similarly, the coefficient on the variable DAYi is 
positive and significant at 90% confidence levels. This 
suggests that there a weak positive relationship between the 
day of the earnings announcement (Friday versus other 
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weekdays) and the cumulative change in the dependent 
variable. 
4.12.2 UEf: Firm Size x Earnings Predictability Score Cross- 
sectional Regressions 
In addition to the coefficients of the variables LAGi 
and DAYi mentioned above, the coefficient of the variable 
UE1- is also significant and positive at 95% confidence 
levels. This suggests that there is a positive association 
between the size of the unexpected component in the earnings 
announcement and the cumulative change in the standardized 
abnormal spread and log spread. 
4.12.3 Cross-sectional Tests: Implications for Other Control 
Variables 
Timely earnings reports play a significant role in 
reducing the relative information asymmetry in the 
environment. For delayed earnings reports, the results 
suggest that the cumulative decrease (increase) in the 
standardized abnormal spread and log spread around earnings 
and dividends announcements will be smaller (larger). This 
suggests the efficiency of an earnings and dividend 
announcement in reducing the relative information asymmetry 
in the environment increases if these signals are timely. 
These results are consistent with the negative abnormal 
returns observed by Trueman (1990) for delayed earnings 
announcements. 
There is weak evidence to suggest that the cumulative 
change in the standardized abnormal spread and log spread 
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will increase if an earnings announcement is made on a 
Friday, i.e. prior to a non-trading period. This implies 
that earnings announcements made on a Friday result in 
smaller (larger) cumulative decreases (increases) in the 
dependent variable and is less efficient in reducing the 
relative levels of information asymmetry as perceived by the 
market makers. The non-trading period increases the 
possibility that informed traders may access unique 
information and, hence, increases the uncertainty associated 
with the earnings announcement on a Friday. 
There is strong evidence that suggests that the 
relative efficiency of earnings and dividend announcements 
in reducing the information asymmetry in the environment is 
positively associated with the magnitude of the unexpected 
earnings component. The results suggest that as the 
magnitude of the unexpected earnings component increases, 
the cumulative decrease (increase) in the standardized 
unexpected abnormal spread and log spread will be smaller 
(larger). The unexpected earnings component may be 
considered to be a proxy for the monetary benefit of the 
unique information in the hands of informed traders. The 
higher the benefits receivable from acquiring such 
information given the costs (legal costs, acquisition 
costs), the higher the chances of informed traders acting on 
their information. 
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Notes 
1. The same analysis was done for volume (see Table 12). It 
is apparent, based on a comparison of the Chi-square 
statistic, that the log transformation has been more 
effective in reducing the non-normalities of the volume 
variable as compared to the spread variable. Hence, the 
study incorporates non-parametric univariate tests on the 
spread variable to test the robustness of the parametric 
results. 
2. The Hausman specification test has been carried using 
the expanded regression technique. (See Maddalla (1988), p. 
440) 
3. It is interesting to note that the Chi-square statistic 
is larger for the log version of the estimation equation. 
Further, the test rejects the null a larger number of times 
for the volume equation suggesting a recursive structure of 
equations. 
4. For the volume equation the mean R-square does increase 
with the log transformation. While lag volume and market 
volume are significant for a larger proportion of the firm- 
events in the volume equation, log spread and log market 
volume is significant for a larger proportion of the firm- 
events in the log volume equation. 
5. Log volume decreases significantly on day -15 (Table 18) 
though this is not evident as per the Rank test-statistic. 
In addition, both volume and log volume increase 
significantly on days -1 and 0 around the earnings signal. 
This is confirmed by the Rank test. Ask and bid prices 
(with and without log transformation) show non-significant 
increases in the event period (Table 78 and 79). Around day 
-1 and 0, the increase (non-significant) in ask price is 
greater than the increase in the bid price resulting in a 
non-significant increase in the spread on day 1. Similarly, 
on day -11 the (non-significant) increase in the bid price 
is greater than the (non-significant) increase in the ask 
price resulting in a significant decrease in the log spread 
on day -11. These significant decreases/increases in the 
spread/log spread reflect the dealers' inventory policy and 
are consistent with the liquidity/inventory hypothesis. 
6. There are no significant changes in volume during the 
dividend signal event period. These results are confirmed 
by the Rank test except for a significant decrease on day +8 
(Table 20). However, daily log volume decreases 
significantly on days -15, -13 and -2. Also, there is a 
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significant increase in log volume on day -7. While there 
is no significant change in log volume around days -1 and 0, 
there is a significant decrease in log volume on day +8. 
Both ask and bid prices (with and without log transform; 
Table 19 and 20) show no significant changes in the event 
period. However, there is a pattern of diminishing 
increases in log ask and bid prices prior to the 
announcement. The relative increase in the log ask price is 
greater than the relative increase in log bid price which 
peaks on day +1 when log spread increases significantly. 
After day +1, the log ask and bid prices decline with the 
relative decline in the ask price being greater than the 
relative decline in the bid price. This peaks on day -6 
when there is a significant decrease in log spread. 
7. According to SEC's rule 10b-5 read in conjunction with 
the Chiarella ruling, insiders have to disclose material 
information or else abstain from trading on that 
information. 
8. John and Mishra (1990) contend that insiders trade prior 
to capital expenditure announcements, and that their trades 
and the subsequent announcement are joint signals that 
complement the information contained in the other. This 
theory is contrary to the adverse selection cost theory of 
Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). 
It implies that insider trades prior to such announcements 
in fact reduce the relative information asymmetry in the 
environment. Hence, the John and Mishra approach would 
predict a reduction in adverse selection costs prior to the 
earnings and dividend announcement surrounding insider 
trades. 
9. Insiders have to file with the SEC, within 10 days after 
the last day of the month of trade, data relating to all 
trades they make in that month (section 16-a of The 
Securities Exchange Act, 1934). 
10. Volume and log volume decreases significantly on day - 
15 and -8 for the firm size based portfolio (Table 23). 
Further, log volume increases significantly on day -1. In 
addition, daily log volume and volume for the firm size 
based low differential information portfolio show a 
significant increase on day 0. This significant increase on 
day 0 and -1 is also evident for the analysts' following 
based portfolio (Table 24). In addition to a significant 
decrease on day -15, there is a significant increase in log 
volume on day +4 for the analysts' following based 
portfolio. 
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11. In the case of daily volume and log volume, the evidence 
points to no significant changes other than a significant 
decrease in log volume on day -10 for the firm size based 
portfolio and days -9 and +5 as per the Rank test-statistic 
for the same portfolio (Tables 27 and 28). 
12. There are significant increases, comparable to the low 
differential information portfolios, in daily volume and log 
volume on days -1 and 0. In addition, volume and log volume 
increases significantly on day -14 for the firm-size based 
portfolio (Table 31 and 32). 
13. Unexpected log volume decreases significantly from day - 
15 to day -13 (Table 34). The decrease on day -15 is weakly 
supported by the Rank test-statistic. There is evidence of 
a significant increase in unexpected log volume on day -7 
with a significant decrease on day -2. As per the Rank 
test-statistic there is no significant change in unexpected 
volume in this period. Further, in the post-announcement 
period there is no significant change in unexpected volume 
and log volume. 
14. There is no significant increase in unexpected log 
volume (Table 36) though there is a significant decrease in 
unexpected volume on day -11 as per the Rank test-statistic. 
Volume decreases significantly on days -2 and -1 as per the 
same test-statistic. There is some evidence of a 
significant decrease in unexpected log volume on days +3 and 
+ 7. 
15. There is a significant decrease in unexpected log volume 
on day -12 and -9 (Table 38). According to the Rank test, 
however, there is no significant change in volume except for 
a slight increase on day -14. Unexpected log volume 
increases on day -5 and on day -2. Both, unexpected volume 
and log volume increase significantly on day -1. 
Significant increase in unexpected log volume is evident on 
days +7, +6 and +10. 
16. However, the cumulative change is larger for the low 
differential information firms as compared to the high 
differential information firms. 
17. As per the Dirk case ruling, selective access by non¬ 
insiders especially security analysts to inside information 
is permissible to maintain a healthy capital market. This 
is provided the insider does not derive any personal 
advantage from such disclosure. This encourages security 
analysts to seek out such unique information from insiders 
and use it for the benefit of their clients provided no 
monetary reward is provided to the insider. The probability 
of selective access by security analysts to insider 
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information, then, will increase as the number of financial 
analysts following a firm increases i.e. as competition for 
unique information increases. 
18. The ANCOVA results demonstrate a significant firm size 
main effect when quality of earnings is defined by the 
earnings predictability score and the dependent variable is 
cumulative standardized abnormal spread. 
19. The ANCOVA results demonstrate a significant firm size 
main effect for the earnings noise based quality of earnings 
variable when the dependent variable is the cumulative 
standardized abnormal spread and log spread. 
20. The high quality of earnings portfolio (i.e. score equal 
to '1') portfolio (Table 46) demonstrates a significant 
increase on days -14 and -10 for log volume. As per the 
Rank test, there are significant increases in volume on 
day -14, -11,-10 -1 and on day 0. For the low quality of 
earnings portfolio (Table 42), both volume and log volume 
increase significantly on day -1 and 0. In addition, log 
volume increases significantly on day -8. As per the Rank 
test-statistic, volume decreases significantly on day +10. 
21. There is a significant increase in unexpected log volume 
on day -7 (Table 44) with significant decreases on days -3 
and -2. The decrease on day -2 is also evident as per the 
Rank test-statistic. There is no significant change 
otherwise. 
22. There is a significant decrease in unexpected volume on 
day -15 as per the Rank test-statistic (Table 46). 
Unexpected log volume decreases significantly on day -9, -8, 
and -4 as per the Brown and Warner test-statistic. There is 
no significant change in the variables for rest of the event 
period except for a significant decrease on day +8 in the 
post-announcement period. 
23. There is no significant change in volume and log volume 
for this portfolio (Table 83). 
24. There is evidence of a significant increase in volume 
and log volume on day +14. Both daily volume and log volume 
decrease significantly on day -7 though the evidence is 
weaker for the Rank test-statistic (Table 85). In addition, 
log volume increases significantly on day -1 and 0. 
25. Daily volume and log volume (Table 87) decreases 
significantly on day -8. Further, there is evidence of a 
significant decrease in volume on day -4. Both daily volume 
and log volume demonstrate a significant increase on day -1 
and 0 . 
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26. In the ANCOVA results, only when the dependent variable 
is cumulative standardized abnormal spread and the 
differential information variable is defined by firm size, 
is there a significant main effect for earnings 
predictability based quality of earnings variable. 
27. In the ANCOVA results, the earnings noise main effect 
(i.e. the quality of earnings effect) is significant with 
cumulative standardized abnormal spread as the dependent 
variable for both differential information variables. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the behavior of the bid-ask spread 
and the adverse selection cost component surrounding second 
quarter earnings and subsequent dividend announcements of OTC 
firms. Specifically, it examines the relationship between the 
spread, the adverse selection cost component of the spread and 
(i) the quality of earnings, (ii) the pre-disclosure 
environment of the firm, and, (iii) the sequence of the 
earnings and dividend announcements made in the second 
quarter. The broad objective of the dissertation is to study 
whether earnings and dividend announcements provide 
information that is useful to investors and, especially, the 
uninformed traders. The study examines the efficiency of 
earnings and dividend announcements in reducing the relative 
information asymmetry in a firm's information environment 
around such signals, given that the adverse selection cost 
component of the spread is positively associated with the 
market makers perception of the relative level of information 
asymmetry. 
Specifically, the dissertation focusses on the relevance 
of earnings quality in reducing information asymmetries 
between informed and uninformed traders by examining the 
behavior of the spread and the adverse selection cost 
component. Further, it examines whether the market makers' 
perception of the relative levels of information asymmetry is 
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associated with the pre-disclosure information that is 
available for a firm. In addition, a comparison has been made 
between the relative efficiencies of a joint announcement of 
dividends and earnings, a sole earnings announcement and a 
earnings-dividend signal sequence. 
The specific hypotheses examined in this study and the 
methodology adopted were described in Chapter 3 . The detailed 
results and specific implications have been discussed in 
Chapter 4. This Chapter will provide a summary of the results 
and their research implications, given the objectives of the 
study. 
The final sections of this chapter will briefly outline 
the limitations of this study and will, also, indicate further 
research extensions of this work. 
5.1 Overview of the Results and their Implications: 
5.1.1 The Broad Results for the Full Sample 
There is evidence to suggest that there is a decrease in 
the market makers' perception of the relative information 
asymmetry in the environment prior to the second quarter 
earnings announcements of OTC firms. These results may be 
driven by a perceived reduction in the arrival rate of 
informed traders given the SEC's "abstain or disclose" 
requirement1 assuming that the adverse selection theory is a 
correct interpretation of events. An alternate explanation is 
provided by the theoretical work of John and Mishra (1990) 
that suggests that insider trades, given the legal 
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environment, are essentially signals that complement the 
information of the earnings announcement. Hence, contrary to 
the adverse selection cost theory, their work suggests that 
insider trades are associated with a decrease in the relative 
information asymmetry in the environment. A documentation of 
the insider trade activity prior to second quarter earnings 
and subsequent dividend announcements may help to discriminate 
between the alternate explanations for the results in this 
study. 
In the post-announcement period of the earnings 
announcements, there is evidence of decrease in the adverse 
selection costs and, therefore, the perception of the relative 
information asymmetry in the environment. This reduction in 
the relative information asymmetry once the information has 
been impounded in the security price has been predicted by the 
adverse selection cost theory. 
Unlike the earnings announcements, the results are mixed 
for the dividend announcement. In the pre-announcement 
period, there is some evidence of increased adverse selection 
costs on certain days followed by significant decreases in 
these costs. This suggests the presence of informed trading 
at this time. The results, however, are sensitive to the 
choice of the test-statistic. In the post-announcement 
period, an increase in the adverse selection costs was 
observed for the dividend announcement on the day after the 
announcement. After this day, adverse selection costs 
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decrease with the impounding of the new information and the 
information contained in the informed trades. In addition, 
the Rank test points to increased adverse selection costs at 
the end of the post-announcement period. 
These results suggest that the dividend announcement 
subsequent to an earnings signal is perceived to be noisy, 
given the increase in the informed trade activity just after 
the day of announcement. This is contrary to the expectations 
based on Miller and Rock (1985) that dividend signals 
subsequent to earnings signals convey information to the 
uninformed investors. Note that this would not violate the 
SEC's "abstain or disclose" rule. 
5.1.2 The Differential Information Hypotheses 
As was expected for the high differential information 
portfolio, there was no significant change in the adverse 
selection costs during the entire event period of the earnings 
signal. This would suggest that for such firms, given the 
high level of pre-disclosure information, the market makers 
perceive a lower level of informed trading during the same 
period. In the case of the dividend signal, however, the 
univariate results provide evidence of increases in adverse 
selection costs both in the pre-announcement and post- 
announcement period possibly associated with increased levels 
of informed trading. It is possible that informed traders are 
better able to disguise their trades for firms with high 
market capitalization. Further, for firms with high analyst 
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following there is a possibility of selective access by some 
analysts to unique information not available to the market 
makers. 
For the low and medium differential information 
environment there is evidence of significant decreases in the 
pre-announcement and post-announcement period for the earnings 
signal. These results point to reduced levels of informed 
trading prior to such announcements given the SEC's "abstain 
or disclose" rule and is consistent with the adverse selection 
cost theory. An alternate explanation, however, assumes high 
levels of insider trading during the pre-announcement period 
which provide complementary information signals to the market 
makers (and the uninformed investors). This results in a 
reduction in the market makers perception of the relative 
information asymmetry in the environment (John and Mishra, 
1990) . The decreases in the post-announcement phase reflects 
the impounding of the information content of the earnings 
signals as per the predictions of the adverse selection cost 
theory. 
For these latter two portfolios, there is weak evidence 
of increased adverse selection costs in the pre-announcement 
period of the dividend signal. This may be due to increased 
levels of informed trading perceived by the market-maker at 
this time and is consistent with the adverse selection cost 
theory. In the post-announcement period, adverse selection 
costs decrease as information is absorbed by the market. 
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While significant results are obtained for the firm size 
based cross-sectional regressions, the results, however, are 
sensitive to the choice of the quality of earnings variable. 
The cross-sectional results indicate that the earnings and 
dividend announcements are more efficient in reducing the 
information asymmetries of the small (market capitalization) 
firms than the large firms when earnings predictability scores 
are used to measure quality of earnings. After controlling 
for the effect of other covariates, the evidence suggests that 
the cumulative increase (decrease) in adverse selection costs 
is smaller (greater) for small and medium size firms as 
compared to large firms. This indicates a higher perception 
of the level of informed trading by the market makers of the 
latter set. It is possible that insiders find it easier to 
disguise trades for large market capitalization firms and, 
hence, this perception on the part of the market makers. In 
contrast, an alternate explanation based on John and Mishra 
(1990) assumes increased insider trading for small firms 
around earnings and dividend announcements that, in fact, may 
convey information to the uninformed traders and the market 
makers in a manner that reduces the perceived levels of 
information asymmetry in the environment. 
When earnings noise scores are used to measure quality of 
earnings, the results demonstrate that the market makers 
perceive a higher level of informed trading in the event 
period of small firms as compared large firms. The results 
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demonstrate that the cumulative increase (decrease) in the 
adverse selection costs is greater (smaller) for small firms 
as compared to large firms. These results are consistent with 
previous results that have indicated that the probability of 
facing an insider increases inversely with firm size. 
5.1.3 The Quality of Earnings Hypotheses 
The results for the quality of earnings issues are mixed. 
With earnings predictability score based portfolios, there is 
no evidence of any significant change in the adverse selection 
costs surrounding the earnings announcement for the high 
quality of earnings portfolio. However, when the earnings 
noise measure is used there is significant evidence of 
increases in the adverse selection costs followed by decreases 
in the same, in the pre-announcement period of the earnings 
signal. This pattern is consistent with the prediction of the 
adverse selection cost theory of an increase in the perception 
of the relative information asymmetry assuming the arrival of 
informed traders, and a decrease in the same once the 
information in such trades has been impounded. 
In the case of the dividend signal for the high quality 
of earnings portfolio, there is no significant change in the 
pre-announcement period. However, there is weak evidence of 
a significant increase in the adverse selection costs in the 
post-announcement period suggesting that the market makers 
perceive an increase in the arrival of informed traders after 
the dividend announcement. 
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For the low quality of earnings portfolio based on the 
earnings predictability score there is some decrease in the 
adverse selection costs in the pre-announcement period of the 
earnings signal. This decrease is also evident in the medium 
quality of earnings noise score based portfolio. This implies 
that market makers perceive reduced levels of information 
asymmetry prior to the earnings announcement which may be 
because of the SEC's "abstain or disclose" rule. Further, the 
earnings predictability score based portfolio displays weak 
evidence of an increase in the adverse selection costs on the 
day before the announcement in the WSJ and the day of the 
announcement in WSJ. The increase in the adverse selection 
costs on the announcement day suggests a perceived increase in 
informed trades timed with the earnings disclosure. 
In the post-announcement period of the low quality of 
earnings portfolio based on the earnings predictability86Xscore, 
there is evidence of a decrease in the adverse selection 
costs. This is contrary to the expectation that low quality 
of earnings firms provide opportunities for sophisticated and 
informed investors to trade even after the earnings 
announcement. The evidence points to the fact that informed 
traders have an opportunity to trade in the pre-announcement 
period of the low quality of earnings firms. There is only 
weak evidence, however, of continued informed trading after 
the earnings announcement. 
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In contrast, for the dividend signal the low quality of 
earnings portfolio demonstrates increased adverse selection 
costs possibly associated with an increase in the level of 
information asymmetry perceived by the market makers in the 
pre-announcement period. Further, in the post-announcement 
period of the dividend signal of the low quality of earnings 
portfolio, the evidence points to increased adverse selection 
costs due to a increase in the perceived levels of informed 
trading. Contrary to the expectations based on Miller and 
Rock (1985) subsequent dividend signals of firms with noisy 
earnings announcements do not reduce the level of information 
asymmetry perceived in the environment. However, adverse 
selection costs decrease in the latter half of the post¬ 
announcement period. In contrast, for the high quality of 
earnings portfolios there is evidence consistent with a 
reduction in the perceived levels of information asymmetry by 
the market makers for all signals. This is as predicted by 
the adverse selection cost theory and implies that the new 
information has been impounded by the market. 
Significant and interpretable cross-sectional results are 
obtained with the earnings noise score and the firm size 
combination. The evidence suggests that as the quality of 
earnings decreases, the cumulative decrease (increase) in the 
adverse selection costs is smaller (greater). The results 
demonstrate that market makers perceive a higher degree of 
informed trading in the event period of low quality of 
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earnings firms as compared to the event period of high quality 
of earnings firms. Further, for small firms, earnings and 
dividend announcements are more efficient in reducing the 
perceived levels of information asymmetry for the low quality 
of earnings firms as compared to the high quality of earnings 
firms. 
5.1.4 The Signal Sequencing Hypothesis 
There is no substantive evidence to suggest any 
significant difference between joint earnings and dividend 
announcements, sole earnings announcements, and earnings- 
dividend signal sequences in terms of their efficiency in 
reducing the market makers' perception of the relative 
information asymmetry surrounding such signals. There is some 
evidence, however, of increased adverse selection costs on the 
announcement day of sole earnings announcments and the 
earnings announcement of the earnings-dividend sequence. 
Further, for both these types of announcements there is only 
weak evidence of subsequent decreases in adverse selection 
costs. To the extent these costs demonstrate significant 
decreases in the post-announcement period of the joint 
announcements, there is reason to believe that joint 
announcements may have a relative advantage over earnings- 
dividend sequence in terms of their efficiency in reducing the 
perceived levels of information asymmetry. This issue needs 
further investigation. 
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5.1.5 Other Cross-sectional Variables 
There is strong evidence to suggest that timely earnings 
announcements increase the relative efficiency with which 
earnings and dividend signals reduce the adverse selection 
costs and the levels of information asymmetry around such 
events. Further, there is evidence of a strong negative 
association between the unexpected component of the earnings 
announcement and the relative efficiency with which earnings 
and dividend signals reduce the perceived levels of 
information asymmetry during the event period. The size of 
the unexpected earnings component may be positively associated 
with monetary value of the unique information in the hands of 
the informed traders and may explain the positive association 
with the cumulative change in the adverse selection costs. In 
addition, there is evidence to suggest that earnings 
announcements prior to non-trading periods are associated with 
increased levels of uncertainty and, as a result, adverse 
selection costs. 
5.2 Limitations 
This study has some limitations that relate to the 
availability of relevant data. Firstly, this study 
exclusively uses bid-ask spread data that is available for OTC 
firms on the CRSP data tapes. The results, therefore, are 
valid only for the competitive dealer system that operates in 
the OTC market as opposed to the monopoly specialist system 
that functions in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) . 
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Further, OTC firms tend to have smaller market capitalization, 
on an average, than NYSE firms and this may bias the results 
to some extent. In addition, many firms had to be dropped 
from the analysis due to a lack of analysts' following data 
and this may have resulted in a selection bias in the sample. 
The second limitation of this study relates to the fact 
that the sample firms are all OTC firms and is concerned with 
the reliability of the earnings predictability measure used 
for the quality of earnings portfolio. For some firms 
analysts' following information is provided infrequently and, 
hence, this measure was constructed to include analyst data 
for at least four out of the six years from 1984 to 1989. 
Consequently, this measure may be a noisy predictor of the 
quality of earnings of a firm. This may partially explain the 
mixed results for the earnings predictability score based 
quality of earnings portfolios. 
There are some limitations that are intrinsic to the 
simultaneous equation methodology adopted. The prediction 
error of the reduced form equations derived from the 
simultaneous equation model is taken to be the proxy for the 
adverse selection costs. This assumes that the average 
adverse selection costs in the estimation period is zero and 
that this cost is a time series cost that is positive only in 
the event period. Further, the Brown and Warner (1985) test 
statistic ignores the variance of the prediction error. While 
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this may bias the test statistics to some extent, it has been 
partially compensated for by using a large event period. 
Finally, the spread data that has been used in this study 
reflects the market spread, i.e. the lowest ask and the 
highest bid price. Data for each market maker's quote is not 
available and, hence, these results are conservative to this 
extent. 
5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
The primary suggestion relates to the institutional and 
legal framework within which this study has been undertaken. 
An important extension of this research would be to examine 
insider trade data for the sample firm-events. A study of 
this data will help to determine whether the reduced 
perception of information asymmetry observed in the pre¬ 
announcement period of the earnings and dividend signals is 
the effect of: 
(i) the SEC's "abstain or disclose" requirement which result 
in reduced informed trade (see endnote 1) and, hence, the 
reduced adverse selection costs, or, 
(ii) increased insider trade that provide complementary 
signals to the uninformed investors and the market makers and, 
hence, the reduced adverse selection costs. 
A methodological extension that would further verify the 
robustness of the results obtained is the use of vector auto¬ 
regressions to estimate the adverse selection cost proxy. 
This procedure may provide more flexibility than the 
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simultaneous methodology with respect to any auto- regression 
in the spread variable. Further, the estimation of the 
variance of the prediction error can be more conveniently 
carried out with this methodology. However, vector auto¬ 
regression approach is not necessarily as intuitive at a 
theoretical level as the approach adopted in this study. 
i 
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Notes 
1. The Wall Street Journal on September 23, 1992 quotes a 
study carried out by H. Nejat Seyhun from the University of 
Michigan. According to this study the predictive value of 
insider trades would have decreased from 1975 to 1989 given 
the increase in the SEC's enforcement activity. The study 
observes a dramatic drop in the average number of insider 
trades prior to takeover announcements from 3495 trades a 
month to 3 0 trades a month from the late 1970s to the late 
1980s. There has been a similar drop though of a lower 
magnitude for insider trades prior to earnings announcements. 
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APPENDIX: 
DATA-TABLES 
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Table 1 
Sample selection 
Firms 
1. Firms on all data tapes 819 
(i.e. OTC_CRSP, COMPUSTAT,IBES) 
Less Firms rejected from sample: 
2. Firms that do not have Dec. 31 548 
year-ends and/or are not fully 
updated on the COMPUSTAT tape 
3. Below SEC 10-k filing threshold 58 
4. Dividend and earnings announcements 
are less than 25 days apart, and, 
confounding events in the window 
starting 35 days prior to first 
announcement and ending 10 days 
second announcement 101 
5. Firms with more than 60 tradings 
days of "zero" spread data in the 
estimation period 0 
6. Firms with sole dividends or 
dividends followed by earnings 
signal sequences 7 
TOTAL: FIRMS (FIRM-EVENTS) 105 
Less Firms with no IBES and/or COMPUSTAT 
data for calculation of quality of 
earnings scores, and, firms with no 
IBES data to calculate unexpected 
earnings 51 
TOTAL: FIRMS (FIRM-EVENTS) _54 
287 
(134) 
(153) 
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Table 2 
Type of signal sequences 
Number of 
firm-events 
1. JOINT ANNOUNCEMENTS: 36 
2. EARNINGS FOLLOWED BY Dividends signal SEQUENCE: 73 
3. SOLE EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS: 44 
TOTAL: 153 
Table 3 
Yearwise analysis 
Number of 
YEAR firm-events 
1985 33 
1986 30 
1987 32 
1988 26 
1989 32 
TOTAL: 153 
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Table 4 
Industry codewise classification of firms 
Description (Code) Firms 
1. Food and kindred products (20) 1 
2. Textile mill products (22) 1 
3. Lumber and wood products except furniture (24) 1 
4. Paper and allied products (26) 1 
5. Printing, publishing and allied (27) 2 
6. Chemicals and allied products (28) 2 
7. Petroleum refining and related industries (29) 1 
8. Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products (30) 1 
9. Stone, clay , glass, concrete products (32) 1 
10. Primar metal industry (33) 1 
11. Fabricated metal except machinery, etc. (34) 1 
12. Machinery except electrical (35) 5 
13. Electrical, electrical machinery, etc. (36) 2 
14. Transportation equipment (37) 2 
15. Measurement instrument, photo goods, etc. (38) 1 
16. Motor freight. Transport, etc. (42) 2 
17. Communication (48) 2 
18. Electric, gas, sanitary services (49) 1 
19. Durable goods-wholesale (50) 3 
20. Banking (60) 20 
21. Insurance (63) 1 
22. Real estate (65) 1 
23. Other (87) 1 
54 
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Table 5 
Estimation period means 
(figures in brackets are standard deviations) 
Mean 
Spread 
Range 
No. Mean 
Abslt. 
Spread 
Mean 
Vol¬ 
ume 
Mean 
Bid 
Price 
Mean 
Ask 
Price 
Mean 
Firm 
Size 
>0.0 - 0.1 0 - - - - - 
>0.1 - 0.2 1 0.17 
(0) 
14590 
(0) 
5.81 
(0) 
5.99 
(0) 
35006 
(0) 
>0.2 - 0.3 18 0.24 
(0.03) 
15287 
(10427) 
12.87 
(8.52) 
13.11 
(8.54) 
94782 
(119240) 
>0.3 - 0.4 30 0.35 
(0.03) 
35394 
(25421) 
21.27 
(9.74) 
21.62 
(9.75) 
334873 
(348979) 
>0.4 - 0.5 18 0.46 
(0.03) 
30011 
(34329) 
28.86 
(10.23) 
29.32 
(10.23) 
341822 
(430084) 
>0.5 - 0.6 33 0.55 
(0.03) 
30927 
(34437) 
29.71 
(10.51) 
30.26 
(10.52) 
370869 
(359340) 
>0.6 - 0.7 23 0.65 
(0.03) 
39042 
(46246) 
33.79 
(13.31) 
34.43 
(13.31) 
413557 
(310100) 
>0.7 - 0.8 12 0.74 
(0.02) 
62177 
(86135) 
39.86 
(12.92) 
40.60 
(12.92) 
588335 
(452152) 
>0.8 - 0.9 5 0.85 
(0.02) 
14821 
(17292) 
45.29 
(22.06) 
46.15 
(22.07) 
548004 
(485467) 
>0.9 - 1.0 5 0.96 
(0.03) 
336202 
(699063) 
46.34 
(22.06) 
47.29 
(22.07) 
1889286 
(485467) 
>1.0 - 1.1 2 1.07 
(0.03) 
504246 
(479532) 
39.60 
(17.19) 
40.67 
(17.21) 
2369425 
(146806) 
>1.1 - 1.2 1 1.18 
(0.00) 
24899 
(00000) 
54.57 
(00.00) 
55.75 
(00.00) 
764454 
(000000) 
>1.2 - 1.3 4 1.27 
(0.03) 
500298 
(815999) 
55.33 
(20.45) 
56.60 
(20.48) 
2535519 
(1676118) 
>1.3 - 1.4 0 - - - - 
- 
>1.4 - 1.5 0 - - - - 
- 
>1.5 - 1.6 1 3.28 
(0.00) 
67954 
(00000) 
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35.80 
(00.00) 
39.08 
(00.00) 
785015 
(000000) 
Table 6 
Analysis of earnings noise scores 
A. Median standard deviation for classifying 54 sample 
firms: 
Variable 
Primary earnings per share (PEPS) 1.11 
Extra-ordinary items, Discontinued 
Operations, and Cumulative effect of 
Accounting policy change per share (DCONT) 0.07 
No. of accounting policy changes (CHNGS) 0.00 
Alowance for uncollectibles or for loan 
losses as a percentage of net income (ACCRL) 0.19 
B. Frequency of earnings noise scores in sample of 153 firm- 
events: 
Score: No. PEPS 
Median 
of 
DCONT CHNGS ACCRL 
4 21 0.87 0.09 0.00 0.19 High Quality 
5 97 0.92 0.07 0.32 0.12 
6 28 1.21 0.35 0.42 0.29 
7 7 1.77 1.01 0.42 0.72 Low Quality 
8 0 
153 
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Table 7 
Analysis of earnings predictability scores 
A. Median of DAFqy and SAFEqy for classifying the 153 
sample firm-events: 
Standardized Absolute 
Forecast Error (SAFE_ ) : 0.464 
H#y 
Relative Dispersion of 
Analysts' Forecast (DAF ) : 0.045 
h#y 
B. Frequency of earnings predictability scores in sample of 
153 firm-events: 
Median 
of 
Score: No. SAFE DAF 
1 48 0.227 0.022 High Quality 
2 21 0.290 0.052 
3 17 0.570 0.029 
4 67 1.202 0.117 Low Quality 
153 
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Table 8 
Analysis of differential information variables: Firmsize 
Mean Firmsize and Standard Deviation (in brackets) 
FIRMSIZE PORTFOLIO NO. 
1 2 3 
YEAR 
(Low) (Medium) (High) 
1985 63511 201617 641795 
(24518) ( 58204) (188219) 
1986 61244 206551 917280 
(29211) ( 50587) (547312) 
1987 50293 000000 564511 
(21830) ( 00000) (538386) 
1988 64117 211412 1468971 
(25683) ( 86094) (1276375) 
1989 81398 238141 1491918 
(41990) ( 66886) (1747742) 
Frequency: 46 37 70 
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Table 9 
Analysis of differential information variables: Analysts' 
following 
Mean Analyst Following and Standard Deviation (in brackets) 
ANALYSTS' FOLLOWING PORTFOLIO NO. 
1 2 3 
YEAR 
(Low) (Medium) (High) 
1985 1.82 4.56 10.15 
(1.08) (0.53) (3.95) 
1986 2.00 5.00 15.60 
(0.89) (1.00) (8.02) 
1987 1.62 5.64 13.00 
(0.96) (1.29) (8.34) 
1988 1.67 6.30 15.70 
(1.51) (1.06) (8.34) 
1989 2.25 6.80 16.00 
(1.42) (1.32) (9.24) 
Frequency: 53 49 51 
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Table 10 
Description and frequencies of other cross-sectional variables 
A. Description of other cross-sectional variables: 
MEAN STND. DEV. 
1. No. of market makers 6.72 (5.29) 
2 . No. of insiders (%age) 14.34 (19.10) 
3 . No. of institutional 
shareholders (%age) 38.16 (19.68) 
B. Frequencies,, of other cross-sectional variables: 
1. Joint, Sole or First (in sequence) 
Earnings announcments on a Friday 33 
2. Second (in sequence) Dividend 
announcements on a Friday 18 
3. Delayed earnings announcements 62 
4. Greater than median R-square in the 
returns-lagged returns regression: 
Non-log version 75 
Log version 74 
NOTES: 
1. The total frequency is 153 frim-events 
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Table 11 
Analysis of skewness and kurtosis of spread 
A. Mean (Standard Deviation) 
SPREAD 
Skewness 1.499 
(0.985) 
Kurtosis 5.070 
(5.712) 
of spread skewness and kurtosis 
LOG SPREAD 
0.638 
(0.703) 
1.475 
(2.159) 
B. Analysis of effect of log-transformation on spread 
skewness: 
Sicrnif icant 
@ p < 0.05 
(2 tailed) 
Not Sianificant Total 
Spread 134 19 153 
Log Spread 101 52 153 
Total 
Spread 235 71 306 
Chi-square statistic: 18.78 Significant @ p < 0.05 
C. Analysis of effect of log-transformation on spread 
kurtosis: 
• 
Sianificant 
@ p < 0.05 
(2 tailed) 
Not Sianificant Total 
Spread 122 31 153 
Log Spread 87 66 153 
Total 
Spread 209 97 306 
Chi-square statistic: 17.45 Significant @ p < 0.05 
contd.-next page 
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Table 11 (Contd.) 
NOTES: 
1. Coefficient of Skewness (g^ = m3/(m2) (m2)0-5 where, m2 and 
m3 are thw second and third moments of the distribution. The 
expected value of the coefficient of skewness is zero when the 
distribution is normal with a variance equal to 6/N, where N 
= 126 days in the estimation period. Hence, g./te/N)0,5 is a 
t-distribution with 125 degrees of freedom. 
2. Coefficient of Kurtosis (g2) = [m4/(m2)2]- 3 where m4 and 
m2 are the fourth and the second moments of the distribution. 
The expected value of the coefficient of kurtosis is zero when 
the distribution is normal with a variance equal to 24/N, 
where N = 12 6 days in the estimation period. Hence, 
g2/(24/N)0,5 is a t-distribution with 125 degrees of freedom. 
192 
Table 12 
Analysis of skewness and kurtosis of volume 
A. Mean (Standard Deviation) of volume skewness and kurtosis 
VOLUME LOG VOLUME 
Skewness 3.391 - .805 
(1.755) (0.820) 
Kurtosis 17.941 2.416 
(19.204) (3.716) 
Analysis of effect of log -transformation on Volume 
skewness: 
Sicrnif icant 
@ p < 0.05 
(2 tailed) 
Not Sicrnificant Total 
Volume 153 0 153 
Log Volume 0 153 153 
Total 
Volume 153 153 306 
Chi-square statistic: 302. 01 Significant @ p < 0.05 
C. Analysis of effect of log-transformation on Volume 
kurtosis: 
Sicrnificant 
@ p < 0.05 
(2 tailed) 
Not Sicrnificant Total 
Volume 151 2 153 
Log Volume 66 87 153 
Total 
Volume 217 89 306 
Chi-square statistic: 111.79 Significant @ p < 0.05 
contd.-next page 
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Table 12 (Contd.) 
NOTES: 
1. Coefficient of Skewness (g,,) = m3/(m2) (m2)0-5 where, m2 and 
m3 are thw second and third moments of the distribution. The 
expected value of the coefficient of skewness is zero when the 
distribution is normal with a variance equal to 6/N, where N 
= 126 days in the estimation period. Hence, (6/N)0-5 is a 
t-distribution with 125 degrees of freedom. 
2. Coefficient of Kurtosis (g2) = [m4/(m2)2]- 3 where m4 and 
m2 are the fourth and the second moments of the distribution. 
The expected value of the coefficient of kurtosis is zero when 
the distribution is normal with a variance equal to 24/N, 
where N = 12 6 days in the estimation period. Hence, 
g2/(24/N)0-5 is a t-distribution with 125 degrees of freedom. 
194 
Table 13 
Results of Hausman specification test 
A. SPREAD VOLUME 
EQUATION EQUATION 
Fail to reject 
null of exogeneity: 142 131 
Reject null i.e. 
existence of 
endogeneity: 11 22 
Total: 153 153 
Chi-square statistic of Goodness of Fit test at p 
levels: 27.04 (Significant) 
B. LOG LOG 
SPREAD VOLUME 
EQUATION EQUATION 
Fail to reject 
null of exogeneity: 144 . 112 
Reject null i.e. 
existence of 
endogeneity: 9 41 
Total: 153 153 
Chi-square statistic on Goodness of Fit test at p 
levels: 143.77 (Significant) 
0.05 
0.05 
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Table 14 
Simultaneous equation model: Structural coefficients and 
percentage significant 
The following simultaneous equation model has been estimated 
for each of the 153 sample firm-events: 
si.t 
TVl.t 
a0 + a1(TVi t) +a2{Pi t) +a2{Ri t) + a4(.Sift_1) + Ti #t 
bo+bi(Si,t) +Jb2(MF/t) + b3(IVi>t_1) + 
(la) 
(lb) 
SPREAD EQUATION: 
COEFFICIENT: MEAN: STND. PERCENTAGE MEAN 
DEV. : SIGNIFICANT: R-SQUARE 
(stnd. dev) 
CONSTANT -0.012 (2.13) 9.2 9.2 % 
(0.115) 
VOLUME 0.000 (0.00) 7.8 
PRICE 0.019 (0.07) 9.2 
RISK 0.042 (0.13) 11.8 
LAG SPREAD 0.141 (0.16) 17.6 
VOLUME EQUATION: 
COEFFICIENT: MEAN: STND. PERCENTAGE MEAN 
DEV. : SIGNIFICANT: R-SQUARE 
(stnd. dev 
CONSTANT 10211.52 ( 34557.92) 9.2 6.6 % 
(0.090) 
SPREAD 13780.44 (101166.13) 7.8 
MARKET 
VOLUME 
0.001 (0.002) 9.2 
LAG VOLUME 0.15 (0.113) 18.3 
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Table 15 
Simultaneous equation model (log version): Structural 
coefficients and percentage significant 
The following simultaneous equation model has been estimated 
for each of the 153 sample firm-events: 
Si,fc ” a0 + a1(TVi t) + a2(Pi t) + a3 (^i/t) + ^4 ^ t-l ^ + 
TVl t - b0 + i3i(Si/t) +b2 (MFiiC) + bz (TVit_i) (lb) 
LOG SPREAD : EOUATION: 
COEFFICIENT : MEAN: STND. PERCENTAGE MEAN 
DEV. : SIGNIFICANT: R-SQUARE 
(stnd.dev.) 
CONSTANT -0.049 (1.96) 9.2 9.2 % 
(0.109) 
VOLUME 0.001 (0.11) 7.8 
PRICE 0.124 (0.54) 5.2 
RISK 0.044 (0.10) 9.2 
LAG SPREAD 0.159 (0.12) 16.3 
LOG VOLUME EOUATION: 
COEFFICIENT : MEAN: STND. PERCENTAGE MEAN 
DEV. : SIGNIFICANT: R-SQUARE 
(stnd. dev 
CONSTANT 0.227 (9.47) 7.8 8.0 % 
(0.119) 
SPREAD 1.264 (3.82) 19.6 
MARKET 
VOLUME 
0.516 (0.58) 11.8 
. 
LAG VOLUME 0.003 (0.025) 3.9 
197 
Table 16 
Mean reduced form coefficients (Impact multipliers) and 
standard deviations for the spread and log spread equations: 
SPREAD LOG SPREAD 
COEFFICIENT: 
CONSTANT 0.024 
(1.909) 
-1.060 
(2.623) 
PRICE 0.015 
(0.066) 
0.137 
(0.678) 
RISK 0.105 
(0.183) 
0.096 
(0.115) 
LAG SPREAD 0.175 
(0.178) 
0.183 
(0.129) 
MARKET VOLUME 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.058 
(0.084) 
LAG VOLUME 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
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Explanations for Tables 17 to 46 
1. The 
of the 
period. 
mean-adjusted spread (U.) : Daily cross-sectional mean 
mean-adjusted spread for each day d in the event 
Further, 
where, M = the number of firm-events in the sample. 
In the case of mean-adjusted log spread, the cross- 
sectional daily mean of the mean-adjusted log spread for each 
day d in the analysis period has been calculated. 
2. The Brown and Warner test-statistic: 
{Ud/§{Ud) ) 
This statistic has a t-distribution with 125 degrees of 
freedom.Here, 
HUd) - { £ (Ut-U)2/125) 
t—147 
and. 
t 
-21 
U- { E 
t—147 
/126 
The same procedure has been adopted for calculation of 
the test-statistics for mean-adjusted log spread. 
3. The Corrado Rank test-statistic: 
To test the behavior of unexpected bid-ask spread in the 
presence of non-normalities, Corrado's Rank Test statistic has 
also been estimated over the event periods. This statistic 
involves the ranking of each U- t, where t = 1 to 152 days in 
the estimation and event period. Further: 
(i) Kift = rank (Uf t) 
(ii) J.'t = (K. t - 76.5), where 76.5 is the average rank over 
the 152' days. 
For each t = 127 to 152 days, the z-statistic is computed as 
follows: 
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Jt/§ (Jt) 
where, 
and, 
S(jt) 
\ 152 
152 
E (JJ2 
4. The cross-sectional mean of the mean-adjusted volume, bid 
and ask price for each day d in the analysis period have been 
calculated in a manner similar to (1). 
5. The Brown and Warner and the Corrado Rank test-statistics 
for volume, bid and ask price have been calculated as in (2) 
and (3) above. 
6 . The event period has been broken up into three sub-periods. 
These are as follows: 
Sub-oeriod Davs 
1. Pre-announcement period -15 to -2 
2 . Announcement period -1 to 0 
3 . Post-announcement period +1 to +10 
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Table 17 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings siqnal Full 
sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0225 -0.2767 0.1062 -0.1425 
-14 -0.0152 -0.1864 0.1214 0.7775 
* -13 -0.0421 -0.5175 -0.5929 -0.2811 
-12 -0.0021 -0.0258 0.0544 -0.2436 
-11 -0.0814 -0.9991 -2.3122* -1.9227@ 
-10 -0.0503 -0.6178 -1.0221 -1.0158 
-9 -0.0446 -0.5476 -1.0481 -0.7836 
-8 -0.0078 -0.0960 0.0605 -0.1808 
-7 -0.0054 -0.0659 0.0597 -0.1249 
- 6 -0.0716 -0.8787 -1.5771 -0.9958 
-5 -0.0650 -0.7984 -1.5120 -1.0403 
-4 -0.0912 -1.1195 -2.1863* -1.9434® 
-3 -0.0589 -0.7232 -1.4921 -1.2693 
-2 -0.0242 -0.2967 -0.3447 -0.7683 
-1 0.0481 0.5913 1.6943® 1.3375 
0 0.0567 0.6967 1.6375@ 1.2915 
1 -0.0434 -0.5325 -0.7723 -0.6473 
2 -0.0609 -0.7483 -1.3930 -1.0816 
3 -0.0503 -0.6178 -0.9749 -0.6419 
4 -0.0086 -0.1061 0.0636 0.3914 
5 0.0036 0.0444 0.7744 1.6784® 
6 -0.0503 -0.6178 -1.3694 -1.1965 
7 -0.0470 -0.5777 -0.9286 -0.6764 
8 -0.0229 -0.2817 -0.4627 -0.2980 
9 -0.0438 -0.5375 -0.9873 -0.9185 
10 -0.0332 -0.4071 -0.8104 -0.7346 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 153 firm-events 
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Table 18 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal, Full 
sample 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.A 
-15 6956.4976 0.6592 -2.0463* -0.6742 
-14 9685.3800 0.9178 1.3948 1.4825 
-13 -1797.5351 -0.1703 0.2728 0.4075 
-12 -1436.1168 -0.1361 -0.1344 -0.2298 
-11 1513.2100 0.1434 -0.5164 -0.2810 
-10 -14353.7050 -1.3602 -0.2260 -0.5077 
-9 -12335.4436 -1.1690 0.1052 0.0106 
-8 -5819.2998 -0.5515 -1.3874 -0.2976 
-7 1279.5630 0.1213 -0.9164 -0.8309 
-6 -10119.7573 -0.9590 -0.2055 -0.6878 
-5 -8516.7050 -0.8071 -0.2167 -0.1085 
-4 -7492.5743 -0.7100 -1.2844 -1.5073 
-3 -17626.5155 -1.6704@ -0.5220 -0.6215 
-2 5247.6545 0.4973 -0.4806 -0.0166 
-1 34708.0728 3.2891* 3.0641* 3.2715* 
0 21871.8440 2.0727* 3.1354* 3.1442* 
1 6387.4388 0.6053 0.1549 -0.1589 
2 5010.9225 0.4749 1.2771 0.9687 
3 -13207.1756 -1.2516 -0.2503 -0.2200 
4 -8559.0514 -0.8111 0.5780 0.1032 
5 -6984.1560 -0.6619 -0.6070 -0.9130 
6 -10997.6789 -1.0422 -0.3275 -0.8640 
7 -5029.0841 -0.4766 -0.5864 -1.0433 
8 -10419.6658 -0.9874 0.1432 -0.5424 
9 -2945.4370 -0.2791 -0.8201 -0.4218 
10 -5376.2998 -0.5095 -0.4498 -0.8143 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 153 firm-events 
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Table 19 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Dividends signal, Full 
sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0628 -0.7715 -1.8677@ 1.2431 
-14 -0.0046 -0.0564 -0.1133 -0.9530 
-13 -0.0251 -0.3088 -0.7336 -1.3474 
-12 -0.0114 -0.1405 -1.1430 1.3152 
-11 -0.0046 -0.0564 -0.2328 -1.3474 
-10 -0.0680 -0.8345 -2.0064* -1.1036 
-9 -0.0303 -0.3719 -1.1721 -2.0704* 
-8 0.0228 0.2801 -0.2303 -0.8820 
-7 0.0451 0.5535 1.4062 -0.0782 
-6 0.0416 0.5114 0.3437 1.1619 
-5 0.0040 0.0487 -0.6475 -1.4559 
-4 0.0160 0.1960 -0.9884 -1.2186 
-3 0.0776 0.9531 1.6396® 1.2704 
-2 -0.0286 -0.3508 -1.1497 -2.1187* 
-1 -0.0303 -0.3719 -0.9952 -2.0002* 
0 0.0708 0.8689 1.4115 0.4891 
1 0.1050 1.2895 2.8569* 0.5206 
2 -0.0269 -0.3298 -0.9443 -0.1395 
3 -0.0286 -0.3508 -0.6865 1.0829 
4 -0.0388 -0.4770 -1.7878® -2.1191* 
5 0.0468 0.5745 1.0794 0.5811 
6 -0.0697 -0.8556 -2.0087* -1.0001 
7 -0.0337 -0.4139 -1.6185 0.6156 
8 -0.0388 -0.4770 -1.2229 -0.4481 
9 0.0297 0.3642 0.6937 1.8825® 
10 0.0742 0.9110 1.7868® -0.2323 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
203 
Table 20 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Dividends signal, Full 
sample 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 14445.3929 1.3689 -3.0618* -1.4054 
-14 7632.6943 0.7233 -1.6940@ -0.1465 
-13 1677.7491 0.1590 -2.1951* -1.6589® 
-12 8726.9683 0.8270 -0.4881 -0.0482 
-11 16378.2559 1.5521 -0.1998 -0.5548 
-10 -1637.6071 -0.1552 -0.7222 -1.0254 
-9 -4143.8263 -0.3927 -1.4451 -0.5122 
-8 1950.3244 0.1848 0.5137 0.7681 
-7 -448.5797 -0.0425 2.0669* 0.8688 
-6 -2572.7852 -0.2438 0.3800 -0.7195 
-5 13143.7765 1.2456 1.6943® -0.3744 
-4 -1086.4427 -0.1030 -1.8178® -0.6377 
-3 2295.4203 0.2175 -0.9536 0.5968 
-2 -3210.7578 -0.3043 -2.9741* 0.3164 
-1 6484.0505 0.6145 0.3084 -1.7151® 
0 658.6395 0.0624 -0.1186 0.5038 
1 9255.6121 0.8771 0.8866 0.0643 
2 -2293.0728 -0.2173 -1.0845 -1.6326 
3 -4523.9222 -0.4287 -0.5823 -0.9404 
4 11212.0641 1.0625 -0.0621 0.3748 
5 5349.0094 0.5069 1.2214 -0.7817 
6 4857.5984 0.4603 0.0093 -0.5992 
7 -493.4701 -0.0468 -1.3853 -1.5826 
8 -7077.3742 -0.6707 -2.1112* -2.0567* 
9 747.5573 0.0708 0.2475 -0.2654 
10 7365.1463 0.6980 0.8857 -0.5366 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 21 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on firm size 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0322 0.6320 1.0150 0.6254 
-14 -0.0602 -1.1789 -0.9804 -0.4336 
-13 -0.0194 -0.3800 -0.3373 -0.2043 
-12 0.0214 0.4189 0.1000 -0.4757 
-11 -0.0900 -1.7648 -1.7604@ -1.3147 
-10 -0.0303 -0.5931 -0.8143 -0.9732 
-9 -0.0737 -1.4452 -1.7511@ -1.8637@ 
-8 0.0268 0.5254 0.4875 0.0359 
-7 -0.0112 -0.2202 -0.2569 0.0094 
-6 -0.0602 -1.1789 -1.1534 -0.3961 
-5 -0.0683 -1.3387 -1.2748 -0.6550 
-4 -0.0194 -0.3800 -0.4668 -0.3774 
-3 -0.0072 -0.1403 -0.4241 -0.5911 
-2 0.0051 0.0993 0.0990 -0.1497 
-1 0.0227 0.4455 0.5909 0.9326 
0 0.0513 1.0048 1.0304 1.1416 
1 -0.0208 -0.4067 -0.1832 -0.2371 
2 -0.0955 -1.8713® -1.9461@ -0.9389 
3 -0.0574 -1.1257 -1.0712 -0.9373 
4 -0.0737 -1.4452 -1.2788 -0.8297 
5 -0.0031 -0.0605 0.2344 1.4598 
6 -0.1064 -2.0844* -2.2274* -1.4941 
7 -0.0004 -0.0072 -0.0826 0.3384 
8 -0.0316 -0.6197 -0.8020 -0.5459 
9 -0.0438 -0.8594 -0.8319 -0.4944 
10 -0.0466 -0.9126 -0.9400 -0.6425 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 46 firm-events 
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Table 22 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0197 0.3869 0.9022 0.8852 
-14 -0.0510 -1.0018 -0.6993 -0.1442 
-13 -0.0322 -0.6315 -0.5244 -0.3271 
-12 -0.0110 -0.2149 -0.3429 -0.6884 
-11 -0.0888 -1.7424@ -1.6711© -1.3659 
-10 -0.0251 -0.4926 -0.5307 -0.1953 
-9 -0.0794 -1.5573 -1.9131© -1.9922* 
-8 0.0527 1.0349 1.0915 0.4512 
-7 0.0103 0.2017 0.1962 0.2062 
-6 -0.0275 -0.5389 -0.6169 -0.0760 
-5 -0.0298 -0.5852 -0.5947 -0.0713 
-4 -0.0157 -0.3075 -0.3600 -0.3318 
-3 -0.0381 -0.7472 -0.8879 -0.6046 
-2 -0.0180 -0.3538 -0.4386 -0.4294 
-1 0.0445 0.8729 1.1602 1.4930 
0 0.0598 1.1738 1.0727 1.1798 
1 -0.0263 -0.5158 -0.2690 -0.5752 
2 -0.0841 -1.6499© -1.8618© -1.2961 
3 -0.0605 -1.1870 -1.1722 -0.8418 
4 -0.0086 -0.1686 -0.4991 -0.2264 
5 0.0315 0.6183 0.7776 1.8527© 
6 -0.1218 -2.3905* -2.5486* -1.9147@ 
7 -0.0275 -0.5389 -0.7784 -0.5039 
8 -0.0640 -1.2564 -1.4702 -1.2310 
9 -0.0605 -1.1870 -1.0757 -0.7442 
10 -0.0463 -0.9092 -0.9159 -0.4806 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 53 firm-events 
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Table 23 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on firm size 
DAY 
ME AN - AD J. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -2126.0571 -0.6130 -3.0587* -1.94 7 9@ 
-14 -2470.2745 -0.7123 0.2161 -0.3855 
-13 5313.2038 1.5320 0.9537 1.0421 
-12 3894.3125 1.1229 -0.0645 0.6770 
-11 551.1603 0.1589 -0.0662 0.1473 
-10 769.1603 0.2218 0.1215 -0.4607 
-9 -2037.9702 -0.5876 -0.3181 -0.8588 
-8 -1713.5136 -0.4941 -2.1441* -0.3965 
-7 -287.0354 -0.0828 -1.1875 -1.2035 
-6 -4042.1223 -1.1655 -0.4714 -0.6174 
-5 3882.6603 1.1195 -0.5242 -0.4435 
-4 -269.2310 -0.0776 -1.8111® -1.7818@ 
-3 -2197.8180 -0.6337 -0.8014 -0.3542 
-2 2828.5951 0.8156 -1.3858 -0.4028 
-1 7961.6603 2.2956* 2.7178* 2.7597* 
0 6293.8777 1.8147@ 2.3101* 2.5654* 
1 1057.3342 0.3049 0.9807 0.6065 
2 -1256.0571 -0.3622 0.4831 0.0125 
3 106.2038 0.0306 -0.2684 -0.0439 
4 750.9212 0.2165 0.7538 0.4686 
5 -167.7962 -0.0484 -0.3104 0.3714 
6 -1565.5571 -0.4514 -0.1996 -0.1238 
7 -2769.2528 -0.7985 0.0566 0.1301 
8 -1620.8397 -0.4673 0.6513 0.0596 
9 -127.4049 -0.0367 -0.8958 -0.8086 
10 -1176.4049 -0.3392 -0.3978 -1.3446 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 46 firm-events 
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Table 24 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 381.3422 0.0906 -2.5759* -1.9537@ 
-14 456.1912 0.1084 1.0547 0.5798 
-13 2038.7950 0.4845 0.9936 0.7957 
-12 320.8139 0.0762 0.2098 0.1163 
-11 -182.2050 -0.0433 0.6931 0.8138 
-10 1749.5120 0.4157 -0.1675 -0.7473 
-9 82.2478 0.0195 0.3649 0.1298 
-8 -1909.9220 -0.4539 -1.2253 0.2295 
-7 -241.5635 -0.0574 -1.0519 -0.6643 
- 6 582.2478 0.1384 0.3478 0.2386 
-5 -2451.3748 -0.5825 -1.0490 -0.7111 
-4 -2012.2427 -0.4782 -1.5362 -1.6668@ 
-3 1814.1912 0.4311 -0.2065 -0.1540 
-2 23551.6818 5.5966* -1.0898 -0.3925 
-1 3862.6063 0.9179 1.9919* 2.2526* 
0 2479.3422 0.5892 2.1448* 2.2315* 
1 -3189.9031 -0.7580 0.5705 -0.0770 
2 17275.3799 4.1051* 0.7476 -0.0347 
3 1791.0026 0.4256 0.8508 0.8243 
4 6046.8139 1.4369 2.0051* 1.6577® 
5 -3734.3560 -0.8874 -0.0255 -0.1917 
6 3969.0214 0.9432 0.2798 0.1978 
7 -2350.8843 -0.5586 0.0449 -0.0679 
8 6963.5875 1.6548@ 1.2380 0.8576 
9 467.5497 0.1111 -1.0022 -0.5601 
10 -1970.2616 -0.4682 -0.1595 -1.2214 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 53 firm-events 
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Table 25 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on firm size 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0229 -0.4545 -0.3334 -0.4346 
-14 0.0278 0.5502 0.7229 1.5039 
-13 -0.0466 -0.9233 -0.7204 -0.2891 
-12 -0.0196 -0.3875 -0.4919 -0.2834 
-11 -0.1614 -3.2005* -3.4167* -2.6753* 
-10 -0.0364 -0.7224 -0.8796 -0.9919 
-9 0.0075 0.1483 0.3381 0.8049 
-8 -0.0196 -0.3875 -0.3873 -0.2853 
-7 -0.0736 -1.4591 -1.4797 -1.8024@ 
-6 -0.0533 -1.0573 -1.2252 -1.4132 
-5 -0.0398 -0.7894 -0.8418 -0.8143 
-4 -0.0804 -1.5931 -1.8197® -1.2659 
-3 -0.1277 -2.5308* -2.6147* -2.3598* 
-2 -0.0060 -0.1196 -0.2830 -0.2929 
-1 0.0852 1.6888@ 1.2549 0.1644 
0 0.2372 4.7027* 3.4133* 1.9649* 
1 -0.0500 -0.9903 -1.0245 -0.7482 
2 0.0311 0.6172 0.5416 -0.2267 
3 -0.0601 -1.1912 -1.2828 -1.1922 
4 0.0007 0.0144 0.1128 0.4516 
5 -0.0094 -0.1866 0.0266 0.6292 
6 -0.0466 -0.9233 -1.0970 -0.8786 
7 -0.0533 -1.0573 -1.3551 -1.6267® 
8 -0.0837 -1.6601 -1.6193 -1.3887 
9 -0.0060 -0.1196 -0.1988 -0.0907 
10 -0.0804 -1.5931 -1.9875* -1.7665® 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 37 firm-events 
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Table 26 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0224 0.3971 0.3573 -0.0129 
-14 0.0045 0.0801 0.1140 1.0929 
-13 -0.0261 -0.4632 -0.2776 -0.3482 
-12 0.0351 0.6235 0.2868 -0.1145 
-11 -0.0975 -1.7309® -1.8538® -1.2735 
-10 0.0173 0.3065 0.3171 0.2676 
-9 -0.0236 -0.4179 -0.3933 -0.0161 
-8 -0.0465 -0.8254 -0.7790 -0.5997 
-7 0.0096 0.1707 0.1654 0.0403 
-6 -0.1103 -1.9573® -1.8288@ -1.3654 
-5 -0.0644 -1.1423 -1.1810 -0.9253 
-4 -0.0822 -1.4592 -1.5830 -1.3525 
-3 -0.0082 -0.1462 -0.4357 -0.4191 
-2 -0.0184 -0.3273 -0.1588 -0.4901 
-1 0.0683 1.2120 0.9858 0.6351 
0 0.1550 2.7514* 2.0402* 1.1026 
1 -0.0746 -1.3234 -1.4893 -1.2122 
2 -0.0312 -0.5537 -0.4612 -0.2902 
3 0.0224 0.3971 0.4502 0.4320 
4 0.0147 0.2612 0.5364 0.7431 
5 -0.0133 -0.2368 0.0180 0.2450 
6 0.0071 0.1254 -0.1558 -0.6609 
7 -0.0261 -0.4632 -0.4819 -0.8753 
8 -0.0414 -0.7348 -0.8937 -0.7496 
9 0.0045 0.0801 -0.0342 -0.0613 
10 -0.0159 -0.2821 -0.6764 -0.7093 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 49 firm-events 
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Table 27 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on firm size 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 15985.3786 1.5114 -0.1084 -0.5183 
-14 -1716.7836 -0.1623 0.0603 0.6256 
-13 -2977.2701 -0.2815 -1.0228 0.2037 
-12 -240.8647 -0.0228 -0.2440 -0.8947 
-11 -18180.7836 -1.7190® -1.6125 -1.9967* 
-10 -6033.7565 -0.5705 -2.0640* -1.3602 
-9 -2573.9457 -0.2434 1.3136 1.1584 
-8 -8546.1620 -0.8080 -0.1359 -0.5819 
-7 -17881.7295 -1.6907® -0.8507 -1.7385® 
-6 -12754.0538 -1.2059 -0.1919 -1.0947 
-5 -13895.6484 -1.3138 -0.8565 -0.9874 
-4 5027.1624 0.4753 -0.2285 -0.9038 
-3 -9476.8376 -0.8960 -0.5679 -1.0056 
-2 -13869.8106 -1.3114 -0.4542 -0.8929 
-1 633.6218 0.0599 0.1227 0.6856 
0 -11350.7836 -1.0732 0.7370 0.6183 
1 -2514.4052 -0.2377 -0.0690 -0.0964 
2 3425.7299 0.3239 0.6489 0.6146 
3 -10480.6755 -0.9909 -0.4350 -0.6892 
4 -1779.2701 -0.1682 -0.0411 -0.1800 
5 -14529.8917 -1.3738 -0.9587 -1.9130® 
6 -8889.2971 -0.8405 -0.0608 -0.6637 
7 -13785.6484 -1.3034 -0.3556 -1.1056 
8 -8723.2160 -0.8248 -0.5313 -0.9674 
9 -10799.6484 -1.0211 -1.4035 -1.1129 
10 -10144.9728 -0.9592 -0.4433 -0.8492 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 37 firm-events 
211 
Table 28 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 7072.9067 1.2536 -1.4568 -0.6731 
-14 3281.1720 0.5815 -0.0269 0.8798 
-13 644.1108 0.1142 -1.3916 -0.0733 
-12 -2030.1137 -0.3598 -0.0820 -0.6056 
-11 -1400.4606 -0.2482 -1.6791@ -0.6262 
-10 2152.8251 0.3816 -0.3609 0.1906 
-9 -3906.9300 -0.6925 -0.6147 -0.5088 
-8 1007.9271 0.1786 -0.7437 -0.2200 
-7 -11270.0933 -1.9975* -0.8149 -1.2435 
-6 -7051.6239 -1.2498 -1.0068 -1.6981® 
-5 3171.3761 0.5621 0.4450 0.2244 
-4 9609.6822 1.7032® -0.0927 -0.3446 
-3 -7654.5831 -1.3567 -1.0260 -0.7743 
-2 -5472.6239 -0.9699 -0.0118 -0.5587 
-1 2183.6414 0.3870 1.4722 1.7289@ 
0 -1247.9096 -0.2212 1.3885 1.5295 
1 -64.0525 -0.0114 -1.3464 -0.7684 
2 -5208.0117 -0.9230 0.0985 0.1305 
3 -6191.8280 -1.0974 -1.6929® -0.6569 
4 -10183.6443 -1.8049® -1.5497 -1.3095 
5 -11404.6035 -2.0213* -1.5663 -1.4004 
6 -9568.8484 -1.6959® -0.6111 -1.1203 
7 -3430.7055 -0.6080 -0.7445 -0.7024 
8 -4647.3790 -0.8237 -1.4572 -1.4561 
9 -254.0117 -0.0450 -0.3849 -0.4722 
10 -1848.7055 -0.3277 -1.0632 -0.9576 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 49 firm-events 
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Table 29 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
High differential information portfolio based on firm size 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0583 -0.3478 -0.3779 -0.4366 
-14 -0.0083 -0.0495 0.4770 0.6078 
-13 -0.0547 -0.3265 -0.2381 -0.1015 
-12 -0.0083 -0.0495 0.2589 0.1675 
-11 -0.0333 -0.1987 -0.3126 -0.3069 
-10 -0.0708 -0.4224 -0.4349 -0.2165 
-9 -0.0530 -0.3159 -0.4483 -0.3106 
-8 -0.0244 -0.1454 -0.0523 -0.1321 
-7 0.0346 0.2061 1.0154 0.9599 
-6 -0.0887 -0.5289 -0.8092 -0.3644 
-5 -0.0762 -0.4543 -0.8293 -0.6200 
-4 -0.1440 -0.8591 -1.8386@ -1.9871* 
-3 -0.0565 -0.3372 -0.4823 -0.0355 
-2 -0.0530 -0.3159 -0.4106 -0.9196 
-1 0.0453 0.2700 1.3464 1.2975 
0 -0.0351 -0.2093 -0.1364 -0.1052 
1 -0.0547 -0.3265 -0.4422 -0.3632 
2 -0.0869 -0.5183 -0.9050 -0.8438 
3 -0.0405 -0.2413 0.0139 0.4818 
4 0.0292 0.1742 0.9116 0.9832 
5 0.0149 0.0889 0.9188 1.1275 
6 -0.0155 -0.0922 0.1572 -0.1700 
7 -0.0744 -0.4437 • -0.5635 -0.2923 
8 0.0149 0.0889 0.7237 0.8511 
9 -0.0637 -0.3798 -0.7207 -1.0199 
10 0.0006 0.0037 0.5153 0.4745 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 70 firm-events 
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Table 30 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
High differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.1096 -0.4924 -0.9027 -1.0397 
-14 0.0032 0.0143 0.7063 0.5969 
-13 -0.0679 -0.3051 -0.2978 0.0833 
-12 -0.0287 -0.1289 0.1422 0.2735 
-11 -0.0581 -0.2611 -0.8287 -1.1647 
-10 -0.1414 -0.6356 -1.5087 -1.8962@ 
-9 -0.0287 -0.1289 0.2394 0.3776 
-8 -0.0336 -0.1509 -0.1781 -0.2152 
-7 -0.0360 -0.1619 -0.2098 -0.4456 
-6 -0.0801 -0.3602 -0.5367 -0.5608 
-5 -0.1022 -0.4593 -0.9969 -1.0245 
-4 -0.1782 -0.8008 -1.9772* -2.0600* 
-3 -0.1292 -0.5805 -1.3433 -1.3979 
-2 -0.0360 -0.1619 -0.0603 -0.5858 
-1 0.0326 0.1465 0.9785 0.5400 
0 -0.0409 -0.1839 0.0656 0.3346 
1 -0.0311 -0.1399 0.2121 0.3859 
2 -0.0654 -0.2941 -0.3196 -0.5497 
3 -0.1096 -0.4924 -0.9914 -0.7815 
4 -0.0311 -0.1399 0.0802 0.2721 
5 -0.0091 -0.0407 0.6012 1.1716 
6 -0.0311 -0.1399 0.0515 0.1152 
7 -0.0875 -0.3932 -0.4632 -0.0208 
8 0.0375 0.1686 1.2542 1.2077 
9 -0.0728 -0.3272 -0.6844 -0.9453 
10 -0.0360 -0.1619 0.0162 -0.2901 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 51 firm-events 
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Table 31 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
High differential information portfolio based on firm size 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 8152.6251 0.3652 0.1705 0.7222 
-14 23700.2393 1.0617 2.4161* 2.1335* 
-13 -5846.7321 -0.2619 0.1363 -0.2693 
-12 -5570.7464 -0.2496 0.0317 -0.2795 
-11 12555.0965 0.5624 0.4594 0.7199 
-10 -28689.2749 -1.2852 1.1707 0.4199 
-9 -24262.0035 -1.0869 -0.4968 -0.0856 
-8 -7076.0464 -0.3170 0.2644 0.2031 
-7 12437.1536 0.5572 0.5230 0.7085 
-6 -12721.2178 -0.5699 0.3949 0.0947 
-5 -13821.7035 -0.6192 1.0177 0.7781 
-4 -18856.9178 -0.8447 0.0988 -0.4187 
-3 -32073.0607 -1.4368 0.5385 -0.0525 
-2 16942.2679 0.7590 1.3104 0.8283 
-1 70295.0679 3.1490* 2.2908* 2.5157* 
0 49669.3251 2.2251* 2.4513* 2.5066* 
1 14595.3393 0.6538 -0.9569 -0.6218 
2 9967.1108 0.4465 1.3151 1.0724 
3 -23397.1178 -1.0481 0.2423 0.1312 
4 -18260.6321 -0.8180 0.1622 -0.0719 
5 -7475.0178 -0.3349 0.0453 -0.4529 
6 -18310.3607 -0.8203 -0.3263 -0.8021 
7 -1885.6464 -0.0845 -0.9296 -0.9812 
8 -17098.4464 -0.7660 -0.1366 -0.2578 
9 -645.7749 -0.0289 0.7972 0.6480 
10 -5615.6464 -0.2516 0.0293 0.2784 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 70 firm-events 
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Table 32 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
High differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 13677.6583 0.4478 1.2744 1.1907 
-14 25429.5602 0.8325 1.5196 1.3656 
-13 -8130.2045 -0.2662 0.5704 0.0888 
-12 -2691.2437 -0.0881 -0.5798 0.0430 
-11 6074.5210 0.1989 -0.4422 -0.6731 
-10 -46947.6359 -1.5369 0.1744 -0.4288 
-9 -33338.0868 -1.0914 0.3423 0.3816 
-8 -16441.4790 -0.5383 -0.3111 -0.5509 
-7 14917.8543 0.4884 0.5869 0.2567 
-6 -24189.2633 -0.7919 0.0964 0.1207 
-5 -26049.6163 -0.8528 0.7615 0.2415 
-4 -29619.4006 -0.9697 -0.2969 -0.9187 
-3 -47410.4790 -1.5521 0.3193 -0.2706 
-2 -3474.3025 -0.1137 0.7419 0.8590 
-1 98012.1289 3.2086* 2.1060* 2.3204* 
0 64237.9328 2.1030* 2.1106* 2.2940* 
1 22538.8543 0.7379 0.9623 0.5052 
2 2083.6975 0.0682 1.62 03@ 1.6931@ 
3 -35533.7535 -1.1633 -0.0676 -0.5412 
4 -22176.8123 -0.7260 -0.2532 -0.0944 
5 -6114.3025 -0.2002 0.4403 -0.1804 
6 -27924.1064 -0.9142 -0.5371 -0.7133 
7 -9348.0084 -0.3060 -0.5909 -1.1949 
8 -34030.5378 -1.1141 -0.0762 -0.4094 
9 -9078.1457 -0.2972 0.2270 0.1846 
10 -12305.1653 -0.4028 0.4526 0.5287 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 51 firm-events 
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Table 33 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Dividends signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.1468 -2.8816* -3.2336* 0.8208 
-14 -0.1706 -3.3489* -3.3186* -1.1910 
-13 -0.1825 -3.5826* -3.7525* -1.8642@ 
-12 -0.1409 -2.7648* -3.1341* 0.4115 
-11 -0.0992 -1.9471@ -1.84580 -0.7881 
-10 -0.1052 -2.0639* -2.0818* -1.4269 
-9 -0.1885 -3.6994* -3.8163* -1.8803@ 
-8 -0.1706 -3.3489* -3.4912* -1.1359 
-7 -0.0397 -0.7788 -0.5553 -0.8879 
-6 0.1568 3.0764* 1.4806 1.67370 
-5 0.1091 2.1418* 0.5995 -0.7909 
-4 0.1210 2.3754* -0.6909 -0.7134 
-3 0.2520 4.9455* 2.6141* 1.1663 
-2 -0.0337 -0.6620 -1.3743 -0.8965 
-1 -0.0992 -1.9471@ -2.0267* -0.9895 
0 0.0794 1.5577 0.7888 1.3482 
1 0.2937 5.7633* 5.5333* 1.84590 
2 -0.0278 -0.5452 -1.5486 -1.4045 
3 0.0079 0.1558 0.2919 1.1020 
4 -0.1944 -3.8162* -4.2334* -1.2231 
5 -0.0159 -0.3115 -0.4220 0.4907 
6 -0.1171 -2.2975* -2.2294* -0.9097 
7 0.0794 1.5577 -0.0927 0.6021 
8 -0.0635 -1.2461 -1.5447 -0.9109 
9 0.0437 0.8567 0.7178 1.4659 
10 -0.0278 -0.5452 -0.8302 -0.6727 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 34 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Dividends signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 45853.2336 10.8960* -3.1788* -1.9448@ 
-14 -6028.6236 -1.4326 -2.3624* -0.9150 
-13 -7267.6236 -1.7270® -2.5704* -1.5046 
-12 -1179.3855 -0.2803 -0.2794 0.4402 
-11 4668.3288 1.1093 -0.6141 -0.3118 
-10 -2001.8617 -0.4757 -1.0512 -0.6915 
-9 -5696.0522 -1.3536 0.5130 -0.1279 
-8 9791.9479 2.3269* 0.7637 1.2137 
-7 6731.0907 1.5995® 2.5436* 0.0594 
-6 -2823.4807 -0.6709 -0.1322 -0.8182 
-5 21691.2812 5.1545* 0.7836 -0.6926 
-4 -1422.1950 -0.3380 -1.9882* -0.1381 
-3 -1228.5760 -0.2919 -1.2977 0.5958 
-2 -8601.3855 -2.0439* -2.1118* 0.9065 
-1 3217.3764 0.7645 0.2198 -0.8397 
0 -263.9093 -0.0627 -0.6137 0.5907 
1 15591.8526 3.7051* 1.7504® -0.7164 
2 -3375.0998 -0.8020 -0.3908 -0.9897 
3 -2324.0045 -0.5523 0.5442 -0.0526 
4 -6252.1950 -1.4857 -0.1253 0.5523 
5 -2641.4807 -0.6277 -0.8633 -1.4491 
6 -5392.6236 -1.2814 -1.5005 -0.1471 
7 -4563.1474 -1.0843 -1.7417® -1.5080 
8 -5290.9093 -1.2573 -1.7912® -0.4329 
9 4485.8050 1.0660 0.2086 -1.0892 
10 5913.3764 1.4052 -0.2173 -0.5353 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 35 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Dividends signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0698 -1.2388 -1.2206 -0.0662 
-14 -0.0335 -0.5947 -0.3827 0.5382 
-13 -0.0013 -0.0222 -0.0993 0.0602 
-12 0.0552 0.9798 0.5459 1.4016 
-11 -0.0496 -0.8809 -1.1653 -2.2577* 
-10 -0.0375 -0.6662 -0.6932 -0.1505 
-9 0.0109 0.1926 -0.1340 -1.0921 
-8 0.1520 2.6973* 1.4988 -0.2517 
-7 0.0673 1.1945 1.3643 0.1361 
-6 0.0028 0.0494 -0.1433 -0.1662 
-5 -0.0456 -0.8094 -0.9493 -0.6731 
-4 -0.0214 -0.3800 -0.6349 -1.0355 
-3 -0.0456 -0.8094 -0.3935 -0.0506 
-2 -0.0537 -0.9525 -0.8299 -1.8519® 
-1 -0.0859 -1.5250 -1.3999 -1.9915* 
0 0.0270 0.4788 0.3224 -0.9536 
1 -0.0577 -1.0241 -1.2039 -1.5087 
2 -0.0375 -0.6662 -0.3399 0.8284 
3 -0.1021 -1.8113® -1.6724® -0.3540 
4 -0.0295 -0.5231 -0.4781 -1.1896 
5 0.1036 1.8386® 1.6032 0.6249 
6 -0.0496 -0.8809 -0.7077 0.3468 
7 -0.1263 -2.2407* -2.1136* -0.1132 
8 -0.0295 -0.5231 -0.5532 0.0048 
9 0.0028 0.0494 0.3011 1.4774 
10 0.0310 0.5504 0.9484 -0.0205 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 31 firm-events 
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Table 36 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Dividends signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -2836.7133 -0.5028 -2.3621* -1.0281 
-14 -4410.6488 -0.7817 -1.3168 -0.5019 
-13 1077.9964 0.1911 -0.8259 -1.0089 
-12 3448.2222 0.6112 1.1378 0.5262 
-11 -6712.2294 -1.1896 -0.3482 -1.5442 
-10 -3479.9068 -0.6168 -0.1132 -0.3387 
-9 -4601.6488 -0.8156 -0.9341 -0.4096 
-8 1332.2867 0.2361 -0.2591 0.0000 
-7 -946.4552 -0.1678 0.2290 0.8963 
-6 -3666.6165 -0.6499 0.2386 0.3823 
-5 4310.0609 0.7639 0.6725 0.4542 
-4 -1401.3907 -0.2484 -0.0715 -0.8588 
-3 -611.2617 -0.1083 -1.0671 -0.5130 
-2 -4382.6810 -0.7768 -3.6809* -1.8920® 
-1 1628.5126 0.2886 -0.9593 -1.953 8@ 
0 -1292.1649 -0.2290 -0.4815 -1.1285 
1 -6758.1649 -1.1978 -0.9512 0.4583 
2 -7505.7455 -1.3303 -2.1508* -1.1285 
3 -4022.5197 -0.7129 -1.5549 -1.1042 
4 7680.8351 1.3613 -0.8133 -0.4593 
5 2367.1900 0.4196 0.8375 -0.0061 
6 -1833.4875 -0.3250 -0.0813 -0.6591 
7 -3729.0681 -0.6609 -2.3676* -1.1498 
8 -5858.1649 -1.0383 -0.8900 -1.4986 
9 -4229.1649 -0.7496 0.2623 0.8882 
10 1149.7061 0.2038 -0.7562 -0.8750 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 31 firm-events 
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Table 37 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Dividends signal 
High differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0315 0.1416 -1.2206 0.0935 
-14 0.2041 0.9174 -0.3827 2.4875* 
-13 0.0970 0.4359 -0.0993 1.0998 
-12 0.0196 0.0881 0.5459 -0.7272 
-11 0.1565 0.7034 -1.1653 0.2566 
-10 -0.0756 -0.3399 -0.6932 -0.9374 
-9 0.0672 0.3021 -0.1340 1.2389 
-8 0.0256 0.1149 1.4988 0.4968 
-7 0.0970 0.4359 1.3643 0.7107 
-6 -0.0161 -0.0724 -0.1433 -0.3015 
-5 -0.0280 -0.1259 -0.9493 0.6195 
-4 -0.0340 -0.1527 -0.6349 0.4848 
-3 0.0851 0.3824 -0.3935 0.9823 
-2 0.0137 0.0614 -0.8299 -0.7564 
-1 0.1208 0.5429 -1.3999 2.2421* 
0 0.1268 0.5696 0.3224 0.8873 
1 0.1565 0.7034 -1.2039 1.4820 
2 -0.0102 -0.0457 -0.3399 1.3930 
3 0.0434 0.1951 -1.6724® 1.0242 
4 0.1029 0.4626 -0.4781 0.4205 
5 . 0.0256 0.1149 1.6032 0.4137 
6 -0.0518 -0.2329 -0.7077 -0.4279 
7 -0.0102 -0.0457 -2.1136* -0.6763 
8 -0.0280 -0.1259 -0.5532 -0.9524 
9 0.0553 0.2486 0.3011 0.9539 
10 0.2398 1.0779 0.9484 1.5217 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
221 
Table 38 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Dividends signal 
High differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 8549.2328 0.2799 1.0938 0.6845 
-14 39072.2804 1.2791 1.6154 1.7023® 
-13 11508.4709 0.3768 -0.2927 -0.0627 
-12 26425.7566 0.8651 -2.9156* -1.4723 
-11 62174.1376 2.0354* 1.0880 0.1288 
-10 1446.2328 0.0474 -0.0428 0.3925 
-9 -1915.7672 -0.0627 -3.1177* -0.3856 
-8 -4978.9577 -0.1630 0.6132 -0.1357 
-7 -6893.2910 -0.2257 1.0569 1.1514 
-6 -707.3862 -0.0232 0.8279 0.0689 
-5 17636.5185 0.5774 2.1367* 0.7465 
-4 -285.7672 -0.0094 -1.5718 0.2300 
-3 10110.2328 0.3310 1.4406 0.3987 
-2 3909.8519 0.1280 1.9447® 0.7499 
-1 16918.4233 0.5539 2.2021* 2.1740* 
0 4460.9471 0.1460 1.5481 1.9502® 
1 26558.7566 0.8695 1.2516 1.6190 
2 6483.8519 0.2123 1.5358 1.6513® 
3 -7464.0053 -0.2444 0.3028 0.0799 
4 33889.0900 1.1094 1.4950 1.2995 
5 17741.2328 0.5808 3.2555* 0.5977 
6 24985.1376 0.8179 2.6378* -0.5268 
7 8352.5661 0.2734 3.3232* 0.8105 
8 -10663.6243 -0.3491 -1.2293 -1.8710® 
9 4355.8995 0.1426 -0.1369 0.2431 
10 17992.0900 0.5890 4.1343* 1.7622® 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 39 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score (=1) 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0340 -0.5903 -0.5001 -0.5680 
-14 0.0259 0.4505 0.4186 0.7892 
-13 0.0285 0.4958 0.5215 0.2371 
-12 0.0416 0.7220 0.5372 0.4805 
-11 -0.0288 -0.4997 -0.5651 -0.3994 
-10 0.0181 0.3148 0.6793 1.0676 
-9 0.0311 0.5410 0.3161 0.3119 
-8 -0.0340 -0.5903 -0.6027 -0.7876 
-7 0.0155 0.2695 0.2914 0.5983 
-6 -0.0496 -0.8618 -0.7954 -0.7033 
-5 -0.0678 -1.1785 -1.2833 -1.2936 
-4 -0.0965 -1.6763® -1.6533® -1.7980® 
-3 -0.0183 -0.3187 -0.6241 -1.0995 
-2 -0.0210 -0.3640 -0.4976 -1.1233 
-1 -0.0288 -0.4997 -0.2712 0.0127 
0 0.0311 0.5410 0.6566 0.1289 
1 0.0598 1.0388 0.9464 1.0310 
2 -0.0626 -1.0880 -0.9961 -0.8465 
3 0.0494 0.8578 0.9524 0.8990 
4 0.0884 1.5366 1.2690 1.3588 
5 0.0858 1.4913 1.7589® 1.7041@ 
6 -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.5532 -0.7876 
7 -0.0288 -0.4997 -0.4933 -0.6508 
8 0.0754 1.3103 1.1158 0.8401 
9 0.0520 0.9030 0.7806 0.3628 
10 0.0233 0.4053 0.3678 0.7224 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 48 firm-events 
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Table 40 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score (=1) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 8846.4934 1.5329 -1.5847 -0.0885 
-14 10561.7017 1.83 01@ 2.1677* 2.1015* 
-13 -5116.5275 -0.8866 0.4964 0.0442 
-12 -2132.4650 -0.3695 0.4798 0.6437 
-11 9840.8267 1.7052® 1.9179® 2.4832* 
-10 8366.0142 1.4496 2.0790* 2.4046* 
-9 2714.0559 0.4703 0.3189 0.5422 
-8 -482.0691 -0.0835 0.6342 0.4767 
-7 -2223.5900 -0.3853 0.8003 0.5979 
-6 3800.1601 0.6585 0.4058 -0.4390 
-5 -636.4441 -0.1103 0.3824 0.3210 
-4 -3324.5066 -0.5761 0.2189 0.1196 
-3 -5466.7566 -0.9473 -1.4792 -0.9468 
-2 576.4934 0.0999 -0.0360 -0.6142 
-1 1451.9309 0.2516 1.5963 2.3243* 
0 4310.6809 0.7469 1.7138® 2.0589* 
1 3021.7642 0.5236 -1.0537 -0.3161 
2 1463.3267 0.2536 0.2835 0.1900 
3 -4822.6733 -0.8356 -1.3229 -0.4619 
4 -4854.9650 -0.8412 0.6090 0.2703 
5 -2001.1941 -0.3468 -0.3532 -0.3178 
6 -6436.4650 -1.1153 -0.1018 -0.7305 
7 -4733.1525 -0.8201 -0.4191 -0.7551 
8 -3888.9858 -0.6739 -1.3170 -1.1499 
9 3509.4517 0.6081 -0.7256 0.0770 
10 2592.2017 0.4492 -0.6578 0.1163 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 48 firm-events 
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Table 41 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
Low quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score (=4) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0159 0.3749 0.6725 0.3726 
-14 -0.0196 -0.4628 -0.2026 0.1797 
-13 -0.0233 -0.5509 -0.3773 0.0040 
-12 -0.0159 -0.3746 -0.1959 -0.0806 
-11 -0.0961 -2.2704* -2.3896* -1.6251@ 
-10 -0.0625 -1.4768 -1.5754 -1.6000 
-9 -0.0569 -1.3445 -1.4248 -1.0742 
-8 -0.0028 -0.0660 0.0782 0.1718 
-7 -0.0103 -0.2423 -0.1397 -0.3145 
-6 -0.0457 -1.0800 -1.1203 -0.7135 
-5 -0.0588 -1.3886 -1.3621 -1.1111 
-4 -0.0569 -1.3445 -1.1640 -1.1019 
-3 -0.0429 -1.0139 -1.2017 -1.0306 
-2 -0.0233 -0.5509 -0.4754 -0.5681 
-1 0.0821 1.9401® 1.7481® 1.4520 
0 0.0942 2.2267* 1.4933 1.1389 
1 -0.0298 -0.7053 -0.5479 -0.4849 
2 -0.0047 -0.1100 0.0401 0.2854 
3 -0.0830 -1.9618* -2.0068* -1.8233® 
4 -0.0401 -0.9477 -1.0071 -1.0623 
5 0.0233 0.5513 0.6424 1.3873 
6 -0.0233 -0.5509 -0.7212 -0.1982 
7 -0.0047 -0.1100 -0.2357 0.0753 
8 -0.0616 -1.4548 -1.2370 -0.5602 
9 -0.0569 -1.3445 -1.4239 -1.0557 
10 -0.0345 -0.8155 -0.9987 -1.0266 
NOTES : 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 67 firm-events 
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Table 42 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
Low quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score (=4) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 8372.5302 0.3757 -1.5880 -0.7298 
-14 14563.7839 0.6536 0.7715 1.0129 
-13 2392.9332 0.1074 -0.3133 0.7832 
-12 3018.4556 0.1355 -0.2937 0.3133 
-11 -6969.1713 -0.3128 -1.63 62@ -1.4062 
-10 -34646.3205 -1.5549 -0.7264 -1.6023 
-9 -27399.2011 -1.2296 -0.9895 -1.0616 
-8 -15185.3355 -0.6815 -2.3775* -1.1602 
-7 -23252.6041 -1.0435 -0.9723 -1.5361 
-6 -23279.8280 -1.0448 -0.2755 -0.0012 
-5 -22346.8579 -1.0029 -0.4950 -0.7530 
-4 -20158.0220 -0.9047 -0.8348 -1.3180 
-3 -31714.1862 -1.4233 0.5942 0.1671 
-2 13237.8138 0.5941 -0.0356 0.4966 
-1 71965.3213 3.2297* 2.5146* 2.0072* 
0 48769.1422 2.1887* 2.4640* 2.4005* 
1 14970.7839 0.6719 0.9290 0.5059 
2 14251.0526 0.6396 1.4445 1.2751 
3 -26509.4996 -1.1897 0.0353 -0.3794 
4 -11043.9325 -0.4956 0.2697 0.1926 
5 -7948.2907 -0.3567 -0.4679 -0.5233 
6 -13778.8280 -0.6184 -0.1603 -0.5360 
7 -5631.2310 -0.2527 -0.7266 -1.0465 
8 -24049.2310 -1.0793 0.6904 -0.4885 
9 -15101.9773 -0.6778 -1.4373 -1.5292 
10 -23551.2310 -1.0569 -0.7795 -1.9039® 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 67 firm-events 
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Table 43 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Dividends signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0696 -1.2093 -1.2569 -1.1824 
-14 -0.0885 -1.5384 -1.6010 -0.6010 
-13 -0.0014 -0.0246 0.0413 -0.9509 
-12 0.0137 0.2387 -0.4003 0.2054 
-11 -0.0128 -0.2220 0.0117 0.2315 
-10 -0.0961 -1.67010 -1.82180 -1.3205 
-9 -0.0355 -0.6169 -0.3758 -0.5228 
-8 0.0175 0.3046 0.1659 0.7955 
-7 0.0971 1.6868@ 1.93840 1.65080 
-6 -0.0734 -1.2751 -1.0772 -1.4943 
-5 -0.0772 -1.3410 -1.3271 -1.0096 
-4 -0.0014 -0.0246 0.0353 -0.1163 
-3 0.0971 1.6868@ 1.9444@ 1.2183 
-2 -0.0696 -1.2093 -1.2626 -0.1489 
-1 -0.0052 -0.0904 0.0308 -0.7086 
0 0.1198 2.0817* 1.5693 -0.5021 
1 0.1350 2.3450* 2.2271* 0.5021 
2 -0.0885 -1.5384 -1.3982 0.4076 
3 0.0062 0.1071 0.3690 -0.2098 
4 -0.1605 -2.7890* -2.8497* -0.2358 
5 0.1236 2.1475* 2.1071* 2.2681* 
6 -0.0317 -0.5511 -0.4129 0.3173 
7 0.0706 1.2260 0.4459 -0.1815 
8 -0.0507 -0.8802 -0.7413 0.1033 
9 0.1047 1.8184@ 1.7897@ 0.0815 
10 0.1539 2.6741* 2.4231* 1.5759 
NOTES : 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 33 firm-events 
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Table 44 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Dividends signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 3074.2799 0.5327 -0.9643 -0.2163 
-14 -3549.3564 -0.6150 -1.7588® -0.4849 
-13 -5186.5685 -0.8987 -0.8063 -1.1223 
-12 4948.7951 0.8575 -0.5748 -0.3354 
-11 -1283.9928 -0.2225 0.9767 0.2665 
-10 -243.5685 -0.0422 -0.6459 -0.8642 
-9 -1684.6292 -0.2919 1.2365 -0.0021 
-8 -2829.3261 -0.4903 0.9176 -0.8391 
-7 1983.6739 0.3437 2.1350* 0.8266 
-6 1744.3406 0.3023 1.2515 0.0596 
-5 18384.6739 3.1856* 2.1409* 0.0408 
-4 3846.8557 0.6666 0.6533 -0.0669 
-3 4394.6436 0.7615 -2.5676* -1.2049 
-2 -2873.1746 -0.4979 -4.3170* -2.2760* 
-1 -3831.9928 -0.6640 0.7876 -0.0742 
0 -2092.9322 -0.3627 0.8586 -0.1850 
1 14396.8254 2.4946* -0.0534 -0.1808 
2 -353.9322 -0.0613 -0.8908 -1.7054 
3 -1210.9322 -0.2098 0.4942 -0.5737 
4 8648.4921 1.4986 -1.1375 -0.9426 
5 11552.6739 2.0018* 1.5956 0.9071 
6 4597.6133 0.7967 1.6131 1.3742 
7 3414.2799 0.5916 -0.7516 1.3250 
8 -1434.5988 -0.2486 -0.2325 0.5183 
9 4445.0678 0.7702 1.0135 0.7890 
10 4440.7951 0.7695 -0.4136 -0.5309 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 33 firm-events 
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Table 45 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Dividends signal 
Low quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 
-15 -0.0744 -1.7572@ 
-14 0.1161 2.7441* 
-13 -0.0565 -1.3352 
-12 0.0626 1.4781 
-11 -0.0267 -0.6319 
-10 -0.0386 -0.9132 
-9 -0.0684 -1.6165 
-8 -0.1458 -3.4452* 
-7 -0.0148 -0.3505 
-6 0.0506 1.1968 
-5 -0.0446 -1.0539 
-4 -0.1636 -3.8672* 
-3 -0.0267 -0.6319 
-2 -0.0446 -1.0539 
-1 -0.0744 -1.7572® 
0 -0.0446 -1.0539 
1 0.0685 1.6188 
2 0.0209 0.4935 
3 -0.1041 -2.4605* 
4 0.0149 0.3528 
5 -0.1220 -2.8825* 
6 -0.1160 -2.7418* 
7 -0.1577 -3.7265* 
8 -0.0803 -1.8979® 
9 -0.0744 -1.7572 
10 -0.0386 -0.9132 
t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-2.0663* -1.0502 
2.5417* 1.86 03@ 
-1.4297 -0.2493 
0.5669 1.4772 
-0.7910 -0.1785 
-1.1993 -0.5332 
-1.5706 -0.9737 
-3.8394* -2.2151* 
-0.3959 0.0538 
0.7928 1.9177@ 
-0.8208 1.4255 
-4.1912* -2.1238* 
-0.1144 0.4100 
-1.1452 -1.6989® 
-2.2157* -1.0842 
-1.0677 -0.1069 
1.5680 0.6388 
0.3566 0.3484 
-2.5099* -0.9588 
-1.6388® -1.63 51@ 
-3.0045* -2.1089* 
-3.1284* -0.4646 
-3.8583* -0.4681 
-1.8843® 0.1884 
-1.7237 1.0070 
-1.1297 -0.3498 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 4 6 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Dividends signal 
Low quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 44961.5911 2.0178* -0.7181 -2.0943* 
-14 27880.4006 1.2512 1.2801 0.9316 
-13 20756.9244 0.9315 0.5672 1.0269 
-12 25075.9720 1.1254 -0.9479 0.2833 
-11 59652.6387 2.6771* 0.1814 -0.4137 
-10 -6761.5042 -0.3034 -1.5849 -0.3455 
-9 -12828.1232 -0.5757 -4.6576* -0.1129 
-8 1607.0197 0.0721 -2.8263* -1.5528 
-7 -5156.6946 -0.2314 0.4637 1.0877 
-6 -8140.8375 -0.3654 -0.7328 0.5591 
-5 18624.6387 0.8358 0.6481 0.7200 
-4 -9399.5518 -0.4218 -4.2357* -0.9789 
-3 -10295.7899 -0.4621 0.3226 -0.0101 
-2 -7291.9804 -0.3273 -1.6190 -1.2797 
-1 11915.4006 0.5347 -0.8547 -1.2878 
0 -9310.9327 -0.4179 -0.7771 -1.3784 
1 8571.5435 0.3847 1.3907 1.5123 
2 -2715.2661 -0.1219 0.1992 -0.5084 
3 -11477.9327 -0.5151 -0.7300 -0.7578 
4 15410.4006 0.6916 -0.3339 -0.5807 
5 -2660.8851 -0.1194 -0.3510 -0.6612 
6 11514.8292 0.5168 0.3389 -0.3455 
7 -9228.6470 -0.4142 -2.3521* -1.4988 
8 -15877.3137 -0.7125 -3.3313* -1.9929* 
9 2216.5435 0.0995 0.0766 1.1661 
10 13050.2101 0.5857 1.1574 -0.5746 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Explanations for Tables 47 to 52 
1. The following cross-sectional regression is run on the 
cumulative standardized mean-adjusted spread and log-spread: 
CSUli - aQ + ax{INF01 i) + a2 (INF02i) +a3(QSi) + a4 (INFOl*QS±) 
+ a5 (INF02 * QSi) + a6(Dli) +a1(D2i) 
+ a8 (£>3.*) +r) 
*pll46X 
where, 
i = the firm-events ranging from i = 1 to N ; 
INF011- = ' 1 ' , for low differential information environment, 
and, ' 0 7 otherwise; 
INF02l- = ' 1 7 , for median differential information 
environment, and, ' 0 7 otherwise; 
QSj = the quality score of the firm. This score takes the 
value of ' 1 7 (for high quality of earnings 
disclosures) to ' 4 7 (for low quality of earnings 
disclosures) if the earnings predictability 
approach is used, or, takes the value of ' 4 7 
(high quality of earnings) to ' 8 7 (low quality of 
earnings) in the case of the earnings noise 
approach. 
Dl. = ' 1 7, if it is a joint announcement and ' 0 7 
otherwise; 
D2. =' 1 7, if it is a sole earnings announcement and 
'0 7 otherwise; 
D3. =' 1 7, if it is a dividend announcement subsequent 
to a earnings announcement and ' 0 7 otherwise. 
CSU1. = the cumulative standardized unexpected spread (or, 
log spread). This is calculated as follows: 
CSUli 
+ 10 
SUi,d 
£>-15 
. . . (1) 
where: 
SUiid - Uitd/£(Ud) ... (2) 
U±td “ ^i, d~ ^ ^i, d* • • • (3) 
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-21 
E 
t—147 
0.5 
£(Ud) - { Y, (Ui.t-UJ2/125} ...(4) 
-21 
E 
t—147 
(Ui c) / 126 ... (5) 
2. The F-statistic has (8,217) degrees of freedom. 
3. The cross-sectional regressions are run for all possible 
combinations of the differential information variable and the 
quality of earnings variable: 
DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION 
1. Analysts' Following 
2. Analysts' Following 
3. Firm Size 
4. Firm Size 
Results for combinations (3) 
Combinations (1) and (2) are i: 
QUALITY OF EARNINGS 
Earnings Noise Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Noise Score 
and (4) are displayed here, 
the Appendix. 
232 
FIRM 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
FIRM 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
Table 47 
Cross-sectional means of CSUl^ 
Firm size x Earnings noise score 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED SPREAD 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 
19.18 -2.33 -6.56 -3.79 
1 (2) (35) (19) (6) 
-6.35 -1.99 -1.40 8.36 
2 (8) (37) (8) (1) 
2.28 3.31 -4.91 0.00 
3 (28) (74) (8) (0) 
1.35 0.62 -5.00 -2.06 
(38) (146) (35) (7) 
TOTAL 
-3.07 
(62) 
-2.36 
(54) 
2.45 
(110) 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED LOG SPREAD 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 
17.42 -2.49 -6.64 -3.34 
1 (2) (35) (19) (6) 
-6.95 -2.73 -1.29 7.00 
2 (8) (37) (8) (1) 
1.69 2.15 -5.77 0.00 
3 (28) (74) (8) (0) 
0.70 -0.20 -5.22 -1.87 
(38) (146) (35) (7) 
TOTAL 
-3.20 
(62) 
-2.96 
(54) 
1.46 
(110) 
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Table 48 
Results of 
unexpected 
cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
spread: Firm size X Earnings noise score 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT aO 10.84 10.57 1.02 
INFOl. al 6.88 15.60 0.44 
INF02i a2 -28.62 17.07 -1.67@ 
QE, a3 -1.75 2.20 -0.79 
INFOl, *QE- i i a4 -2.06 3.00 -0.68 
INF02. *QE1- a5 4.81 3.42 1.41 
Dli a6 -0.52 2.51 -0.21 
D2i a7 0.55 2.41 0.23 
D3i a8 0.06 1.97 0.03 
R-square: 6.89 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 2.01 (SIGNF.) 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
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Table 4 9 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
unexpected log spread: Firm size X Earnings noise score 
Variable: Coefficient : Stnd. Dev. : t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT aO 11.82 9.55 1.23 
INFOl. al 4.19 14.09 0.30 
INF021- a2 -30.91 15.42 -2.00* 
QE1- a3 -2.08 1.98 -1.05 
INFOl i*QE1- a4 -1.37 2.71 -0.51 
INF02.*QEi a5 5.36 3.09 1.73@ 
Dli a6 -1.20 2.27 -0.53 
D2i a7 0.36 2.17 0.16 
D3i a8 -0.68 1.78 -0.38 
R-square: 7 .17 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 2.10 (SIGNF 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
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Table 50 
FIRM 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
FIRM 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
Cross-sectional means of CSUl^ 
Firm size x Earnings predictability score 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED SPREAD 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCORE 
1 2 3 4 
4.83 -5.70 -4.08 -3.98 
1 (8) (8) (5) (41) 
-8.67 0.57 -1.49 -1.94 
2 (34) (11) (14) (21) 
2.55 -2.14 11.88 2.51 
3 (65) (14) (6) (25) 
TOTAL 
-3.07 
(62) 
-2.36 
(54) 
2.45 
(110) 
1.67 -2.19 1.20 -1.63 
(81) (32) (25) (88) 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED LOG SPREAD 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCORE 
1 2 3 4 
4.33 -6.06 -4.66 -3.94 
1 (8) (8) (5) (41) 
-8.88 0.56 -2.51 -2.70 
2 (34) (ID (14) (21) 
1.71 -2.79 8.49 1.51 • 
3 (65) (14) (6) (25) 
0.92 -2.56 -0.30 -2.08 
(81) (32) (25) (88) 
TOTAL 
-3.20 
(62) 
-2.96 
(54) 
1.46 
(110) 
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Table 51 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
unexpected spread: Firm size X Earnings predictability- 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT aO 1.85 2.34 0.79 
INF01. al 1.17 5.20 0.23 
INF02. a2 -7.70 5.28 -1.46 
QE| a3 0.36 0.96 0.38 
INF01i*QE1- a4 -2.16 1.66 -1.30 
INF021-*QEi a5 0.88 1.79 0.49 
Dli 3.6 -0.50 2.52 
o
 
(N • 
O
 1 
D2i a7 -0.34 2.43 -0.14 
D3i a8 0.06 1.98 0.03 
R-square: 5.81 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.67 
* = significant at p < 0 .05 levels with 217 degrees 
freedom 
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Table 52 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
unexpected log spread: Firm size X Earnings predictability 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT aO 1.56 2.12 0.73 
INF01- al 1.08 4.71 0.23 
INF02. a2 -6.63 4.79 -1.38 
QEi a3 0.19 0.87 0.21 
INF011- *QE1- a4 -1.80 1.50 -1.19 
INF02.*QE. a5 0.72 1.62 0.44 
Dli a6 -1.27 2.29 -0.55 
D2i X a7 -0.44 2.21 -0.20 
D3i a8 -0.63 1.80 -0.38 
R-square: 5.51 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.58 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 217 degrees 
freedom 
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Explanation for Tables 53 to 71 
1. The abnormal spread (U- d) : This is the cross-sectional 
daily mean of the abnormal' spread for day d in the event 
period. For each firm-event, the abnormal spread is 
calculated as follows: ^ = S- d - E(S- d) . To estimate the 
expected spread, the following simultaneous equation model was 
run for each of the sample firm-events: 
si.t 
TV 1. t 
a0 + a1(TVit) + a2{Pit) +a3{Ri t) +a4(Si/t_1) +r\i t 
b0+b1 (Sit t) +b2(MFi' t.) +b3(TVltt.1) 
(la) 
(lb) 
The predicted structural coefficients were used to estimate 
the reduced form coefficients for the spread equation. The 
expected value of the spread in the event period is derived by 
using the spread reduced form equation. 
Abnormal log spread was calculated in a similar fashion 
after log-transforming the dependent variable, the bid-ask 
spread. 
2. The Brown and Warner test-statistic: 
(Ud/S(Ud) ) 
This statistic has a t-distribution with 125 degrees of 
freedom.Here, 0 5 
£(Ud) - ( £ (Ut-U) 7125) 
t—147 
and, 
t 
-21 
U - { £ U^/ 126 
t—147 
The same procedure was adopted to calculate the Brown and 
Warner test-statistics for abnormal log spread. 
3. The Corrado Rank test-statistic: 
To test the behavior of unexpected bid-ask spread in the 
presence of non-normalities, Corrado's Rank Test statistic has 
also been estimated over the event periods. This statistic 
involves the ranking of each t, where t = 1 to 152 days in 
the estimation and event period. Further: 
(i) Ki t = rank (Ui t) 
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(ii) J. = (K. t - 76.5), where 76.5 is the average rank over 
the 152' days. 
For each t = 127 to 152 days, the z-statistic is computed as 
follows: 
Jt/i (Jt) 
where, 
i N 
iV i-1 
and. 
S(Jt) 
152 
We 152 
t-i 
4. The event period has been broken up into three sub-periods. 
These are as follows: 
Sub-oeriod Davs 
1. Pre-announcement period -15 to -2 
2 . Announcement period -1 to 0 
3 . Post-announcement period +1 to +10 
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Table 53 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal, Full 
sample 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0182 -0.4130 -0.4486 -0.8304 
-14 -0.0053 -0.1196 -0.4168 0.2844 
-13 -0.0397 -0.9010 -1.1226 -1.0243 
-12 0.0133 0.3021 0.1873 -0.5995 
-11 -0.0695 -1.5766 -3.0380* -2.3651* 
-10 -0.0273 -0.6190 -1.0321 -1.0557 
-9 -0.0246 -0.5566 -1.2695 -0.9459 
-8 0.0066 0.1489 -0.1073 -0.6480 
-7 0.0016 0.0366 -0.4052 -0.6308 
-6 -0.0550 -1.2465 -2.4352* -1.4214 
-5 -0.0263 -0.5964 -1.6954® -0.7991 
-4 -0.0751 -1.7024@ -3.0045* -2.5654* 
-3 -0.0346 -0.7847 -1.8914® -1.3608 
-2 0.0094 0.2119 -0.4707 -0.3864 
-1 0.0723 1.6388® 1.8027® 0.9944 
0 0.0622 1.4092 1.2257 0.6080 
1 -0.0476 -1.0798 -2.0385* -1.8626® 
2 -0.0520 -1.1800 -1.8614® -1.4770 
3 -0.0395 -0.8951 -1.5424 -1.3216 
4 0.0182 0.4116 -0.1822 -0.1212 
5 0.0009 0.0204 0.1460 0.4084 
6 -0.0312 -0.7078 -2.1053* -1.7386® 
7 -0.0331 -0.7499 -1.3816 -1.0707 
8 -0.0010 -0.0218 -0.2688 -0.7727 
9 -0.0253 -0.5735 -1.3691 -1.6844® 
10 -0.0388 -0.8789 -1.5365 -1.8968® 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 153 firm-events 
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Table 54 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Dividends signal, Full 
sample 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0836 -1.8964@ -2.6380* 0.6710 
-14 -0.0062 -0.1405 -0.3969 -1.3402 
-13 -0.0209 -0.4747 -0.7988 -0.9760 
-12 -0.0115 -0.2604 -1.5356 1.82 06@ 
-11 -0.0266 -0.6027 -0.6362 -1.6063 
-10 -0.0851 -1.9290@ -3.2683* -1.1259 
-9 -0.0460 -1.0435 -1.7451® -2.0132* 
-8 0.0022 0.0487 -0.7950 -1.2548 
-7 0.0499 1.1307 1.8105® -0.2177 
-6 0.0198 0.4491 -0.4957 0.7789 
-5 0.0002 0.0041 -1.1759 -1.7711® 
-4 0.0039 0.0878 -1.6908® -1.3148 
-3 0.0646 1.4657 1.7652® 1.4856 
-2 -0.0317 -0.7181 -1.4676 -2.4306* 
-1 -0.0370 -0.8396 -1.3448 -1.6565® 
0 0.0785 1.7788® 1.3143 0.2075 
1 0.0493 1.1189 2.2567* -0.3765 
2 -0.0689 -1.5632 -2.0555* -0.7138 
3 -0.0362 -0.8214 -0.9526 0.6452 
4 -0.0603 -1.3672 -3.0092* -2.0971* 
5 0.0299 0.6774 0.9636 -0.5751 
6 -0.0935 -2.1202* -2.9203* -1.2338 
7 -0.0339 -0.7681 -2.2198* 0.3885 
8 -0.0472 -1.0696 -1.6060 -0.5279 
9 0.0388 0.8799 0.5470 1.6344® 
10 0.0535 1.2125 1.4674 -0.6654 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 55 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on firm size 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0161 0.3210 0.7755 0.1717 
-14 -0.0723 -1.4434 -1.4812 -0.2670 
-13 -0.0314 -0.6269 -0.6133 -0.7088 
-12 0.0194 0.3879 0.3000 -0.6612 
-11 -0.0975 -1.9480® -1.9737® -1.2842 
-10 -0.0318 -0.6346 -0.7823 -1.1729 
-9 -0.0673 -1.3433 -1.7076® -1.6084 
-8 0.0345 0.6891 0.7529 0.1367 
-7 -0.0329 -0.6567 -0.6882 -0.2670 
-6 -0.0783 -1.5634 -1.1322® -1.0235 
-5 -0.0562 -1.1230 -1.0801 -0.7216 
-4 -0.0323 -0.6454 -0.9308 -1.0744 
-3 -0.0235 -0.4698 -0.6209 -1.2874 
-2 -0.0024 -0.0476 0.1095 -0.0890 
-1 0.0118 0.2355 0.4879 0.2607 
0 0.0396 0.7914 0.8077 0.8074 
1 -0.0519 -1.0367 -0.2880 -1.0744 
2 -0.1157 -2.3112* -2.1591* -1.4081 
3 -0.0438 -0.8747 -0.8951 -0.7804 
4 -0.0734 -1.4655 -1.1113 -0.8137 
5 -0.0170 -0.3402 0.0795 0.9250 
6 -0.1121 -2.2378* -2.3993* -2.1933* 
7 0.0155 0.3092 0.2847 0.2734 
8 -0.0196 -0.3911 -0.6858 -0.8233 
9 -0.0365 -0.7291 -0.7997 -0.9663 
10 -0.0768 -1.5333 -1.3587 -1.5798 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 46 firm-events 
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Table 56 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0120 0.2395 0.9922 0.7018 
-14 -0.0723 -1.4416 -1.2433 -0.5547 
-13 -0.0480 -0.9575 -0.7895 -0.9784 
-12 -0.0104 -0.2063 -0.2035 -1.0490 
-11 -0.1022 -2.0374* -1.8930® -1.4051 
-10 -0.0320 -0.6390 -0.5335 -0.7254 
-9 -0.0876 -1.7479® -1.8160® -2.0995* 
-8 0.0539 1.0748 1.4343 0.3752 
-7 -0.0248 -0.4936 -0.4869 -0.2016 
-6 -0.0417 -0.8323 -1.3442 -0.6400 
-5 -0.0250 -0.4978 -0.5588 -0.2075 
-4 -0.0374 -0.7457 -1.0092 -1.0549 
-3 -0.0531 -1.0581 -1.4944 -0.9990 
-2 -0.0125 -0.2483 -0.4498 -0.1074 
-1 0.0561 1.1189 1.1632 1.3021 
0 0.0421 0.8402 0.8057 0.7048 
1 -0.0391 -0.7796 -0.6266 -0.8695 
2 -0.1119 -2.2311* -2.2155* -1.6405@ 
3 -0.0736 -1.4683 -1.3334 -1.4242 
4 -0.0026 -0.0519 -0.5786 -0.1339 
5 0.0086 0.1722 0.4704 1.1255 
6 -0.1508 -3.0085* -3.0360* -2.8381* 
7 -0.0154 -0.3075 -0.4552 -0.4958 
8 -0.0737 -1.4692 -1.5736 -1.8259@ 
9 -0.0526 -1.0485 -1.2329 -1.2521 
10 -0.0637 -1.2709 -1.2008 -1.0314 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 53 firm-events 
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Table 57 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on firm size 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0587 -1.2440 -1.0151 -0.9191 
-14 0.0072 0.1526 0.3842 1.0801 
-13 -0.0840 -1.7805® -1.5064 -1.0479 
-12 -0.0436 -0.9242 -0.8219 -0.9899 
-11 -0.2006 -4.2490* -3.8632* -3.1887* 
-10 -0.0208 -0.4402 -0.6494 -0.2495 
-9 -0.0107 -0.2260 0.0124 0.8290 
-8 -0.0557 -1.1802 -0.9158 -1.0157 
-7 -0.1092 -2.3133* -2.1579* -1.7883@ 
-6 -0.0548 -1.1616 -1.4350 -0.8950 
-5 -0.0555 -1.1762 -1.6712® -0.7163 
-4 -0.1217 -2.5775* -2.5079* -1.6950® 
-3 -0.1466 -3.1053* -3.0288* -2.1199* 
-2 0.0022 0.0463 -0.3875 0.1175 
-1 0.0718 1.5216 0.7658 0.2688 
0 0.1715 3.6342* 2.6144* 1.2378 
1 -0.1613 -3.4170* -3.5087* -2.4161* 
2 -0.0396 -0.8387 -0.3356 -1.1155 
3 -0.1381 -2.9257* -2.2804* -1.8173® 
4 -0.0293 -0.6212 -0.6802 -0.2978 
5 -0.0732 -1.5507 -1.2109 -0.6068 
6 -0.1082 -2.2932* -2.1695* -1.3666 
7 -0.1075 -2.2772* -2.2984* -2.2970* 
8 -0.1311 -2.7766* -2.1720* -1.9525@ 
9 -0.0254 -0.5379 -0.5653 -0.4266 
10 -0.1343 -2.8450* -2.8413* -2.7445* 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 37 firm-events 
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Table 58 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0035 0.0684 -0.1736 -0.3136 
-14 -0.0034 -0.0656 -0.0629 0.9438 
-13 -0.0380 -0.7377 -0.4514 -0.3863 
-12 0.0280 0.5431 0.4459 -0.4287 
-11 -0.1266 -2.4555* -2.3566* -2.2571* 
-10 0.0368 0.7129 0.5245 0.9816 
-9 -0.0375 -0.7273 -0.9129 -0.2287 
-8 -0.0670 -1.2984 -1.1406 -1.0256 
-7 -0.0120 -0.2329 -0.1414 -0.4651 
-6 -0.1339 -2.5960* -2.5428* -1.5770 
-5 -0.0587 -1.1377 -1.5050 -0.5650 
-4 -0.1009 -1.95670 -2.0934* -2.0102* 
-3 -0.0103 -0.1999 -0.3284 -0.6559 
-2 -0.0263 -0.5098 -0.5546 -0.4181 
-1 0.0488 0.9468 0.8177 0.4984 
0 0.1057 2.0500* 1.3281 0.2560 
1 -0.1539 -2.9845* -2.9525* -2.8010* 
2 -0.0466 -0.9043 -0.5079 -0.7574 
3 -0.0024 -0.0472 -0.0546 0.0106 
4 -0.0149 -0.2890 0.0210 -0.1060 
5 -0.0501 -0.9721 -0.6277 -0.9892 
6 -0.0038 -0.0727 -0.4883 -0.6832 
7 -0.0527 -1.0228 -0.9934 -1.2513 
8 -0.0347 -0.6736 -0.7074 -0.7302 
9 -0.0165 -0.3202 -0.0001 -0.4893 
10 -0.0485 -0.9405 -1.1248 -1.71030 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 49 firm-events 
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Table 5 9 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
High differential information portfolio based on firm size 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0193 -0.2492 -0.6792 -0.8261 
-14 0.0322 0.4146 0.3880 -0.1224 
-13 -0.0218 -0.2810 -0.2067 -0.4001 
-12 0.0394 0.5080 0.5293 0.2236 
-11 0.0181 0.2336 -0.4289 -0.6225 
-10 -0.0278 -0.3584 -0.4601 -0.6920 
-9 -0.0038 -0.0492 -0.4433 -0.9768 
-8 0.0211 0.2723 -0.2217 -0.4284 
-7 0.0829 1.0679 1.3064 0.4637 
-6 -0.0397 -0.5121 -1.2399 -0.9344 
-5 0.0088 0.1136 -0.5552 -0.2613 
-4 -0.0786 -1.0126 -2.0818* -2.2006* 
-3 0.0173 0.2228 -0.3902 0.2565 
-2 0.0208 0.2686 -0.5422 -0.6578 
-1 0.1123 1.4469 1.7621@ 1.2521 
0 0.0191 0.2466 -0.4853 -0.4990 
1 0.0153 0.1968 -0.5881 -0.5131 
2 -0.0168 -0.2161 -0.7198 -0.5802 
3 0.0155 0.1996 -0.1107 -0.2754 
4 0.1034 1.3326 1.0774 0.6202 
5 0.0518 0.6682 0.8917 0.4331 
6 0.0626 0.8071 0.2503 -0.2471 
7 -0.0257 -0.3306 -0.8475 -0.2907 
8 0.0800 1.0316 1.5128 0.7614 
9 -0.0179 -0.2303 -0.9906 -1.7534@ 
10 0.0367 0.4732 0.6289 0.0447 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 70 firm-events 
247 
Table 60 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
High differential information portfolio based on analysts7 
following 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS .3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0705 -0.7278 -1.6160 -1.9334 
-14 0.0626 0.6456 0.6219 0.2061 
-13 -0.0328 -0.3382 -0.6774 -0.6966 
-12 0.0238 0.2458 0.1043 0.2088 
-11 0.0192 0.1982 -1.0049 -1.1762 
-10 -0.0839 -0.8663 -1.7117 -2.2042* 
-9 0.0535 0.5518 0.5613 0.3382 
-8 0.0280 0.2893 -0.5685 -0.6561 
-7 0.0421 0.4346 -0.0583 -0.5942 
-6 0.0071 0.0729 -0.3621 -0.6979 
-5 0.0034 0.0351 -0.8902 -0.8178 
-4 -0.0895 -0.9233 -2.1025* -2.0950* 
-3 -0.0388 -0.4005 -1.3834 -1.0738 
-2 0.0662 0.6837 0.1845 -0.2600 
-1 0.1116 1.1522 1.1068 0.2439 
0 0.0411 0.4244 0.0042 0.2762 
1 0.0456 0.4708 -0.0314 -0.2331 
2 0.0049 0.0509 -0.4236 -0.6157 
3 -0.0396 -0.4086 -1.2130 -1.2031 
4 0.0715 0.7378 0.2619 -0.0121 
5 0.0419 0.4324 0.3633 0.6211 
6 0.0667 0.6886 -0.0181 -0.0795 
7 -0.0325 -0.3357 -0.9468 -0.4567 
8 0.1070 1.1049 1.8243® 0.8609 
9 -0.0054 -0.0556 -1.0722 -1.6019 
10 -0.0035 -0.0358 -0.3227 -1.1196 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 51 firm-events 
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Table 61 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Dividends signal 
Low differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.1643 -3.2763* -2.9409* 0.3997 
-14 -0.1632 -3.2542* -2.9479* -1.4824 
-13 -0.1483 -2.9581* -2.7008* -1.5975 
-12 -0.1207 -2.4064* -2.6012* 0.7451 
-11 -0.1428 -2.8475* -2.0114* -1.4370 
-10 -0.1120 -2.2330* -2.1924* -1.5776 
-9 -0.2308 -4.6031* -4.0115* -2.0304* 
-8 -0.1548 -3.0872* -2.9708* -1.5078 
-7 -0.0058 -0.1156 0.1653 -0.9133 
-6 0.1368 2.7280* 1.4116 1.6318@ 
-5 0.1471 2.9331* 0.9410 -0.7152 
-4 0.1042 2.0788* -0.5828 -1.3108 
-3 0.2529 5.0450* 3.3026* 0.7727 
-2 -0.0208 -0.4152 -1.1408 -1.2897 
-1 -0.0308 -0.6144 -1.1564 -0.9056 
0 0.1599 3.1883* 1.4488 0.6023 
1 0.2285 4.5575* 5.7813* 1.0550 
2 -0.1310 -2.6128* -2.0203* -1.8687@ 
3 -0.0153 -0.3055 0.8257 0.9847 
4 -0.2101 -4.1913* -4.5161* -1.3296 
5 -0.0356 -0.7091 -0.1246 -0.6499 
6 -0.1348 -2.6876* -1.7686@ -1.3794 
7 0.1095 2.1836* 0.3087 0.2867 
8 -0.0810 -1.6161 -1.5421 -1.0971 
9 0.0751 1.4968 0.8423 1.1835 
10 -0.0652 -1.2996 -0.8192 -1.1724 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 62 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Dividends signal 
Medium differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0813 -1.5763 -1.6759@ -0.6574 
-14 -0.0287 -0.5562 -0.7952 0.7117 
-13 0.0073 0.1421 -0.3321 0.3558 
-12 0.0558 1.0812 0.3056 1.6994® 
-11 -0.0703 -1.3639 -1.5704 -2.0876* 
-10 -0.0427 -0.8288 -1.1973 0.4101 
-9 0.0022 0.0432 -0.5688 -0.6423 
-8 0.1299 2.5195* 1.0202 -0.5280 
-7 0.0727 1.4088 1.2945 0.3605 
-6 -0.0237 -0.4589 -1.0884 -0.3397 
-5 -0.0815 -1.5812 -2.0077* -1.0813 
-4 -0.0189 -0.3658 -1.0831 -0.5684 
-3 -0.0597 -1.1581 -0.7575 0.2923 
-2 -0.0434 -0.8412 -0.7609 -1.3921 
-1 -0.1059 -2.0536* -1.9512 -1.2015 
0 0.0524 1.0168 0.4830 -0.3431 
1 -0.1121 -2.1729* -2.3409* -1.7271® 
2 -0.0210 -0.4073 -0.5163 1.0733 
3 -0.0881 -1.7081@ -2.0436* -0.6065 
4 -0.0489 -0.9489 -1.0722 -0.9231 
5 0.0988 1.9160@ 1.4907 0.6296 
6 -0.0746 -1.4466 -1.6142 0.5129 
7 -0.1236 -2.3970* -2.7298* -0.0150 
8 -0.0052 -0.1016 -0.4688 0.1259 
9 0.0024 0.0462 -0.2273 1.1853 
10 0.0427 0.8283 0.6965 0.1548 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 31 firm-events 
250 
Table 63 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Dividends signal 
High differential information portfolio based on analysts' 
following 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0065 -0.0669 0.1297 -0.3965 
-14 0.1840 1.8988® 3.2801* 2.2424* 
-13 0.0647 0.6680 1.5669 0.6706 
-12 -0.0016 -0.0162 -0.9173 -1.4277 
-11 0.1542 1.5916 3.0155* 0.8467 
-10 -0.1207 -1.2459 -2.5513* -1.4308 
-9 0.0675 0.6969 1.3337 1.5445 
-8 -0.0295 -0.3049 -0.1322 -0.1472 
-7 0.0719 0.7423 1.5260 0.4541 
-6 -0.0330 -0.3406 -0.7825 -1.2875 
-5 -0.0261 -0.2690 -0.3217 0.3918 
-4 -0.0629 -0.6495 -1.1866 0.2796 
-3 0.0599 0.6184 1.3392 0.0756 
-2 -0.0253 -0.2606 -0.6658 -1.2937 
-1 0.0584 0.6030 1.3284 1.7533® 
0 0.0355 0.3659 0.4649 -0.9183 
1 0.1084 1.1193 2.1781* 1.1551 
2 -0.0777 -0.8015 -1.3179 -0.6582 
3 0.0194 0.2003 0.2853 -0.1207 
4 0.0728 0.7511 0.0676 -0.1706 
5 -0.0064 -0.0665 -0.1478 -0.3918 
6 -0.0802 -0.8276 -1.6730® -0.1815 
7 -0.0448 -0.4622 -0.7082 -1.3965 
8 -0.0752 -0.7765 -0.9702 -1.6131 
9 0.0563 0.5815 0.5825 1.1644 
10 0.1880 1.9406@ 2.6905* 0.0117 
NOTES : 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 64 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0786 -1.3786 -1.1115 -1.4050 
-14 -0.0118 -0.2069 -0.1929 -0.3270 
-13 0.0016 0.0282 0.1802 -0.1829 
-12 0.0277 0.4854 0.4728 0.0582 
-11 -0.0599 -1.0516 -0.9268 -0.9436 
-10 -0.0188 -0.3294 0.1260 -0.0291 
-9 -0.0238 -0.4166 -0.2818 -0.8646 
-8 -0.0617 -1.0830 -1.1309 -1.4992 
-7 -0.0149 -0.2622 0.0404 -0.0776 
-6 -0.0756 -1.3264 -1.5780 -1.3441 
-5 -0.0557 -0.9774 -1.2818 -0.6623 
-4 -0.0981 -1.72 04@ -1.6047 -1.8346® 
-3 -0.0144 -0.2521 -0.6793 -0.6374 
-2 -0.0225 -0.3955 -0.4977 -0.6887 
-1 -0.0257 -0.4506 -0.6037 -0.0111 
0 0.0044 0.0768 0.3138 -0.3714 
1 0.0451 0.7914 0.5306 0.4877 
2 -0.0965 -1.6930® -1.4244 -1.2318 
3 0.0125 0.2199 0.5584 0.1136 
4 0.0775 1.3594 0.7911 0.8106 
5 0.0496 0.8708 0.9725 0.4018 
6 -0.0521 -0.9136 -1.3637 -1.6295 
7 -0.0444 -0.7782 -0.5576 -0.7053 
8 0.0527 0.9243 1.3666 0.4559 
9 0.0485 0.8513 0.4387 0.1940 
10 -0.0104 -0.1824 -0.0832 -0.2106 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 48 firm-events 
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Table 65 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
Low quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0260 0.7067 0.5291 0.2039 
-14 0.0068 0.1835 -0.1708 0.8974 
-13 -0.0051 -0.1376 -0.4938 -0.3981 
-12 0.0065 0.1768 0.1640 -0.4092 
-11 -0.0690 -1.8752@ -2.5771* -1.7851@ 
-10 -0.0250 -0.6789 -1.1058 -1.4592 
-9 -0.0065 -0.1769 -0.7145 -0.2760 
-8 0.0251 0.6813 0.5361 0.2067 
-7 0.0091 0.2477 -0.3317 -0.4230 
-6 -0.0190 -0.5174 -1.0269 -0.5937 
-5 -0.0278 -0.7559 -1.1246 -1.2608 
-4 -0.0412 -1.1193 -1.5152 -1.9432@ 
-3 -0.0165 -0.4481 -1.0361 -1.0916 
-2 -0.0007 -0.0182 -0.1891 -0.5895 
-1 0.0973 2.6448* 2.3590* 1.1582 
0 0.0980 2.6623* 1.5102 0.8891 
1 -0.0595 -1.6167 -1.2614 -1.7324@ 
2 0.0016 0.0435 0.3224 -0.3204 
3 -0.0644 -1.7504@ -2.3213* -2.2387* 
4 -0.0144 -0.3917 -0.5572 -1.1304 
5 0.0355 0.9646 0.9676 1.2220 
6 0.0000 0.0010 -0.4111 -0.4064 
7 0.0165 0.4484 -0.1428 -0.1179 
8 -0.0226 -0.6153 -0.6924 -0.4896 
9 -0.0354 -0.9609 -1.3129 -1.9266@ 
10 -0.0308 -0.8360 -1.2947 -2.0902* 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 67 firm-events 
253 
Table 66 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Dividends signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earninqs 
predictability score 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.1240 -2.1757* -1.7229® -1.7070® 
-14 -0.1074 -1.8833® -2.0863* -0.9782 
-13 0.0158 0.2778 0.4467 -0.6585 
-12 -0.0065 -0.1132 -0.6158 -0.5167 
-11 -0.0665 -1.1672 -0.4902 -0.3921 
-10 -0.1192 -2.0905* -2.3111* -1.6125 
-9 -0.0790 -1.3861 -0.7921 -1.3461 
-8 -0.0366 -0.6428 -0.4217 0.1247 
-7 0.0776 1.3615 1.6780® 1.1330 
-6 -0.1302 -2.2843* -2.1775* -2.0458* 
-5 -0.0983 -1.7244@ -1.9238® -1.4788 
-4 -0.0425 -0.7455 -0.6199 -0.8294 
-3 0.0467 0.8192 1.4857 0.3639 
-2 -0.1171 -2.0550* -2.0830* -0.9229 
-1 -0.0217 -0.3798 -0.1953 -1.0546 
0 0.1247 2.1878* 0.9938 -0.6344 
1 0.0312 0.5477 1.4091 -0.1428 
2 -0.1324 -2.3221* -1.9596® -0.4323 
3 -0.0256 -0.4498 0.2715 -0.7118 
4 -0.2284 -4.0063* -4.1353* -0.7258 
5 0.0852 1.4946 2.0392* 1.1923 
6 -0.1028 -1.8036® -1.1733 -0.5198 
7 0.0314 0.5502 -0.2912 -0.9691 
8 -0.1161 -2.0366* -1.4346 -0.5228 
9 0.1235 2.1666* 1.8356® -0.0292 
10 0.0952 1.6704@ 1.8269® 0.9822 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 33 firm-events 
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Table 67 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Dividends signal 
Low quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings 
predictability score 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0334 -0.9079 -1.6330@ -0.7180 
-14 0.1751 4.7595* 4.4117* 2.2763* 
-13 -0.0389 -1.0585 -1.1740 -0.2271 
-12 0.1160 3.1530* 1.9829* 2.1090* 
-11 0.0018 0.0476 -0.3514 -0.0258 
-10 -0.0031 -0.0855 -0.7051 -0.0612 
-9 -0.0154 -0.4188 -0.8012 -0.6051 
-8 -0.0869 -2.3624* -3.1089* -2.1729* 
-7 0.0526 1.4291 1.7035® 0.4773 
-6 0.1151 3.1296* 2.4925* 2.1294* 
-5 0.0239 0.6488 0.9072 1.2496 
-4 -0.1178 -3.2005* -3.9267* -1.8806@ 
-3 0.0676 1.8368® 2.2339* 1.7500® 
-2 0.0370 1.0044 0.8060 -1.5365 
-1 0.0004 0.0116 -0.4884 -1.0022 
0 0.0178 0.4848 0.7577 0.0945 
1 0.1078 2.9302* 2.8533* 0.8947 
2 0.0544 1.4783 1.6327 -0.0150 
3 -0.0416 -1.1304 -1.2309 -0.7268 
4 0.1085 2.9490* -0.0185 -0.9219 
5 -0.0524 -1.4237 -1.7331 -1.7269® 
6 -0.0357 -0.9700 -1.4175 0.7642 
7 -0.0710 -1.9297 -2.3999* 0.0884 
8 0.0171 0.4642 -0.0721 0.7506 
9 0.0061 0.1643 -0.3765 1.1857 
10 0.0081 0.2194 -0.3387 -0.1006 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 68 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings and dividend 
signal, Joint announcement sample 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0069 0.0538 0.5192 0.1320 
-14 0.0165 0.1275 0.5093 -0.0503 
-13 -0.0546 -0.4232 -0.3991 -1.0148 
-12 -0.0149 -0.1155 0.0214 -0.0785 
-11 -0.0552 -0.4273 -1.5476 -0.8923 
-10 -0.0920 -0.7122 -1.4356 -1.3604 
-9 -0.0442 -0.3420 -1.1173 -0.2513 
-8 0.0909 0.7043 1.4693 0.7163 
-7 -0.0533 -0.4129 -0.9977 -0.9708 
-6 -0.0478 -0.3705 -1.7227® -1.0996 
-5 -0.1408 -1.0906 -2.8538* -2.1584* 
-4 -0.0308 -0.2387 -0.9715 -0.5435 
-3 -0.1102 -0.8532 -2.3251* -1.6149 
-2 -0.0451 -0.3495 -1.3419 -0.8514 
-1 0.0555 0.4300 0.6826 0.3519 
0 -0.0781 -0.6050 -1.8881 -1.4829 
1 -0.0310 -0.2398 -1.1246 -1.3007 
2 -0.1901 -1.4721 -3.4179* -2.4537* 
3 -0.0640 -0.4959 -1.2693 -1.1562 
4 0.0116 0.0895 -0.6804 -0.1068 
5 -0.0647 -0.5013 -1.3341 -1.0682 
6 0.0383 0.2966 -0.3283 -0.4273 
7 -0.0561 -0.4342 -1.2162 -0.9677 
8 -0.0947 -0.7336 -1.7784@ -1.0870 
9 -0.0926 -0.7174 -1.6213® -1.2881 
10 -0.2096 -1.6235® -3.4396* -3.5659* 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 36 firm-events 
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Table 6 9 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal, Earnings 
followed by dividends sequence sample 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0527 -1.1600 -1.0745 -1.4226 
-14 -0.0322 -0.7092 -0.9915 0.0840 
-13 -0.0337 -0.7417 -0.7530 -0.5118 
-12 0.0048 0.1055 -0.2788 -0.7280 
-11 -0.1116 -2.4580* -2.4217* -1.9850* 
-10 0.0435 0.9570 0.9255 0.8533 
-9 -0.0451 -0.9934 -1.1865 -1.4824 
-8 -0.0635 -1.3987 -1.3947 -1.1006 
-7 -0.0035 -0.0774 0.1496 0.3347 
-6 -0.0764 -1.68140 -1.8772@ -0.8453 
-5 0.0132 0.2912 -0.1432 0.4888 
-4 -0.1090 -2.4009* -2.5894* -2.6417* 
-3 -0.0081 -0.1774 -0.6333 -0.4359 
-2 0.0132 0.2902 -0.2035 -0.0069 
-1 0.0840 1.84880 1.3015 1.4916 
0 0.0654 1.4401 1.4292 1.64340 
1 -0.0532 -1.1707 -1.5077 -1.3674 
2 -0.0056 -0.1235 -0.0510 0.0621 
3 0.0010 0.0217 0.1080 0.2680 
4 0.0261 0.5746 -0.0045 -0.3427 
5 0.0199 0.4381 0.9313 1.0983 
6 -0.0662 -1.4577 -2.1522* -1.75150 
7 -0.0491 -1.0804 -0.8967 -0.7337 
8 0.0310 0.6830 0.7137 0.2484 
9 0.0089 0.1963 -0.5082 -1.1236 
10 -0.0171 -0.3766 -0.3846 -0.2703 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 70 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Dividends signal, Earnings 
followed by dividends sequence sample 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.' 
-15 -0.0836 -1.8417® -1.7391® -1.1744 
-14 -0.0062 -0.1365 -0.2617 0.5196 
-13 -0.0209 -0.4610 -0.5266 -0.4358 
-12 -0.0115 -0.2529 -1.0124 -1.2534 
-11 -0.0266 -0.5853 -0.4194 0.1089 
-10 -0.0851 -1.8734® -2.1546* -1.4402 
-9 -0.0460 -1.0134 -1.1505 -0.7399 
-8 0.0022 0.0473 -0.5241 -0.9206 
-7 0.0499 1.0981 1.1936 1.2403 
-6 0.0198 0.4361 -0.3268 -0.6273 
-5 0.0002 0.0040 -0.7752 -0.7829 
-4 0.0039 0.0852 -1.1146 -1.5084 
-3 0.0646 1.4234 1.1638 0.7746 
-2 -0.0317 -0.6974 -0.9675 -0.8584 
-1 -0.0370 -0.8154 -0.8866 -0.6680 
0 0.0785 1.7275® 0.8664 0.2167 
1 0.0493 1.0866 1.4878 0.5926 
2 -0.0689 -1.5181 -1.3551 -1.3732 
3 -0.0362 -0.7977 -0.6280 -0.5124 
4 -0.0603 -1.3277 -1.9838* -1.1337 
5 0.0299 0.6579 0.6353 0.2765 
6 -0.0935 -2.0590* -1.9252@ -1.3983 
7 -0.0339 -0.7460 -1.4634 -1.4282 
8 -0.0472 -1.0388 -1.0588 -0.5471 
9 0.0388 0.8546 0.3606 0.4406 
10 0.0535 1.1775 0.9674 1.0751 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 71 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal, Sole 
earnings announcement sample 
DAY 
ABNORMAL 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0184 0.3641 0.1473 -0.0199 
-14 0.0216 0.4284 0.0974 0.5927 
-13 -0.0376 -0.7444 -0.8112 -0.5729 
-12 0.0506 1.0016 0.8132 -0.2616 
-11 -0.0115 -0.2270 -1.0937 -1.6954® 
-10 -0.0918 -1.8181® -2.1099* -2.2468* 
-9 0.0256 0.5073 0.3219 0.2020 
-8 0.0538 1.0660 0.3545 -0.6755 
-7 0.0551 1.0906 -0.0278 -0.9239 
-6 -0.0253 -0.5018 -0.4564 -0.9255 
-5 0.0018 0.0358 -0.3440 -0.2848 
-4 -0.0550 -1.0889 -1.3821 -1.5829 
-3 -0.0169 -0.3339 -0.5728 -0.8312 
-2 0.0476 0.9417 0.7519 0.0099 
-1 0.0666 1.3191 1.1140 -0.2086 
0 0.1715 3.3969* 2.4471* 0.6093 
1 -0.0521 -1.0312 -0.8234 -0.9868 
2 -0.0162 -0.3198 -0.2357 -0.9338 
3 -0.0865 -1.7136® -2.1142* -2.2369* 
4 0.0104 0.2053 0.3492 0.3245 
5 0.0231 0.4568 0.3038 0.4934 
6 -0.0300 -0.5949 -0.8233 -1.0663 
7 0.0123 0.2427 -0.2632 -0.4106 
8 0.0227 0.4494 0.2298 -1.0067 
9 -0.0270 -0.5338 -0.4037 -0.9371 
10 0.0651 1.2890 1.0049 -0.2583 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 44 firm-events 
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Explanations for Tables 72 to 77 
1. The following cross-sectional regression is run on the 
cumulative standardized abnormal spread and log-spread: 
CSU2i - cQ + c1{INFOli) + c2 (INFO2i) +c3(^1) + c4 {INFOI + QSJ 
+ C5(INF02*QSi) + C6 (UEi) +C7(LAGi) + C8 (MMi) 
+ c9 (INS ID i) + c10 (INSTi) + cn {QS INSTj) + c12 (DAY.) 
+ c13 (D1 j) + C14 (D2j) + C15 (D3j) + c16 ( VTj) + y ^ 
where, 
i = 1.N firm-events; 
INF01i = '1', for low differential information environment 
and 'O' otherwise; 
INF02i = , for medium differential information environment 
and 'O' otherwise; 
QS- = the quality score of the firm; 
UE- = the unexpected earnings of the firm in that quarter; 
LAG1- = ' 1 ' , if the earnings or dividend announcement is 
delayed and, '0 otherwise i.e. if it is timely or 
early; 
MM. = the average number of market makers dealing in the 
security in the estimation period; 
INSIDj = the fraction of insider share holding; 
INSTj = the fraction of institutional share holding; 
DAY]. = ' 1 ' , if the announcement is made on Friday and 
' O' otherwise; 
D1. = ' 1 ', if it is a joint announcement and ' 0 ' 
otherwise; 
D2^ = ' 1 ', if it is a sole earnings announcement and 
'0 ' otherwise; 
03^ = ' 1 ', if it is a dividend announcement subsequent 
to a earnings announcement and ' 0 ' otherwise. 
VT. = ' 1 ' if the variability of returns explained by 
lagged returns is greater than the median R2, and is 
' 0 ' otherwise. 
CSU2J = the cumulative standardized abnormal spread (or, log 
spread). This is calculated as follows: 
CSU2 i 
+ 10 
E sui.* ...(i) 
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where: 
SU i.d Uid/S(Ud) ...(2) 
ui.d - Si,d-E(Slid) ...(3) 
-21 _ 0.5 
S(ad) - ( Y, i)2/125} ...(4) 
£—147 
-21 
Ui - Y, /126 • • • (5) 
£—147 
2. The F-statistic has (16,209) degrees of freedom. 
3. The cross-sectional regressions are run for all possible 
combinations of the differential information variable and the 
quality of earnings variable: 
DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION QUALITY OF EARNINGS 
1. Analysts' Following 
2. Analysts' Following 
3. Firm Size 
4. Firm Size 
Earnings Noise Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Noise Score 
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FIRM 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
FIRM 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
Table 72 
Cross-sectional means of CSt^. 
Firm size x Earnings noise score 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL SPREAD 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 
8.75 -0.02 -9.37 -6.97 
1 (2) (35) (19) (6) 
-6.47 -4.93 -1.13 1.83 
2 (8) (37) (8) (1) 
-2.31 2.65 5.28 0.00 
3 (28) (74) (8) (0) 
-2.60 0.09 -4.14 -5.72 
(38) (146) (35) (7) 
TOTAL 
-3.28 
(62) 
-4.47 
(54) 
1.58 
(110) 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL LOG SPREAD 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 
7.42 0.60 -10.69 -5.77 
1 (2) (35) (19) (6) 
-0.35 -6.38 -2.53 -1.55 
2 (8) (37) (8) (1) 
-2.10 1.51 -1.90 0.00 
3 (28) (74) (8) (0) 
-1.23 -0.71 -6.82 -5.16 
(38) (146) (35) (7) 
TOTAL 
-3.25 
(62) 
-4.83 
(54) 
0.34 
(110) 
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Table 73 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative stand.a3rd.ized 
abnormal spread: Firm size X Earnings noise score 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statist 
CONSTANT cO -40.24 15.63 -2.57* 
INFOl,. cl 57.79 15.35 3.76* 
INF02- c2 -4.77 15.85 -0.30 
QEj c3 7.88 3.08 2.55* 
INFOl, *QE. 1 1 c4 -12.37 2.96 -4.17* 
INF02,*QE, 
1 1 c5 -0.57 3.17 -0.18 
UE- c6 40.58 32.06 1.27 
LAG,. cl 4.70 1.53 3.06* 
MM,. c8 -0.13 0.15 -0.88 
INSID- c9 5.65 4.00 1.41 
INST,. clO 50.96 33.29 1.53 
INST. *QE- 
1 1 
ell -9.13 6.37 -1.43 
DAY,. cl2 2.92 1.73 1.69@ 
Dli cl3 -1.86 2.24 -0.83 
D2i cl4 0.37 2.18 0.17 
D3i cl5 0.10 1.75 0.06 
VTi cl6 -0.40 1.50 -0.26 
R-square: 20.83 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 3.44 (Signf.) 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Table 74 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
abnormal log spread: Firm size X Earnings noise score 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT cO -18.99 15.43 -1.23 
INF01i cl 44.32 15.16 2.92* 
INF02i c2 2.IQ 15.65 0.18 
QE. c3 3.32 3.04 1.09 
INF01/QE. c4 -9.30 2.92 -3.17* 
INF02i*QEi c5 -1.78 3.13 -0.57 
UE- c6 48.86 31.64 1.54 
LAGi c7 5.38 1.51 3.56* 
MM. c8 -0.13 0.15 -0.82 
INSID,- c9 2.08 3.94 0.53 
INST- clO 32.38 32.86 0.98 
INST1-*QE1- c 11 -5.78 6.28 -0.92 
DAY,- cl2 2.98 1.71 1.74@ 
Dli cl3 -0.94 2.21 -0.43 
D2i cl4 2.29 2.15 1.06 
D3i cl5 -0.11 1.73 -0.06 
VTi cl6 -0.15 1.48 -0.10 
R-square: 17.82 h ; F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 2.83 (Si1 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Table 75 
Cross-sectional means of CSU2f 
Firm size x Earnings predictability score 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL SPREAD 
FIRM 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCORE 
1 2 3 4 
0.47 -10.20 -8.45 -2.03 
1 (8) (8) (5) (41) 
-11.15 -3.34 -3.03 -3.47 
2 (34) (11) (14) (21) 
0.59 -1.61 6.74 4.71 
3 (65) (14) (6) (25) 
-0.58 -4.30 -1.77 -0.47 
(81) (32) (25) (88) 
TOTAL 
-3.28 
(62) 
-4.47 
(54) 
1.58 
(110) 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL LOG SPREAD 
FIRM 
SIZE 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCORE 
1 2 3 4 
0.96 -13.62 -8.93 -1.36 
1 (8) (8) (5) (41) 
-5.12 -1.82 -7.00 -4.71 
2 (34) (ID (14) (21) 
-0.33 -3.13 3.49 3.27 
3 (65) (14) (6) (25) 
TOTAL 
-3.25 
(62) 
-4.83 
(54) 
0.34 
(110) 
TOTAL 
-0.67 
(81) 
-5.34 
(32) 
-4.87 
(25) 
-0.88 
(88) 
Table 76 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread: Firm size X Earnings predictability score 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev . : t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT cO -6.03 4.33 -1.39 
INFOl- cl -7.02 4.93 -1.42 
INF02. c2 -10.53 4.98 -2.11* 
QE,- c3 2.01 1.42 1.42 
INF01,.*QE. c4 -0.04 1.55 -0.02 
INF02.*QE1- c5 1.07 1.68 0.64 
UE- c6 73.52 33.24 2.21* 
LAG1- c7 3.62 1.56 2.31* 
MM- c8 -0.16 0.16 -1.01 
INSID1- c9 3.49 4.06 0.86 
INST,- clO 13.31 8.52 1.56 
INST.*QE. cl 1 -2.82 2.82 -1.00 
DAY,. cl2 3.16 1.79 1.76@ 
Dli cl3 -2.32 2.34 -0.99 
D2i cl4 -0.43 2.31 -0.19 
D3i Cl5 0.08 1.81 0.05 
VTi cl6 0.40 1.55 0.26 • 
R-square: 15.29 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 2.35 (Signf 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. , _ 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees o 
freedom. 
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Table 77 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
abnormal log spread: Firm size X Earnings predictability score 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev . : t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT cO -6.79 4.25 -1.60 
INFOl,- cl -7.90 4.83 -1.64@ 
INF02- c2 -2.77 4.88 -0.56 
QEf c3 1.89 1.39 1.35 
INFOl,. *QE,. c4 0.71 1.52 0.47 
INF02,.*QE,. c5 -1.17 1.64 -0.71 
UE- c6 67.39 32.57 2.06* 
LAG,. c7 4.19 1.53 2.72* 
MM. c8 -0.12 0.16 -0.77 
INSID. c9 2.05 3.98 0.52 
INST^ clO 12.94 8.35 1.54 
INST,.*QE,. ell -3.17 2.77 -1.14 
DAY,. cl2 2.86 1.76 1.63® 
Dli cl3 -2.99 2.30 -1.30 
D2i cl4 0.62 2.26 0.27 
D3i cl5 -0.10 1.78 -0.06 
VTi cl6 0.20 1.52 0.13 
R-square: 13.31 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 2.00 (Signf 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Explanation for Tables 78 to 87 
1. The mean-adjusted spread (U.) : Daily cross-sectional mean 
of the mean-adjusted spread for each day d in the event 
period. Further, 
- ^ 
M 
where, M = the number of firm-events in the sample. 
In the case of mean-adjusted log spread, the cross- 
sectional daily mean of the mean-adjusted log spread for each 
day d in the analysis period has been calculated. 
2. The Brown and Warner test-statistic: 
(Ud/£(Ud) ) 
This statistic has a t-distribution with 125 degrees of 
freedom.Here, 0 5 
§(Ud) - { £ (Uc- U)2/125} 
t—147 
and. 
t 
-21 
U - { £ J7J/126 
t—147 
The same procedure has been adopted for calculation of 
the test-statistics for mean-adjusted log spread. 
3. The Corrado Rank test-statistic: 
To test the behavior of unexpected bid-ask spread in the 
presence of non-normalities, Corrado's Rank Test statistic has 
also been estimated over the event periods. This statistic 
involves the ranking of each It t, where t = 1 to 152 days in 
the estimation and event period. Further: 
(i) K- = rank (U- ) 
(ii) J/t = (K. t - 76.5), where 76.5 is the average rank over 
the 152' days.1' 
For each t = 127 to 152 days, the z-statistic is computed as 
follows: 
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where, 
Jt/S (Je) 
and, 
4. The cross-sectional mean of the mean-adjusted volume, bid 
and ask price for each day d in the analysis period have been 
calculated in a manner similar to (1). 
5. The Brown and Warner and the Corrado Rank test-statistics 
for volume, bid and ask price have been calculated as in (2) 
and (3) above. 
6. The event period has been broken up into three sub-periods. 
These are as follows: 
Sub-oeriod Davs 
1. Pre-announcement period -15 to -2 
2 . Announcement period -1 to 0 
3 . Post-announcement period + 1 to +10 
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Table 78 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted ask price: Earnings siqnal 
Full sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY ASK PRC.1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.5400 0.6139 0.7474 0.9911 
-14 0.5734 0.6520 0.7449 1.0056 
-13 0.5702 0.6483 0.6983 0.9315 
-12 0.6478 0.7365 0.8027 1.0239 
-11 0.6249 0.7105 0.7970 0.9892 
-10 0.6225 0.7077 0.7889 0.9202 
-9 0.6274 0.7133 0.7939 0.9580 
-8 0.6699 0.7616 0.8511 1.0379 
-7 0.6396 0.7273 0.8419 1.0678 
-6 0.6208 0.7059 0.8096 1.0075 
-5 0.6037 0.6864 0.7809 0.9459 
-4 0.5996 0.6817 0.7635 0.8941 
-3 0.5902 0.6711 0.7433 0.8247 
-2 0.6004 0.6827 0.7703 0.9114 
-1 0.6858 0.7797 0.8496 0.9469 
0 0.6805 0.7737 0.8033 0.9399 
1 0.6494 0.7384 0.7720 0.9303 
2 0.6527 0.7421 0.7826 0.9352 
3 0.6404 0.7282 0.7576 0.9091 
4 0.6069 0.6901 0.7349 0.8670 
5 0.5154 0.5861 0.6553 0.8588 
6 0.4190 0.4764 0.5745 0.7161 
7 0.4427 0.5034 0.5998 0.7683 
8 0.4333 0.4927 0.5735 0.7629 
9 0.4288 0.4876 0.5913 0.8069 
10 0.4301 0.4890 0.6189 0.8233 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted ask price: Daily cross-sectional mean of 
the mean-adjusted ask price. The expected price for each- 
firm event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
price 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 153 firm-events 
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Table 79 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted bid price: Earninqs sianal 
Full sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY BID PRC.1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.5625 0.6107 0.6758 0.9431 
-14 0.5886 0.6391 0.6932 0.9410 
-13 0.6123 0.6648 0.6951 0.9299 
-12 0.6499 0.7056 0.7690 1.0282 
-11 0.7063 0.7668 0.8289 1.1205 
-10 0.6728 0.7305 0.7822 0.9952 
-9 0.6720 0.7296 0.7831 0.9274 
-8 0.6777 0.7358 0.7897 1.0160 
-7 0.6450 0.7003 0.7934 1.0107 
-6 0.6924 0.7517 0.8274 1.0260 
-5 0.6687 0.7260 0.7891 0.9934 
-4 0.6907 0.7500 0.7945 0.9897 
-3 0.6491 0.7047 0.7525 0.9015 
-2 0.6246 0.6781 0.7220 0.8965 
-1 0.6376 0.6923 0.7005 0.8767 
0 0.6238 0.6772 0.6916 0.8732 
1 0.6928 0.7522 0.7581 0.9632 
2 0.7136 0.7748 0.7895 0.9895 
3 0.6907 0.7500 0.7588 1.0093 
4 0.6156 0.6684 0.6978 0.9404 
5 0.5118 0.5557 0.5989 0.8044 
6 0.4693 0.5096 0.5976 0.8266 
7 0.4898 0.5318 0.6069 0.8586 
8 0.4563 0.4954 0.5926 0.8470 
9 0.4726 0.5131 0.5917 0.8231 
10 0.4632 0.5029 0.6188 0.9005 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted bid price: Daily cross-sectional mean of 
the mean-adjusted bid price. The expected price for each- 
firm event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
price 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 153 firm-events ' 
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Table 80 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted ask price: Dividends siqnal 
Full sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY ASK PRC.1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.' 
-15 0.4971 0.5652 0.3752 0.5784 
-14 0.5330 0.6060 0.4469 0.2618 
-13 0.5193 0.5905 0.4102 0.6570 
-12 0.5108 0.5807 0.4436 0.7904 
-11 0.5467 0.6216 0.4807 0.7769 
-10 0.4183 0.4756 0.3818 0.3931 
-9 0.4132 0.4698 0.3625 0.3380 
-8 0.3892 0.4425 0.3436 0.3409 
-7 0.3738 0.4250 0.3265 0.7498 
-6 0.3566 0.4055 0.3193 0.6787 
-5 0.3310 0.3763 0.3074 0.2894 
-4 0.3036 0.3452 0.2658 0.1716 
-3 0.3738 0.4250 0.3041 0.4221 
-2 0.2676 0.3043 0.2185 -0.0517 
-1 0.2316 0.2634 0.1825 0.0065 
0 0.2060 0.2342 0.1606 0.2297 
1 0.1888 0.2147 0.1603 0.2288 
2 -0.0355 -0.0404 -0.0453 -0.4183 
3 -0.0509 -0.0579 -0.0911 -0.2717 
4 -0.1382 -0.1572 -0.1662 -0.5935 
5 -0.1331 -0.1513 -0.2476 -0.4377 
6 -0.2290 -0.2604 -0.3350 -0.6850 
7 -0.1468 -0.1669 -0.2831 -0.5014 
8 -0.1845 -0.2097 -0.3386 -0.6896 
9 -0.1964 -0.2234 -0.3421 -0.5372 
10 -0.0817 -0.0929 -0.2524 -0.3880 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted ask price: Daily cross-sectional mean of 
the mean-adjusted ask price. The expected price for each- 
firm event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
price 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 153 firm-events 
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Table 81 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted bid price: Dividends siqnal 
Full sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY BID PRC.1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.5599 0.6079 0.3798 0.3759 
-14 0.5376 0.5837 0.3618 0.4777 
-13 0.5445 0.5911 0.3983 0.8899 
-12 0.5222 0.5670 0.3972 0.6252 
-11 0.5513 0.5986 0.4471 1.0154 
-10 0.4862 0.5279 0.3825 0.5702 
-9 0.4434 0.4815 0.3661 0.6068 
-8 0.3664 0.3978 0.3275 0.5904 
-7 0.3287 0.3569 0.2775 0.9195 
-6 0.3150 0.3420 0.2810 0.4793 
-5 0.3270 0.3550 0.3034 0.5598 
-4 0.2876 0.3123 0.2573 0.3309 
-3 0.2962 0.3216 0.2397 0.1552 
-2 0.2962 0.3216 0.2182 0.2073 
-1 0.2619 0.2844 0.2075 0.2538 
0 0.1352 0.1468 0.1115 0.2279 
1 0.0838 0.0910 0.0693 0.2020 
2 -0.0086 -0.0094 -0.0369 -0.3095 
3 -0.0223 -0.0242 -0.0438 -0.3022 
4 -0.0994 -0.1079 -0.1622 -0.3631 
5 -0.1799 -0.1953 -0.2236 -0.4775 
6 -0.1593 -0.1730 -0.2325 -0.5139 
7 -0.1131 -0.1228 -0.1912 -0.5167 
8 -0.1456 -0.1581 -0.2555 -0.5096 
9 -0.2261 -0.2455 -0.3134 -0.6606 
10 -0.1559 -0.1693 -0.2693 -0.2149 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted bid price: Daily cross-sectional mean of 
the mean-adjusted bid price. The expected price for each- 
firm event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
price 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
price 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 153 firm-events 
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Table 82 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
high quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=4) 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0346 -0.4774 -0.3430 -0.5109 
-14 -0.1298 -1.7931® -1.8156® -1.2893 
-13 -0.0703 -0.9708 -0.8500 -0.5849 
-12 0.0488 0.6738 0.6334 0.2698 
-11 -0.0167 -0.2307 -0.2474 -0.3557 
-10 0.0369 0.5094 0.4558 0.1958 
-9 0.0071 0.0982 -0.1558 0.1361 
-8 0.0012 0.0160 0.0642 0.3748 
-7 0.0726 1.0028 1.2195 1.6020 
-6 -0.1119 -1.5464 -1.6539® -1.3895 
-5 0.1083 1.4961 1.3564 1.4230 
-4 -0.1000 -1.3819 -1.4506 -1.0624 
-3 0.0369 0.5094 0.5953 0.7783 
-2 0.0488 0.6738 -0.0072 -1.3394 
-1 0.0369 0.5094 0.6705 0.8332 
0 0.1559 2.1540* 2.1558* 2.0771* 
1 -0.0703 -0.9708 -0.8272 -0.5133 
2 0.0785 1.0850 1.2126 0.9120 
3 0.0726 1.0028 1.1262 0.6088 
4 0.1202 1.6606® 1.7376® 1.9124@ 
5 0.0309 0.4271 0.7206 0.8834 
6 -0.0286 -0.3952 -0.3486 -0.2626 
7 -0.1417 -1.9575® -2.0625* -2.1249* 
8 -0.0465 -0.6418 -1.0653 -1.4540 
9 -0.0346 -0.4774 -0.6579 -0.6327 
10 -0.0346 -0.4774 -0.3597 -0.5587 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 83 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=4) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS .3 t-STATS .A 
-15 -8649.4021 -1.0393 -0.1110 -0.3210 
-14 -1963.2593 -0.2359 0.2481 0.1457 
-13 -8175.6402 -0.9824 -0.0008 -0.6964 
-12 -8342.8783 -1.0025 0.1755 -0.3457 
-11 -2187.2593 -0.2628 -1.1927 -0.0445 
-10 7377.5979 0.8865 -0.8040 -0.4223 
-9 -4578.9259 -0.5502 -0.7422 -0.6915 
-8 -2425.1164 -0.2914 -0.3953 -0.4618 
-7 -5848.7355 -0.7028 0.0958 -0.0667 
-6 -7268.6878 -0.8734 -0.4698 -1.1977 
-5 -1294.3069 -0.1555 1.1105 0.8372 
-4 -725.4974 -0.0872 0.7685 0.5532 
-3 9257.6455 1.1124 1.1171 0.7977 
-2 65229.7884 7.8378* 1.5803 1.0125 
-1 6867.0265 0.8251 0.0947 1.4299 
0 -420.3545 -0.0505 1.1284 1.0496 
1 5672.4074 0.6816 -0.8152 -0.0099 
2 49759.6455 5.9790* 1.0220 1.4793 
3 3946.8836 0.4743 -0.4620 0.5680 
4 1252.2169 0.1505 0.7899 0.6371 
5 -10950.7355 -1.3158 -0.3064 -0.7952 
6 7340.0741 0.8820 -0.1807 -0.5087 
7 -7940.9259 -0.9542 -0.9758 -1.8324@ 
8 993.5503 0.1194 -0.9838 -1.0076 
9 4504.3598 0.5412 -0.2806 -0.3285 
10 -977.4021 -0.1174 0.2969 0.1926 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 84 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=5) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 0.0166 0.4229 0.8513 0.3761 
-14 0.0463 1.1770 1.3210 1.6824@ 
-13 -0.0130 -0.3313 -0.2266 -0.2646 
-12 0.0115 0.2917 -0.0142 -0.1705 
-11 -0.0491 -1.2494 -1.6255@ -1.4518 
-10 -0.0491 -1.2494 -1.2248 -1.3709 
-9 -0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0097 0.0918 
-8 0.0218 0.5540 0.3536 -0.1946 
-7 -0.0053 -0.1345 -0.5535 -0.9839 
-6 -0.0401 -1.0199 -0.7847 -0.1848 
-5 -0.0646 -1.6429® -1.7705® -1.4562 
-4 -0.0362 -0.9215 -0.8746 -0.8833 
-3 -0.0220 -0.5608 -0.8120 -0.9423 
-2 0.0012 0.0294 0.1514 -0.0743 
-1 0.0914 2.3247* 2.2216* 1.6442® 
0 0.1004 2.5542* 2.0410* 1.4223 
1 -0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0032 0.0295 
2 -0.0646 -1.6429 -1.7650® -1.4201 
3 -0.0465 -1.1838 -1.2138 -0.7729 
4 0.0024 0.0622 -0.1640 -0.3159 
5 0.0179 0.4557 0.6757 1.2047 
6 -0.0156 -0.3969 -0.9469 -1.0232 
7 0.0024 0.0622 0.1355 0.0787 
8 0.0347 0.8819 0.7480 1.0189 
9 -0.0079 -0.2001 -0.2654 -0.4023 
10 0.0037 0.0950 -0.2145 -0.3881 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 97 firm-events 
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Table 85 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=5) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 8967.6193 1.5302 -1.1933 -0.1217 
-14 11456.1141 1.9548® 1.9322@ 2.5716* 
-13 -840.0508 -0.1433 -0.4520 0.2301 
-12 -1311.1951 -0.2237 -0.5775 -0.3374 
-11 11386.3925 1.9429® -0.4512 -0.2920 
-10 -2867.9683 -0.4894 -0.1217 0.0819 
-9 2559.2482 0.4367 1.0385 1.2300 
-8 4163.6399 0.7105 -0.3946 0.4369 
-7 14636.1760 2.4974* -2.1767* -1.4512 
-6 1882.9698 0.3213 0.0208 -0.5210 
-5 1268.0729 0.2164 -0.9295 -0.7632 
-4 -2591.1539 -0.4421 -1.3609 -1.7576® 
-3 -4606.0714 -0.7860 -1.1556 -0.9015 
-2 -4368.3395 -0.7454 -0.7641 -0.7709 
-1 8725.1966 1.4888 2.3266* 2.5174* 
0 4962.6915 0.8468 2.7507* 3.1756* 
1 615.8873 0.1051 -0.2693 -0.2633 
2 1813.3719 0.3094 0.9753 0.7134 
3 -2328.3498 -0.3973 -0.9261 -0.6448 
4 -5456.9065 -0.9311 -0.7421 -0.8262 
5 -6257.5869 -1.0678 -0.5184 -0.6493 
6 -8406.2158 -1.4344 -0.3559 -0.8141 
7 -3345.4116 -0.5708 -0.5704 -0.3418 
8 -280.7828 -0.0479 -0.0513 -0.3728 
9 -1379.6797 -0.2354 -1.1446 -0.5907 
10 2192.0317 0.3740 -0.4680 -0.8174 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 97 firm-events 
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Table 86 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal 
Medium quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=6) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS. 
-15 -0.1268 -0.3221 
-14 -0.1626 -0.4128 
-13 -0.1536 -0.3902 
-12 -0.0688 -0.1747 
-11 -0.2429 -0.6169 
-10 -0.1268 -0.3221 
-9 -0.2027 -0.5149 
-8 -0.1626 -0.4128 
-7 -0.0822 -0.2088 
-6 -0.1983 -0.5035 
-5 -0.1893 -0.4809 
-4 -0.2831 -0.7190 
-3 -0.2652 -0.6736 
-2 -0.1492 -0.3788 
-1 -0.0956 -0.2428 
0 -0.1224 -0.3108 
1 -0.1804 -0.4582 
2 -0.1760 -0.4468 
3 -0.1804 -0.4582 
4 -0.1492 -0.3788 
5 -0.0867 -0.2201 
6 -0.1938 -0.4922 
7 -0.1536 -0.3902 
8 -0.2072 -0.5262 
9 -0.1893 -0.4809 
10 -0.1581 -0.4015 
2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-0.4532 -0.2286 
-0.8959 -0.5540 
-0.7445 -0.3061 
0.0148 -0.1763 
-2.1523* -1.8033@ 
-0.6173 -0.6024 
-1.4484 -1.2765 
-0.8094 -0.4378 
0.0293 0.1375 
-1.3758 -0.9898 
-1.1214 -0.6857 
-2.3403* -2.3031* 
-2.1959* -1.8072@ 
-0.6512 -0.2828 
-0.2689 -0.3215 
-0.3726 -0.1046 
-1.0778 -1.2203 
-1.1828 -0.8465 
-1.0154 -0.6334 
-0.6776 0.0078 
-0.1554 0.4901 
-1.2767 -0.8620 
-0.8505 -0.2034 
-1.4095 -1.2765 
-1.4360 -1.5612 
-1.0712 -0.6780 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 28 firm-events 
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Table 87 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Earnings signal 
Medium quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=6) 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 10624.4875 0.2160 -1.9341@ -1.2323 
-14 14427.2732 0.2932 -0.5751 -1.4320 
-13 -2828.6553 -0.0575 0.7162 0.4462 
-12 -434.2625 -0.0088 0.1721 0.0659 
-11 -31984.0482 -0.6501 -0.4103 -1.0262 
-10 -73811.1553 -1.5002 0.1085 -1.1856 
-9 -69792.9768 -1.4186 -0.7081 -1.4044 
-8 -45831.6196 -0.9316 -2.1892* -1.8612@ 
-7 -39635.3339 -0.8056 1.6733@ 0.3336 
-6 -55093.4053 -1.1198 -0.0868 0.1190 
-5 -49644.6553 -1.0091 0.1835 0.2188 
-4 -37488.4053 -0.7620 -1.8157@ -1.9632* 
-3 -87479.3696 -1.7781@ -0.3775 -0.9327 
-2 -3872.0482 -0.0787 -0.1382 0.7734 
-1 149622.9161 3.0411* 2.5212* 2.5347* 
0 104610.6304 2.1263* 2.0895* 2.0036* 
1 31296.3804 0.6361 1.3906 0.3952 
2 -16872.5482 -0.3429 1.2177 0.2996 
3 -69290.7268 -1.4084 0.6984 -0.3208 
4 -32417.8696 -0.6589 1.8609@ 1.2472 
5 -8276.9053 -0.1682 0.0981 -0.6735 
6 -38027.1553 -0.7729 0.4499 -0.3803 
7 -7956.2268 -0.1617 0.2908 -0.4781 
8 -56627.4410 -1.1510 0.7804 -0.2720 
9 -19111.6910 -0.3885 0.7770 0.6055 
10 -35888.3696 -0.7295 -0.4113 -0.8138 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 28 firm-events 
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Explanations for Tables 88 to 93 
1. The following cross-sectional regression is run on the 
cumulative standardized mean-adjusted spread and log-spread: 
CSU1± - a0 + a1 {INFOlj) +a2(INF02i) +a2(QSi) + a4 (INF01*0Si) 
+ a5 (INF02*QSi) +a6(Dli) +a1(D2i) 
+ ae(D3i) +1^. 
where, 
i = the firm-events ranging from i = 1 to N ; 
INF01i = ' 1 ', for low differential information environment, 
and, 7 0 7 otherwise; 
INF02i = ' 1 7 , for median differential information 
environment, and, ' 0 7 otherwise; 
QSi = the quality score of the firm. This score takes the 
value of ' 1 7 (for high quality of earnings 
disclosures) to ' 4 7 (for low quality of earnings 
disclosures) if the earnings predictability 
approach is used, or, takes the value of ' 4 7 
(high quality of earnings) to ' 8 7 (low quality of 
earnings) in the case of the earnings noise 
approach. 
Dl- =' 1 7, if it is a joint announcement and ' 0 7 
otherwise; 
D2. = ' 1 7, if it is a sole earnings announcement and 
'0 7 otherwise; 
D3- =' 1 7, if it is a dividend announcement subsequent 
to a earnings announcement and ' 0 7 otherwise. 
CSUli = the cumulative standardized unexpected spread (or, 
log spread). This is calculated as follows: 
CSUli 
+ 10 
E sui.* 
t--15 
. . . (1) 
where: 
sui.d - Uiid/S(Ud) ...(2) 
ul.d ~ Slid~E(.SLd) ...(3) 
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-21 0.5 
§(.Ud) - { Y, (Vi.t-Ui)2/125} ...(4) 
t—147 
-21 
u,- - E (uliC)/i2e 
t—147 
(5) 
2. The F-statistic has (8,217) degrees of freedom. 
3. The cross-sectional regressions are run for all possible 
combinations of the differential information variable and the 
quality of earnings variable: 
DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION 
1. Analysts' Following 
2. Analysts' Following 
3. Firm Size 
4. Firm Size 
Results for combinations (1) 
Combinations (3) and (4) are i: 
QUALITY OF EARNINGS 
Earnings Noise Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Noise Score 
and (2) are displayed here, 
the text. 
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Table 88 
Cross-sectional means of CSUli 
Analysts' following x Earnings noise score 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED SPREAD 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 TOTAL 
-2.06 
(74) 
-1.08 
(80) 
2.65 
(72) 
1.35 0.62 -5.00 -2.06 
TOTAL (38) (146) (35) (7) 
1 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
-0.18 
(13) 
-0.32 
(35) 
-6.56 
(19) 
-2.06 
(7) 
-3.07 -0.43 -3.42 0.00 
2 (14) (61) (5) (0) 
8.79 2.55 -3.03 0.00 
3 (ID (50) (11) (0) 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED LOG SPREAD 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 
-0.29 -0.95 -6.64 -1.87 
1 (13) (35) (19) (7) 
-3.57 -0.91 -3.14 0.00 
2 (14) (61) (5) (0) 
7.32 1.20 -3.71 0.00 
3 (ID (50) (ID (0) 
TOTAL 
-2.28 
(74) 
-1.52 
(80) 
1.39 
(72) 
TOTAL 
0.70 
(38) 
-0.20 
(146) 
-5.22 
(35) 
-1.87 
(7) 
Table 89 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
unexpected spread: Analysts' following X Earnings noise 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statistics 
CONSTANT aO 28.04 11.61 2.41* 
INFOl. al 18.76 14.72 -1.27 
INF02. a2 33.69 17.95 -1.87® 
QE,. a3 -5.07 2.31 -2.19* 
INF011-*QE1- a4 2.99 2.86 1.04 
INF02i*QEi a5 6.02 3.61 1.67 
Dli a6 -1.44 2.55 -0.56 
D2i a7 0.16 2.48 0.07 
D3i a8 0.06 1.99 0.03 
R-square: 2.84 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 0.91 
* = significant at p < 0 .05 levels with 217 degrees 
freedom 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
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Table 90 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
unexpected log spread: Analysts' following X Earnings noise 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT aO 25.23 10.52 2.39* 
INFOl. al -16.81 13.34 -1.26 
INF02. a2 -32.09 16.26 -1.97* 
QE,- a3 -4.69 2.09 -2.24* 
INF01.*QE. a4 2.78 2.59 1.07 
INF02>QE1- a5 5.88 3.27 1.80@ 
Dli a6 -2.01 2.31 -0.87 
D2i a7 0.06 2.24 0.03 
D3i a8 -0.68 1.80 -0.38 
R-square: 5 .13 % F- statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.47 (N.S.) 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
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Table 91 
Cross-sectional means of CSUl^ 
Analysts' following x Earnings predictability 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED SPREAD 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCORE 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
-2.06 
(74) 
-1.08 
(80) 
2.65 
(72) 
1.67 -2.19 1.20 -1.63 
TOTAL (81) (32) (25) (88) 
1 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
3.81 
(14) 
-4.65 
(11) 
1.07 
(10) 
-4.24 
(39) 
-2.11 1.90 0.59 -2.07 
2 (34) (11) (14) (21) 
4.65 -3.96 11.15 2.35 
3 (33) (10) (1) (28) 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED LOG SPREAD 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCORE 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
TOTAL 
1 
3.25 
(14) 
-4.48 
(11) 
-1.15 
(10) 
-4.13 
(39) 
2 
-2.30 
(34) 
1.67 
(ID 
-0.46 
(14) 
-2.62 
(21) 
3 
3.25 
(33) 
-5.11 
(10) 
10.39 
(1) 
1.19 
(28) 
0.92 
(81) 
-2.56 
(32) 
-0.30 
(25) 
-2.08 
(88) 
-2.38 
(74) 
-1.52 
(80) 
1.39 
(72) 
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Table 92 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
unexpected spread: Analysts' following X Earnings 
predictability 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT aO 4.46 3.01 1.48 
INFOl. al -0.14 4.76 -0.03 
INF02i a2 -5.74 3.98 -1.44 
QE. a3 -0.71 1.03 -0.68 
INFOl .*QE. a4 -1.17 1.57 -0.74 
INF02 .*QE. a5 0.92 1.47 0.63 
Dli a6 -1.84 2.52 -0.73 
D2i a7 -1.03 2.49 -0.41 
D3i a8 0.06 2.00 0.03 
R-square: 3.99 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.12 (N.S.) 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
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Table 93 
Results of cross 
unexpected log 
predictability 
-sectional test on 
spread: Analysts' 
cumulative standardized 
following X Earnings 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev . : t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT aO 3.40 2.72 1.25 
INF01. al 0.45 4.31 0.10 
INF02. a2 -4.23 3.61 -1.17 
QE1- a3 -0.66 0.94 -0.71 
INFOl - *QE- i i a4 ■1.07 1.43 -0.75 
INF02i*QEi a5 0.63 1.34 0.47 
Dli a 6 2.37 2.29 -1.04 
D2i a 7 0.90 2.26 
o
 • 
o
 1 
D3i a8 0.68 1.82 -0.37 
R-square: 3 .59 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.01 (N.S.) 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 217 degrees of 
freedom 
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Explanation for Tables 94 to 104 
1. The abnormal spread (U- d) : This is the cross-sectional 
daily mean of the abnormal' spread for day d in the event 
period. For each firm-event, the abnormal spread is 
calculated as follows: U. ^ = S. d - E(Sid). To estimate the 
expected spread, the following simultaneous equation model was 
run for each of the sample firm-events: 
si.t 
TVl.t 
a0 + a1{ TVit t) +a2 (Pi t) + a3(Ri t) + a4(Si ^ + r|^ t 
b0+bltSi.t) +b2^MFi,t^ 
(la) 
(lb) 
The predicted structural coefficients were used to estimate 
the reduced form coefficients for the spread equation. The 
expected value of the spread in the event period is derived by 
using the spread reduced form equation. 
Abnormal log spread was calculated in a similar fashion 
after log-transforming the dependent variable, the bid-ask 
spread. 
2. The Brown and Warner test-statistic: 
(Ud/S(Ud)) 
This statistic has a t-distribution with 125 degrees of 
freedom. Here, 0>5 
<HUd) - ( £ (Uc-U)2/125) 
t—147 
and, 
t 
-21 
U - { Y, Ut)/126 
t—147 
The same procedure was adopted to calculate the Brown and 
Warner test-statistics for abnormal log spread. 
3. The Corrado Rank test-statistic: . . 
To test the behavior of unexpected bid-ask spread in the 
presence of non-normalities, Corrado's Rank Test statistic has 
also been estimated over the event periods. This statistic 
involves the ranking of each U, t, where t = 1 to 152 days in 
the estimation and event period. Further: 
(i) K. = rank (U- t) 
i,i » 
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(ii) J. t = (K1- t - 76.5), where 76.5 is the average rank over 
the 152' days. 
For each t = 127 to 152 days, the z-statistic is computed as 
follows: 
where, 
- i N 
Jt - TrE Ji.t 
iV i-1 
and, 
i(jc) 
\ 152 
152 
t-1 
2 
4. The event period has been broken up into three sub-periods. 
These are as follows: 
Sub-oeriod Davs 
1. Pre-announcement period -15 to -2 
2 . Announcement period -1 to 0 
3 . Post-announcement period + 1 to +10 
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Table 94 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=4) 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0497 -0.6945 -0.0400 -0.8767 
-14 -0.1346 -1.8799® -1.7119® -1.0268 
-13 -0.0683 -0.9536 -0.4669 -0.2850 
-12 0.0299 0.4174 0.7757 -0.0979 
-11 -0.0470 -0.6559 -0.3222 -0.8680 
-10 0.0182 0.2543 0.4023 0.0413 
-9 -0.0297 -0.4144 -0.0546 -0.4025 
-8 -0.0246 -0.3431 -0.0261 -0.0239 
-7 0.0237 0.3303 1.1345 0.9942 
-6 -0.1476 -2.0616* -2.4681* -2.1124* 
-5 0.1439 2.0106* 2.0635* 2.0297* 
-4 -0.1196 -1.6707@ -1.6563® -1.7904® 
-3 0.0539 0.7527 0.4860 1.2509 
-2 0.0085 0.1191 -0.7121 -1.7252@ 
-1 0.0577 0.8063 0.5498 0.4634 
0 0.0912 1.2734 1.9375® 1.0551 
1 -0.1423 -1.9871* -2.1514* -1.9732* 
2 0.0308 0.4296 1.0133 0.5243 
3 -0.0532 -0.7425 0.0138 -0.8854 
4 0.0915 1.2779 1.1741 0.7157 
5 0.0144 0.2004 0.4835 -0.1066 
6 -0.0754 -1.0532 -0.6533 -0.2328 
7 -0.1700 -2.3745* -2.2849* -2.4104* 
8 -0.0780 -1.0896 -0.8113 -1.4989 
9 -0.0114 -0.1593 -0.7532 -0.3111 
10 -0.0469 -0.6554 -0.2832 -0.5896 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 21 firm-events 
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Table 95 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
High quality of earnings portfolio based on earninqs noise 
score (=5) 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0067 -0.1735 0.0990 -0.3166 
-14 0.0272 0.7091 0.6733 1.0424 
-13 -0.0346 -0.9022 -0.7228 -1.2185 
-12 0.0125 0.3248 0.2146 -0.1456 
-11 -0.0611 -1.5924 -1.8151® -1.6144 
-10 -0.0546 -1.4235 -1.3560 -1.4648 
-9 -0.0050 -0.1306 -0.0736 0.0438 
-8 0.0077 0.2001 0.1108 -0.5812 
-7 -0.0188 -0.4887 -0.8660 -1.2714 
-6 -0.0455 -1.1864 -1.2237 -0.2718 
-5 -0.0651 -1.6966 -2.1103* -1.4363 
-4 -0.0469 -1.2206 -1.3346 -1.3834 
-3 -0.0329 -0.8560 -1.1339 -1.2246 
-2 0.0055 0.1431 0.1764 0.3135 
-1 0.0818 2.1311* 2.1693* 1.4343 
0 0.0748 1.9480@ 1.3711 0.6179 
1 -0.0325 -0.8461 -0.7781 -0.9192 
2 -0.0769 -2.0032* -2.0872* -1.9890* 
3 -0.0526 -1.3707 -1.4286 -1.2571 
4 -0.0014 -0.0354 -0.3221 -0.7064 
5 -0.0173 -0.4503 -0.0908 0.2148 
6 -0.0321 -0.8352 -1.4821 -1.6806@ 
7 -0.0141 -0.3685 -0.2248 -0.3166 
8 0.0275 0.7167 0.7988 0.3054 
9 -0.0230 -0.5994 -0.4330 -1.0963 
10 -0.0326 -0.8488 -0.9315 -1.8455® 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 97 firm-events 
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Table 96 
Behavior of daily abnormal spread: Earnings signal 
Medium quality of earnings portfolio based on earnings noise 
score (=6) 
ABNORMAL 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0110 -0.0706 -0.6895 -0.3560 
-14 -0.0432 -0.2785 -1.3508 -1.1500 
-13 -0.0677 -0.4364 -1.2909 -0.8676 
-12 0.0297 0.1914 -0.1162 -0.6384 
-11 -0.1156 -0.7460 -3.1908* -2.6109* 
-10 0.0271 0.1748 -0.2342 -0.5156 
-9 -0.0446 -0.2879 -1.8036® -1.4241 
-8 -0.0227 -0.1465 -1.1026 -0.7898 
-7 0.0554 0.3573 -0.2709 -0.1228 
-6 -0.0538 -0.3467 -1.6658® -1.2175 
-5 0.0151 0.0977 -0.9225 -0.3233 
-4 -0.1422 -0.9175 -3.0232* -2.4841* 
-3 -0.0918 -0.5924 -2.3931* -2.1035* 
-2 0.0492 0.3175 -0.3708 0.3356 
-1 0.0552 0.3558 -0.3654 -0.4420 
0 0.0562 0.3626 -0.3371 0.6875 
1 -0.0385 -0.2486 -1.5736 -1.74 74@ 
2 -0.0435 -0.2805 -1.2758 -0.6589 
3 -0.0021 -0.0136 -0.9203 -0.3356 
4 0.0416 0.2685 -0.4816 0.3356 
5 0.0418 0.2699 -0.1454 0.1473 
6 0.0106 0.0683 -1.4470 -0.9372 
7 0.0032 0.0207 -0.9383 -0.0859 
8 -0.0359 -0.2315 -1.2415 -1.1008 
9 -0.0408 -0.2629 -1.7075@ -2.1526* 
10 -0.0410 -0.2643 -1.2807 -0.9003 
NOTES: 
1. The abnormal spread or the proxy for the adverse selection 
cost component of the spread. This is the daily cross- 
sectional mean abnormal spread. The expected spread is 
estimated using a simultaneous equation system. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the abnormal log spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the abnormal spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 28 firm-events 
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Table 97 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal, Joint 
announcement sample 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0502 -0.1638 0.3132 0.1919 
-14 -0.0224 -0.0731 0.6471 1.0302 
-13 -0.0641 -0.2091 -0.1291 -0.1503 
-12 -0.0467 -0.1525 0.1367 0.1014 
-11 -0.1266 -0.4131 -1.2295 -1.1062 
-10 -0.1509 -0.4925 -1.2657 -1.2945 
-9 -0.1300 -0.4245 -0.9381 -0.5268 
-8 0.0193 0.0629 0.9699 0.8057 
-7 -0.1092 -0.3565 -0.5240 -0.3748 
-6 -0.1405 -0.4585 -1.4866 -1.1152 
-5 -0.2307 -0.7531 -2.3075* -2.1037* 
-4 -0.1266 -0.4131 -0.9621 -0.7948 
-3 -0.1925 -0.6285 -1.8470® -1.3560 
-2 -0.1509 -0.4925 -1.2154 -1.1297 
-1 -0.0294 -0.0958 0.6178 0.5377 
0 -0.1544 -0.5038 -1.2965 -1.3615 
1 -0.1231 -0.4018 -0.8937 -1.3524 
2 -0.2481 -0.8098 -2.7839* -2.6650* 
3 -0.1648 -0.5378 -1.4405 -1.1551 
4 -0.0953 -0.3111 -0.3529 0.3929 
5 -0.0953 -0.3111 -0.5519 -0.4001 
6 -0.0675 -0.2205 -0.1790 -0.1629 
7 -0.1092 -0.3565 -0.6872 -0.3730 
8 -0.1648 -0.5378 -1.4597 -0.7568 
9 -0.1752 -0.5718 -1.4470 -1.0048 
10 -0.2446 -0.7985 -2.7066* -3.0868* 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 36 firm-events 
293 
Table 98 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume:: Earnings signal 
Joint announcement sample 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 17812.3818 1.5834 0.5835 1.2818 
-14 2729.2985 0.2426 1.9864* 1.72 94@ 
-13 -1673.9515 -0.1488 0.3419 -0.2035 
-12 -1523.3959 -0.1354 -0.1386 -0.2136 
-11 -16295.5348 -1.4486 -0.0409 -1.5219 
-10 -8010.2848 -0.7121 0.3049 -0.9969 
-9 -3621.7848 -0.3220 0.4784 0.1261 
-8 -15913.4237 -1.4146 -1.9762* -1.6541@ 
-7 -8444.3959 -0.7507 -0.9689 -1.2024 
-6 1893.3263 0.1683 0.8251 0.4680 
-5 -4197.9793 -0.3732 -0.2897 -0.9196 
-4 5001.7985 0.4446 -0.8542 -0.8749 
-3 -12833.0071 -1.1408 -1.6826@ -2.0610* 
-2 -16395.0626 -1.4575 -2.9398* -2.0203* 
-1 3323.7985 0.2955 2.0483* 2.5534* 
0 -2894.5626 -0.2573 1.7977@ 1.1190 
1 -2437.0348 -0.2166 1.9342® 1.2736 
2 -429.4515 -0.0382 0.3031 -0.0509 
3 -8665.5348 -0.7703 1.0929 0.3642 
4 -4158.4793 -0.3697 2.0634* 1.6317® 
5 -7964.7848 -0.7080 -1.0125 -1.2187 
6 -2785.0348 -0.2476 -0.4280 0.4212 
7 -9320.7293 -0.8286 0.3690 -0.2380 
8 -2213.9793 -0.1968 1.1086 0.8627 
9 326.3818 0.0290 0.4412 0.6816 
10 -10487.7571 -0.9323 0.5714 -0.5799 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 36 firm-events 
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Table 99 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal, 
Earnings followed by dividends sequence sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS .3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0183 -0.3967 -0.2226 -0.3904 
-14 -0.0200 -0.4338 -0.3699 0.2450 
-13 -0.0234 -0.5081 -0.3032 -0.2679 
-12 0.0091 0.1975 -0.1632 -0.4414 
-11 -0.0936 -2.0307* -2.1417* -1.4327 
-10 0.0468 1.0145 1.1238 0.8956 
-9 -0.0097 -0.2110 -0.4944 -0.6570 
-8 -0.0508 -1.1023 -0.9938 -0.8407 
-7 0.0211 0.4574 0.5816 0.6966 
-6 -0.0508 -1.1023 -0.8515 -0.4657 
-5 -0.0012 -0.0253 -0.1439 -0.0383 
-4 -0.0885 -1.9193@ -2.0411* -1.9353® 
-3 -0.0097 -0.2110 -0.5478 -0.7616 
-2 0.0160 0.3460 0.1860 -0.4312 
-1 0.0690 1.4972 1.4573 1.0870 
0 0.0982 2.1286* 2.2887* 2.2428* 
1 -0.0217 -0.4710 -0.3950 -0.0447 
2 0.0211 0.4574 0.4499 0.5830 
3 0.0451 0.9773 1.0603 1.3778 
4 0.0416 0.9031 0.6022 0.4057 
5 0.0451 0.9773 1.5480 2.1088* 
6 -0.0406 -0.8795 -1.3760 -1.4097 
7 -0.0371 -0.8052 -0.7765 -0.7425 
8 0.0416 0.9031 0.7209 0.4567 
9 0.0108 0.2346 -0.1542 -1.0053 
10 0.0125 0.2718 0.1355 0.4618 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 100 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume:: Earnings signal. 
Earnings followed by dividends sequence sample 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -1289.9770 -0.2806 -2.7366* -0.9711 
-14 10513.0505 2.2870* 0.1512 0.6207 
-13 3627.0641 0.7890 0.8321 1.1524 
-12 50.9135 0.0111 -0.1384 -0.4605 
-11 3468.0231 0.7544 0.2011 0.7353 
-10 5798.6943 1.2614 0.4255 1.1402 
-9 2515.5984 0.5472 0.6928 0.7420 
-8 3088.5573 0.6719 -0.3114 0.4027 
-7 498.1189 0.1084 0.0030 0.3571 
-6 -398.4564 -0.0867 0.3812 -0.5262 
-5 -1890.4701 -0.4113 0.8508 0.7787 
-4 -3432.5112 -0.7467 -0.8977 -1.1713 
-3 -400.1961 -0.0871 -0.2428 0.0534 
-2 11296.8587 2.4575* 0.8170 -0.0968 
-1 2057.2833 0.4475 1.8950® 2.2114* 
0 6366.2148 1.3849 2.6715* 3.1981* 
1 2754.2833 0.5992 -0.5514 -0.3404 
2 17108.3381 3.7217* 0.7128 0.6485 
3 2013.6943 0.4381 -1.1420 0.1824 
4 563.1052 0.1225 -0.0666 -0.3849 
5 -3506.3605 -0.7628 0.1942 -0.2303 
6 -6873.6893 -1.4953 -0.2372 -0.8410 
7 22.0505 0.0048 -0.6915 -0.7142 
8 -3793.7989 -0.8253 -0.9041 -0.7486 
9 -1330.5112 -0.2894 -1.7180® -0.9433 
10 224.2696 0.0488 -0.7069 -0.3649 
BOXES.-- 
1 . The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2, Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3, Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjustea log 
volume 
4, Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5, * • significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
9 m significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6, Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 101 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Dividends signal 
Earnings followed by dividends sequence sample 
DAY 
MEAN-ADJ. 
SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0628 -1.3622 -1.4666 -0.8536 
-14 -0.0046 -0.0996 -0.0890 0.2927 
-13 -0.0251 -0.5453 -0.5761 -0.6778 
-12 -0.0114 -0.2482 -0.8976 -1.5224 
-11 -0.0046 -0.0996 -0.1828 0.0988 
-10 -0.0680 -1.4737 -1.5756 -1.3183 
-9 -0.0303 -0.6567 -0.9204 -0.7727 
-8 0.0228 0.4946 -0.1809 -0.6636 
-7 0.0451 0.9773 1.1042 0.7317 
- 6 0.0416 0.9031 0.2699 -0.3504 
-5 0.0040 0.0861 -0.5085 -0.7535 
-4 0.0160 0.3460 -0.7762 -1.4723 
-3 0.0776 1.6829@ 1.2875 0.7817 
-2 -0.0286 -0.6195 -0.9028 -1.3632 
-1 -0.0303 -0.6567 -0.7815 -0.7753 
0 0.0708 1.5344 1.1084 0.4429 
1 0.1050 2.2771* 2.2434* 1.63 02@ 
2 -0.0269 -0.5824 -0.7415 -0.6174 
3 -0.0286 -0.6195 -0.5391 -0.0847 
4 -0.0388 -0.8423 -1.4039 -1.5429 
5 0.0468 1.0145 0.8477 0.5237 
6 -0.0697 -1.5108 -1.5774 -1.4736 
7 -0.0337 -0.7309 -1.2710 -1.5057 
8 -0.0388 -0.8423 -0.9603 -0.7676 
9 0.0297 0.6431 0.5448 0.5109 
10 0.0742 1.6087 1.4032 1.2156 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 102 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume: Dividends signal, 
Earnings followed by dividends sequence sample 
DAY 
MEAN - AD J. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS .4 
-15 14445.3929 3.1424* -2.2811* -1.4671 
-14 7632.6943 1.6604@ -1.2620 -0.3776 
-13 1677.7491 0.3650 -1.63 54@ -1.7867@ 
-12 8726.9683 1.8984@ -0.3637 -0.9679 
-11 16378.2559 3.5629* -0.1489 -0.1786 
-10 -1637.6071 -0.3562 -0.5381 -0.5004 
-9 -4143.8263 -0.9014 -1.0766 -0.3537 
-8 1950.3244 0.4243 0.3827 0.9337 
-7 -448.5797 -0.0976 1.5398 1.6320@ 
- 6 -2572.7852 -0.5597 0.2831 0.6403 
-5 13143.7765 2.8593* 1.2623 0.9690 
-4 -1086.4427 -0.2363 -1.3543 -1.2192 
-3 2295.4203 0.4993 -0.7105 0.1797 
-2 -3210.7578 -0.6985 -2.2157* -1.2454 
-1 6484.0505 1.4105 0.2298 0.6073 
0 658.6395 0.1433 -0.0884 0.2104 
1 9255.6121 2.0134* 0.6605 0.9292 
2 -2293.0728 -0.4988 -0.8080 -0.5311 
3 -4523.9222 -0.9841 -0.4338 -0.9360 
4 11212.0641 2.4390* -0.0462 0.1388 
5 5349.0094 1.1636 0.9099 1.1919 
6 4857.5984 1.0567 0.0069 0.5869 
7 -493.4701 -0.1074 -1.0321 -0.4151 
8 -7077.3742 -1.5396 -1.5728 -1.3852 
9 747.5573 0.1626 0.1844 0.3253 
10 7365.1463 1.6022 0.6599 1.2010 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 73 firm-events 
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Table 103 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted spread: Earnings signal, Sole 
earnings sample 
MEAN-ADJ. 
DAY SPREAD1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 -0.0069 -0.1234 -1.4666 0.1931 
-14 -0.0012 -0.0221 -0.0890 0.0605 
-13 -0.0552 -0.9843 -0.5761 -0.7647 
-12 0.0158 0.2817 -0.8976 0.1911 
-11 -0.0240 -0.4272 -0.1828 -0.8977 
-10 -0.1291 -2.3010* -1.5756 -2.3961* 
-9 -0.0325 -0.5792 -0.9204 -0.6327 
-8 0.0414 0.7375 -0.1809 0.4131 
-7 0.0357 0.6362 1.1042 -0.0786 
-6 -0.0495 -0.8830 0.2699 -0.7251 
-5 -0.0353 -0.6298 -0.5085 -0.6371 
-4 -0.0666 -1.1869 -0.7762 -1.0463 
-3 -0.0311 -0.5539 1.2875 -0.5521 
-2 0.0130 0.2311 -0.9028 0.3127 
-1 0.0769 1.3705 -0.7815 1.1180 
0 0.1607 2.8645* 1.1084 1.9630* 
1 -0.0140 -0.2500 2.2434* -0.2037 
2 -0.0439 -0.7817 -0.7415 -0.6529 
3 -0.1149 -2.0478* -0.5391 -2.0153* 
4 -0.0211 -0.3766 -1.4039 -0.2845 
5 0.0158 0.2817 0.8477 0.2345 
6 -0.0524 -0.9337 -1.5774 -0.9864 
7 -0.0126 -0.2247 -1.2710 -0.2618 
8 -0.0140 -0.2500 -0.9603 -0.4021 
9 -0.0268 -0.4779 0.5448 -0.4001 
10 0.0641 1.1427 1.4032 0.9774 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted spread: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted spread. The expected spread for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
spread 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
spread 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted spread 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 44 firm-events 
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Table 104 
Behavior of daily mean-adjusted volume:: Earnings signal Sole 
earnings sample 
DAY 
ME AN - AD J. 
VOLUME1 t-STATS.2 t-STATS.3 t-STATS.4 
-15 11756.0615 0.3579 -1.2132 -1.0167 
-14 14003.5388 0.4264 0.7126 0.8732 
-13 -10898.5521 -0.3318 -0.8964 -0.6159 
-12 -3831.8249 -0.1167 0.0447 0.3337 
-11 12840.7888 0.3910 -1.3181 -0.4460 
-10 -52978.4385 -1.6130 -1.3609 -1.8852@ 
-9 -44104.0294 -1.3428 -1.2004 -1.1149 
-8 -12339.4158 -0.3757 -0.4910 0.0873 
-7 10532.0161 0.3207 -0.9484 -1.2989 
-6 -36077.1658 -1.0984 -1.7878@ -1.0448 
-5 -23043.7340 -0.7016 -1.3100 -0.6113 
-4 -24451.2567 -0.7444 -0.6253 -0.8077 
-3 -50128.5067 -1.5262 0.9412 0.2183 
-2 12919.1524 0.3933 0.8783 1.6498@ 
-1 114556.7433 3.4878* 1.8139® 1.7153® 
0 67860.5161 2.0661* 1.1712 1.1679 
1 19635.1979 0.5978 -0.8991 -0.8280 
2 -10608.5749 -0.3230 1.4208 1.1352 
3 -42175.8703 -1.2841 -0.0990 -0.9902 
4 -27294.0067 -0.8310 -0.7933 -0.4974 
5 -11951.8021 -0.3639 -0.5100 -0.6331 
6 -24559.1885 -0.7477 0.0658 -0.9325 
7 -9898.0294 -0.3014 -0.6784 -0.9761 
8 -28126.3249 -0.8563 0.3930 -0.7344 
9 -8301.6885 -0.2528 0.1411 -0.0733 
10 -10486.0521 -0.3193 -0.5757 -0.7298 
NOTES: 
1. The mean-adjusted volume: Daily cross-sectional mean of the 
mean-adjusted volume. The expected volume for each-firm 
event is the estimation period mean. 
2. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
3. Brown and Warner test-statistic for the mean-adjusted log 
volume 
4. Corrado's Rank test-statistic for the mean-adjusted 
volume 
5. * = significant at p < 0.05, 2 tailed 
@ = significant at p < 0.10, 2 tailed 
6. Sample size: 44 firm-events 
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Explanations for Tables 105 to 110 
1. The following cross-sectional regression is run on the 
cumulative standardized abnormal spread and log-spread: 
CSU2i - C0 + cx (INFOl i) + c2 (INFO2i) + c3 (QS1) + c4 (INFOl * QS1) 
+ C5 {INF02*QSi) + C6 ( UEd) + C7 (LAGi) + c8 {MM^ 
+ c9 (INS ID i) + c10 {INST.) + cn {QS^INSTJ + c12 {DAY^ 
+c14(D2i) +c15(D3i) + <^(1^) + y i 
where, 
i = 1.N firm-events; 
INFOl - = '1', for low differential information environment 
and '0' otherwise; 
INF02i = ' 1', for medium differential information environment 
and 'O' otherwise; 
QS^ = the quality score of the firm; 
UE^ = the unexpected earnings of the firm in that quarter; 
LAG^ = ' 1 ', if the earnings or dividend announcement is 
delayed and, '0 ’ , otherwise i.e. if it is timely or 
early; 
MMi = the average number of market makers dealing in the 
security in the estimation period; 
INSIDi = the fraction of insider share holding; 
INSTi = the fraction of institutional share holding; 
DAYl- = ' 1 ' , if the announcement is made on Friday and 
' O' otherwise; 
D1. = ' 1 ', if it is a joint announcement and ' 0 ' 
otherwise; 
D21- = ' 1 ' , if it is a sole earnings announcement and 
'0 ' otherwise; 
D3i = ' 1 ', if it is a dividend announcement subsequent 
to a earnings announcement and ' 0 ' otherwise. 
VTj = ' 1 ' if the variability of returns explained by 
lagged returns is greater than the median R2, and is 
' 0 ' otherwise. 
CSU2. = the cumulative standardized abnormal spread (or, log 
spread). This is calculated as follows: 
CSU2i 
+ 10 
E sui.* ...{!) 
301 
where: 
sui.d - Ulid/S(Ud) ...(2) 
u 'i.d - Siid-B{S±id) ...(3) 
£(Ud) * < E (Ul.t-Ui)2/l25) ...(4) 
t—147 
-21 
ui~ Y, /126 • • • (5) 
t—147 
2. The F-statistic has (16,209) degrees of freedom. 
3. The cross-sectional regressions are run for all possible 
combinations of the differential information variable and the 
quality of earnings variable: 
DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION QUALITY OF EARNINGS 
1. Analysts' Following 
2. Analysts' Following 
3. Firm Size 
4. Firm Size 
Earnings Noise Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Predictability Score 
Earnings Noise Score 
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Table 105 
Cross-sectional means of CSt^. 
Analysts' following x Earnings noise score 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL SPREAD 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 TOTAL 
-3.12 
(74) 
-1.77 
(80) 
1.42 
(72) 
-2.60 0.09 -4.14 -5.72 
TOTAL (38) (146) (35) (7) 
1 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
-4.94 
(13) 
1.47 
(35) 
-9.37 
(19) 
-5.72 
(7) 
-2.34 -1.58 -2.60 0.00 
2 (14) (61) (5) (0) 
-0.17 1.15 4.20 0.00 
3 (id (50) (ID (0) 
MEAN cumulative standardized abnormal log spread 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
EARNINGS NOISE SCORE 
4 5 6 7 
0.69 0.81 -10.69 -5.16 
1 (13) (35) (19) (7) 
-3.99 -2.18 i • 00
 
o
 
0.00 
2 (14) (61) (5) (0) 
0.02 0.03 -1.05 0.00 
3 (11) (50) (ID (0) 
TOTAL 
-2.73 
(74) 
-2.66 
(80) 
-0.14 
(72) 
TOTAL 
-1.23 
(38) 
-0.71 
(146) 
-6.82 
(35) 
-5.16 
(7) 
Table 106 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread: Analysts' following X Earnings noise 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statis 
CONSTANT cO -5.36 16.54 -0.32 
INF01i- cl 8.40 14.32 0.59 
INF02i c2 -4.26 18.69 -0.23 
QE, c3 0.29 3.17 0.09 
INF01i*QEi c4 -2.41 2.79 -0.86 
INF02i*QEi- c5 0.34 3.74 0.09 
UE- c6 73.37 35.21 2.08* 
LAGi c7 3.32 1.63 2.04* 
MMi c8 -0.07 0.16 -0.40 
INSID- c9 6.03 4.51 1.33 
INST- clO 9.13 34.09 0.26 
INST-*QE. ell -0.73 6.42 -0.11 
DAYi cl2 3.43 1.86 1.84@ 
Dli cl3 -2.41 2.79 -0.86 
D2i Cl4 0.20 2.35 0.08 
D3i cl5 0.07 1.86 0.04 
VTi cl6 1.36 1.55 0.88 
R-square: 9.93 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Table 107 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread: Analysts' following X Earnings noise 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev. : t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT cO -2.22 15.81 -0.14 
INFOl. cl 16.24 13.69 1.18 
INF021- c2 -11.59 17.86 -0.65 
QE,- c3 -0.75 3.02 -0.24 
INFOl/QE. c4 -3.49 2.67 -1.31 
INF02i*QEi c5 2.01 3.57 0.56 
UEi c6 70.32 33.64 2.08* 
LAGi c7 4.39 1.56 2.82* 
MMi- c8 -0.03 0.15 -0.17 
INSID^ c9 3.74 4.31 0.87 
INSTi clO 21.47 32.58 0.66 
INST1-*QE1- ell -3.27 6.14 -0.53 
DAYi cl2 3.28 1.78 1.84@ 
Dli cl3 -1.17 2.31 -0.51 
D2i cl4 2.10 2.25 0.93 
D3i cl5 -0.13 1.78 -0.07 
VTi cl6 1.07 1.48 0.72 
R-square: 12.37 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.84 (Signf 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. „ _ 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Table 108 
Cross-sectional means of CSU2i 
Analysts' following x Earnings predictability 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL SPREAD 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCOPF. 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
1 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
-3.21 
(14) 
-8.47 
(11) 
-1.97 
(10) 
-1.87 
(39) 
-3.12 
(74) 
2 
-1.38 
(34) 
-1.54 
(11) 
-1.53 
(14) 
-2.70 
(21) 
-1.77 
(80) 
3 
1.35 
(33) 
-2.74 
(10) 
-3.12 
(1) 
3.15 
(28) 
1.42 
(72) 
-0*58 -4.30 -1.77 -0.47 
T0TAL (81) (32) (25) (88) 
MEAN CUMULATIVE STANDARDIZED ABNORMAL LOG SPREAD 
EARNINGS PREDICTABILITY SCORE 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
1 
ANALYSTS' 
FOLLOWING 
0.92 
(14) 
-10.53 
(11) 
-3.68 
(10) 
-1.59 
(39) 
-2.73 
(74) 
2 
-2.23 
(34) 
-0.48 
(11) 
-5.93 
(14) 
-2.32 
(21) 
-2.66 
(80) 
3 
0.26 
(33) 
-4.98 
(10) 
-1.84 
(1) 
1.19 
(28) 
-0.14 
(72) 
TOTAL 
-0.67 
(81) 
-5.34 
(32) 
-4.87 
(25) 
-0.88 
(88) 
306 
Table 109 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
abnormal spread: Analysts' following X Earnings predictability 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev. : t-Statistics: 
CONSTANT cO -6.80 5.50 -1.23 
INFOl,. cl 5.62 4.94 -1.13 
INF02i c2 -1.94 4.06 -0.48 
QE. c3 1.50 1.80 0.83 
INFOl. *QE- ^ i c4 0.48 1.61 0.30 
INF02 - *QE- i i c5 -0.36 1.49 -0.24 
UE- c6 76.95 35.12 2.19* 
LAGi cl 2.68 1.63 1.65® 
MM. c8 -0.04 0.16 -0.25 
INSID. c9 6.05 4.27 1.42 
INST,- clO 12.87 9.56 1.34 
INST- *QE- i i ell -3.15 3.12 -1.01 
DAY,. cl2 3.25 1.85 1.75@ 
Dli cl3 -3.75 2.38 -1.57 
D2i cl4 -0.82 2.39 -0.34 
D3i cl5 0.08 1.87 0.04 
VTi cl6 1.55 1.59 0.98 
R-square: 9.87 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.43 (N 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Table 110 
Results of cross-sectional test on cumulative standardized 
abnormal log' spread: Analysts7 following X Earnings 
predictability 
Variable: Coefficient: Stnd. Dev.: t-Statist 
CONSTANT cO -9.79 5.36 -1.820 
INFOl,. cl -0.30 4.82 -0.06 
INF02. c2 -0.26 3.96 -0.07 
QEf c3 1.89 1.75 1.08 
INFOl-*QE. i i c4 -0.62 1.57 -0.40 
INF02 - *QE. i i c5 -0.67 1.45 -0.45 
UE- c6 73.20 34.23 2.13* 
LAG,- c7 3.59 1.58 2.26* 
MM,- c8 -0.01 0.16 -0.03 
INS ID,. c9 4.55 4.16 1.09 
INST,. clO 16.00 9.32 1.720 
INST,. *QE,. cl 1 -4.23 3.04 -1.41 
DAY,. cl2 2.91 1.81 1.61 
Dli cl3 -3.41 2.32 -1.46 
D2i cl4 0.40 2.33 0.17 
D3i cl5 -0.11 1.82 -0.06 
VTi cl6 1.03 1.55 0.67 
R-square: 8.80 % F-statistics (zero slopes)2: 1.26 (N.S.) 
* = significant at p < 0.05 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
@ = significant at p < 0.10 levels with 209 degrees of 
freedom. 
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